The implementation of control mechanisms in European multinationals : a comparison of British and German subsidiaries in Venezuela by Márquez, Lud
University of Warwick institutional repository: http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the University of Warwick
http://go.warwick.ac.uk/wrap/2603
This thesis is made available online and is protected by original copyright.
Please scroll down to view the document itself.
Please refer to the repository record for this item for information to help you to
cite it. Our policy information is available from the repository home page.
ük 
The Implementation of Control Mechanisms 
in European Multinationals: 
A Comparison of British and German 
Subsidiaries in Venezuela 
By 
Lud Marquez M. 
Thesis submitted for the fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Industrial and 
Business Studies 
University of Warwick, Warwick Business School 
January, 2005 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES ............. 
LIST OF FIGURES ......................... 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
DECLARATION 
.................................................................. 
8 
...................................................... 9 
................................................................... 10 
............................... 12 
SUMMARY ....................................................................................................... 13 
ABREVIATIONS .............................................................................................. 
15 
INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 
16 
RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY ........................................................................... 
17 
THE ARGUMENT AND APPROACH OF THE THESIS ............................................ 
20 
OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS ............................................................................... 
23 
CHAPTER 1: THE MNC SUBSIDIARIES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT... 24 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
.............................................................. I........................... 
24 
1.2 THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF BUSINESS FIRMS .................................... 
25 
1.3 THE MANAGEMENT OF MNC SUBSIDIARIES ............................................. 
32 
1.3.1 The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship Stream of Research...... 33 
1.3.2 The Subsidiary Role Stream of Research .......................................... 
36 
1.3.3 The Subsidiary Development Research Stream ................................ 40 
1.4 CONTROL MECHANISMS IN MNC SUBSIDIARIES ....................................... 43 
1.5 THE EXISTENCE OF CONTROL MECHANISMS IN ORGANISATIONS .............. 
53 
1.6 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF CONTROL MECHANISMS 
IN MNCS ......................................................................................................... 60 
1.7 CONCLUSIONS 
........................................................................................... 
68 
CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ................................................ 71 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
......................................................................................... 
71 
2.2 PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION 
......................................................................... 
71 
2.3 THEORY GENERATION FROM THE CASE STUDY METHOD .......................... 
76 
2.4 THE FRAMEWORK DESIGN 
......................................................................... 
80 
N 
2 
2.5 THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
............................................................................ 
82 
2.5.1 The Preliminary Design 
.................................................................... 
82 
2.5.1.1 Selection of the Country of Origin of the MNC subsidiaries..... 84 
2.5.1.2 Selection of the Country of Operations ...................................... 85 
2.5.1.3 Selection of the Industries .......................................................... 86 
2.5.1.4 Selection of the MNC subsidiaries ............................................. 88 
2.5.2 Fieldwork: Collecting the Data ......................................................... 90 
2.5.3 Data Analysis .................................................................................... 94 
2.6 CONCLUSIONS 
........................................................................................... 
98 
CHAPTER 3: THE INFLUENCE OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND 
THE COUNTRY OF OPERATION ON MNC SUBSIDIARIES ................... 100 
3.1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 100 
3.2 COUNTRY LEVEL OF ANALYSIS ............................................................... 
101 
3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ON THE OPERATIONS OF 
MNCs ........................................................................................................... 106 
3.4 THE INFLUENCE OF THE COUNTRY OF OPERATIONS ON MNC SUBSIDIARIES 
...................................................................................................................... 112 
3.5 COUNTRY OF ORIGIN EFFECT ON GERMAN AND BRITISH MNCs .............. 
116 
3.5.1 Main Features of the German Model and their Effect on Local Firms 
.................................................................................................................. 117 
3.5.1.1 The Internationalisation of German Firms ............................... 124 
3.5.1.2 The Presence of Control Mechanisms in German MNCs ........ 128 
3.5.2 Alain Features of the British Model and their Effect on Local Firms 
.................................................................................................................. 134 
3.5.2.1 The Internationalisation of British Firms ................................. 139 
3.5.2.2 The Presence of Control Mechanisms in British MNCs.......... 142 
3.6 THE CHARACTERISTICS OF VENEZUELAN INSTITUTIONS AND THEIR 
INFLUENCE ON LOCAL FIRMS 
....................................................................... 
146 
3.7 CONCLUSIONS 
......................................................................................... 
158 
CHAPTER 4: THE OILFIELD SERVICE AND BUSINESS SOFTWARE 
INDUSTRIES ................................................................................................... 161 
3 
4.1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 161 
4.2 THE OILFIELD SERVICE INDUSTRY IN VENEZUELA .................................. 
163 
4.2.1 The Evolution of the Oil Industry .................................................... 163 
4.2.2 The Forces of Change in the Oil Industry ....................................... 166 
4.2.3 The Oil Industry in Venezuela ......................................................... 171 
4.3 THE BUSINESS SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN VENEZUELA ............................. 
174 
4.3.1 The forces of Competition in the Business Software Industry ........ 175 
4.3.2 The Trends in the Business Software Industry and their Effect on the 
Industry in Venezuela 
...... 179 
4.4 CONCLUSIONS 
......................................................................................... 
182 
CHAPTER 5: THE OIL MNC SUBSIDIARIES: PREUSSAG ENERGIE 
VENEZUELA AND LASMO VENEZUELA ................................................. 186 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
...... .. 186 
5.2. PREUSSAG AG ........................................................................................ 187 
5.2.1 THE PREUSSAG OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
............................................. 
190 
5.2.2. Preussag Energie ........................................................................... 191 
5.3 PREUSSAG ENERGIE VENEZUELA (PEV) ................................................. 193 
5.3.1 Preussag Energie Venezuela market positioning ............................ 195 
5.3.2 The Evolution of Preussag Energie Venezuela and the Development 
of its Capabilities ..................................................................................... 
196 
5.4 OUTPUT CONTROLS IN PREUSSAG ENERGIE VENEZUELA ........................ 
201 
5.5. BUREAUCRATIC FORMALISED CONTROL MECHANISMS IN PREUSSAG 
ENERGIE VENEZUELA 
.................................................................................... 
204 
5.6 HR PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN PREUSSAG ENERGIE VENEZUELA......... 206 
5.7 EXPATRIATE MANAGERS AND PERSONAL CONTROL IN PREUSSAG ENERGIE 
VENEZUELA 
.................................................................................................. 
209 
5.8 CONTROL THROUGH SOCIALISATION AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN 
PREUSSAG ENERGIE VENEZUELA 
.................................................................. 
212 
5.9 LASMO 
.................................................................................................. 
214 
5.9.1 Lasmo Ownership Structure 
............................................................ 217 
5.10 LASMO VENEZUELA 
.............................................................................. 219 
5.10.1 Lasmo Venezuela Market Positioning 
........................................... 221 
4 
5.10.2 Evolution of Lasmo Venezuela and Development of Capabilities 222 
5.11 OUTPUT CONTROLS IN LASMO VENEZUELA .......................................... 
225 
5.12 BUREAUCRATIC FORMALISED CONTROL MECHANISMS IN LASMO 
VENEZUELA 
.................................................................................................. 
227 
5.13 HR PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN LASMO VENEZUELA ........................... 
228 
5.14 EXPATRIATE MANAGERS AND PERSONAL CONTROL IN LASMO 
VENEZUELA 
.................................................................................................. 
231 
5.15 CONTROL THROUGH SOCIALISATION AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN 
LASMO VENEZUELA 
...................................................................................... 
236 
5.16 CONCLUSIONS 
....................................................................................... 
239 
CHAPTER 6: THE BUSINESS SOFTWARE MNC SUBSIDIARIES: SAP 
FOR THE ANDEAN REGION AND THE CARIBBEAN AND BAAN 
VENEZUELA .................................................................................................. 242 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
....................................................................................... 242 
6.2. SAP AG 
................................................................................................. 
242 
6.2.1. The Internationalisation Process of SAP AG ................................. 244 
6.2.2 SAP AG Ownership Structure ......................................................... 249 
6.3 SAP FOR THE ANDEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION ............................. 
251 
6.3.1. Market Positioning of the SAP Subsidiary for the Andean and the 
Caribbean region ..................................................................................... 254 
6.3.2. Subsidiary Evolution and the Development of Capabilities .......... 255 
6.4 OUTPUT CONTROL MECHANISMS IN SAP ANDEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN 
........................................................................... 25 9 
6.5 BUREAUCRATIC FORMALISED CONTROL MECHANISMS IN SAP ANDEAN 
AND THE CARIBBEAN .................................................................................... 
262 
6.6 HR PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN SAP ANDEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN .... 
263 
6.7 EXPATRIATE MANAGERS AS A PERSONAL CENTRALISED CONTROL 
MECHANISM IN SAP ANDEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN .................................... 
268 
6.8 CONTROLS THROUGH SOCIALISATION AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN 
SAP ANDEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN ............................................................. 
271 
6.9 BAAN COMPANY 
..................................................................................... 274 
6.9.1 The Internationalisation Process of Baan ....................................... 275 
5 
6.9.2 The Ownership Structure of Baan 281 
6.9.2.1 Invensys Acquisition of Baan .................................................. 282 
6.10 BAAN VENEZUELA ................................................................................ 
284 
6.10.1 Baan Venezuela Subsidiary: its Market Position and its Evolution 
.................................................................................................................. 
285 
6.11 OUTPUT CONTROL MECHANISMS IN ExBAANVE .................................. 
288 
6.12 BUREAUCRATIC FORMALISED CONTROL MECHANISMS IN ExBAANVE 290 
6.13 HR PRACTICES AND POLICIES IN ExBAANVE ....................................... 
291 
6.14 EXPATRIATES AS A PERSONAL CENTRALISED CONTROL MECHANISM IN 
ExBAANVE ................................................................................................... 
291 
6.15 CONTROL THROUGH SOCIALISATION AND NETWORK DEVELOPMENT IN 
ExBAANVE 
................................................................................................... 
292 
6.16 CONCLUSIONS 
....................................................................................... 
294 
CHAPTER 7: THE ORIGIN OF CONTROL MECHANISMS IN MNCS A 
COMPARISON ACROSS COUNTRIES ........................................................ 
296 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
........................................................................................ 
296 
7.2.1 The German MNCs and their Subsidiaries ..................................... 
297 
7.2.2 The British MNCs and their Subsidiaries ....................................... 
302 
7.3 CONTROL MECHANISMS IN MNC SUBSIDIARIES ..................................... 
305 
7.3.1 The Comparison of the Output Controls in the MNC Subsidiaries. 305 
7.3.1.1 The German MNCs: The cases of SAP AG and Preussag AG 306 
7.3.1.2 The British MNCs: Lasmo and Baan ....................................... 311 
7.3.2 Comparison of Standardisation as a Bureaucratic Formalised 
Control Mechanism .................................................................................. 314 
7.3.2.1 The standardisation in the German Subsidiaries ...................... 314 
7.3.2.2 The Standardisation in the British Subsidiaries ....................... 317 
7.3.3 Comparison of the HR Practices and Policies in the MNC 
Subsidiaries.... 
.. 318 
7.3.4 The Presence of Expatriate Managers as a Personal Centralised 
Control Mechanism .................................................................................. 324 
7.3.4.1 The Presence of Expatriates in the Oilfield MNC Subsidiaries 
.............................................................................................................. 324 
6 
7.3.4.2 The Presence of Expatriates in the Business Software MNC 
Subsidiaries .......................................................................................... 329 
7.3.5 Comparison of Control through Socialisation and Network 
Development in the AMC subsidiaries ..................................................... 
331 
7.3.5.1 Subtle Controls in the German Subsidiaries ............................ 331 
7.3.5.2 Subtle Controls in the British Subsidiaries .............................. 
333 
7.4 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 
334 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS ... 338 
8.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 33 8 
8.2 THE EFFECT OF THE COUNTRY OF OPERATIONS ...................................... 
341 
8.3 THE EFFECT OF THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN ............................................... 344 
8.4 THE PRESENCE OF CONTROL MECHANISMS IN THE MNC SUBSIDIARIES. 350 
8.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
..................................................................................................... 
3 51 
REFERENCES LIST ....................................................................................... 355 
7 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1 Typologies of Subsidiary Roles ..................................... 37 
Table 1.2 Five Types of Subsidiary Evolution Processes .................... . 42 
Table 1.3 Classification of Control Mechanisms in Two Dimensions ...... . 48 
Table 1.4 The Four Streams on the Explanation of Control 
Mechanisms in MNCs ................................................................. . 57 
Table 2.1 Stages to Build Theory from Case Study Research ........................ 78 
Table 2.2 Description of the Case Studies of the Research .................... . 
89 
Table 2.3 Topics covered in the interviews ......................................... 91 
Table 2.4 Distribution and Number of Interviews ............................... 92 
Table 3.1 Main Characteristics of German firms according to the Influence 
of Social Institutions ......................................................................................... 124 
Table 3.2 Presence of Control Mechanisms in German MNCs ................ 133 
Table 3.3 Main Characteristics of British Firms According to the Influence 
of Social Institutions ................................................................. 139 
Table 3.4 Presence of Control Mechanisms in British MNCs .................. 145 
Table 3.5 Main Characteristics of Venezuelan Firms according to the Influence 
of the Main Institutions ......................................................... 157 
Table 3.6 Main Characteristics of German and British MNCs ................ 159 
Table 4.1 Main Characteristics of the Oilfield Service and Business Software 
Industries .............................................................................. 182 
Table 4.2 Main Strategies of Firms in the Oilfield Service and Business 
Software Industries ... ............................................................. 183 
Table 5.1 Summary of Control Mechanisms in PEV ........................... 213 
Table 5.2 Summary of the Control Mechanisms in Lasmo Venezuela ...... 238 
Table 6.1 Summary of Control Mechanisms in SAC .......................... 273 
Table 6.2 Summary of the Control Mechanisms in exBaanVe ............... 293 
Table 7.1 The Main Features of the German MNC Case Studies ............. 298 
Table 7.2 The Main Features of the German MNC Subsidiaries .............. 299 
Table 7.3 The Main Features of the British MNC Case Studies ............... 302 
Table 7.4 The Main Features of the British MNC Subsidiaries ............... 303 
8 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework of the Configuration of Control 
Mechanisms in NC Subsidiary .......................................................... 62 
Figure 2.1 Sample Design of the Research .................................... . 84 
Figure 2.2 The Iterative process of Deductive and Inductive Analysis 
in Case Study Research ................................................................. 95 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of the Oil Prices during the Period 1972-2001 ......... 170 
Figure 4.2 Market Shares of the ES Leading Vendors in 2001 ................ 176 
Figure 5.1 The turnover of Preussag by regions in 1997/1998 
(in DM millions) .................................................................... 187 
Figure 5.2 Group Turnover by Regions 2001 (£ millions) ....................... 189 
Figure 5.3 PEV Organisational Chart in 2002 ................................... 200 
Figure 5.4 Lasmo Organisational Chart in 2001 ............................... 223 
Figure 5.5 Lasmo Venezuela workforce localisation plan ................... 233 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of SAP AG Workforce by Regions ............ 243 
Figure 6.2 SAP AG Revenues 1996-2001 (in £ millions) .................. 245 
Figure 6.3 Shareholder Structure of SAP AG Free Float Shares (2003) ... 249 
Figure 6.4 Organisational Chart for SAP Andean and the Caribbean 
Region (2001) ......................................................................... 258 
Figure 6.5 Baan Net Revenues by Geographic Regions (in $ thousands) .... 274 
Figure 6.6 Baan Operative Revenues/ Net Income 1994-1999 ............... 279 
Figure 6.7Distribution of Invensys Workforce by Regions 
(per cent) ............................................................................... 283 
Figure 6.8 The Divisions of Invensys .............................................. 283 
Figure 6.9 ExBaanVe Organisational Chart ....................................... 287 
9 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I wish to thank my supervisor, Glenn Morgan, for his invaluable orientation, 
dedication and patience. My most precious learning from the PhD came from 
his effort to help me on this journey. I also wish to thank my second supervisor, 
Diana Sharpe, for her guidance the first years of the PhD and later. She was 
extremely helpful in providing valuable comments and advice. 
At the Instituto de Estudios Superiores de Administraciön (IESA), Ramon 
Pinango and Ana Maria Leizaola were especially helpful. I am most grateful to 
Elena Granell, who encouraged me to start my PhD and has served as mentor 
during my academic career. Oswaldo Lorenzo provided help during the 
different stages of this project. Jose Ramon Padilla made possible the case 
sample. Lastly, I thank my friends who supported me during the difficult times 
in these five years: Rafael Lorenzo, Miriam Quintana, Stephane Laurent, 
Andres Hatum, Izumi Kubo, Fernands Galindo, Anna Marino, Adriana Aguilar, 
Alfonso Miranda and Cristina Lucas. 
At Warwick my thanks to the PhD staff, particularly Jan Woodley, for her 
willingness to help me and orient me. Finally, to Lesley Inness and Clemencia 
Rodas who made things smooth in these years. 
At the companies that participated in the study, my thanks to the managers and 
staff who made time available and responded the questions. I am grateful to the 
rest of people who in some way helped me to make this dissertation possible. 
10 
My parents and my brother provided generous support and encouragement for 
my professional development. Thanks also to Pavel, my partner, for his 
companion, love and support during these five years. Finally, as yet unborn 
Federico who has been with me in the final months. To all them, I dedicate this 
thesis. 
11 
DECLARATION 
None of the materials contained in this thesis has been submitted for publication 
prior to the start of the candidature for the Doctoral Degree. However, some of 
the work in the thesis has been published or submitted for the publication in 
refereed international conferences prior to the completion of the thesis. 
12 
SUMMARY 
In organizational theory, there is increased concern over how a particular 
context affects the operations of firms, especially in multinational 
organizations. As these firms operate in different contexts, there is growing 
interest in learning how social institutions from these contexts may influence 
the operations of these firms. MNC subsidiaries, principally, have attracted the 
attention of academics because they move in different spaces that are 
interrelated (e. g., country of origin, industry and country of operations), which 
may have different institutional settings. The implementation of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries represents an organizational area that is 
significantly influenced by these forces. 
This thesis develops a theoretical framework to explain the presence of control 
devices in MNC subsidiaries. The framework encompasses different levels of 
analysis: country of origin, country of operations, industry and the organization 
itself. The aim is to explain the presence of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries by examining features that might affect the implementation of these 
devices. The framework places particular emphasis on two areas. First, 
understanding the effect of institutions based in the country of origin on the 
implementation of control mechanisms in MNCs. And second, appreciating the 
effect of institutions in the country of operations on the implementation of these 
devices in subsidiaries. 
13 
To examine these issues the research has built on MNC theory and 
institutionalist theory. The scope of the research is limited to four case studies: 
two from Britain and two from Germany. The research design is of comparative 
nature and the comparison is across countries and industries. The industries 
selected are oilfield services and business software. Venezuela, the country of 
operations presents a context with dissimilar characteristics when is compared 
either to Germany or Britain, in light of its fragmented institutional system. 
The findings of the research have contributed to share more light into how the 
country of origin and country of operations impact the management of MNC 
subsidiaries. The research has shown the dynamic nature of institutional 
systems, and how this dynamism affects the implementation of control 
mechanisms. It also has demonstrated the effect of unstable environments on 
the operations of MNC subsidiaries and on the implementation of control 
devices. 
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Introduction 
In the development of MNC theory, there is a particular interest in the study of 
how multinationals (MNCs) evolve and in the identification of the forces that 
intervene in their configuration. The increasing globalisation of the world 
economy has a common element, which is the MNCs. UNCTAD (UNCTAD 
1996) estimates that there are around 39,000 parent-company MNCs controlling 
265,000 foreign affiliates. According to its estimates, they also account for 
around two-thirds of world exports of goods and services. This increasing 
power of MNCs in the trade of goods and services has attracted the attention of 
academic scholars who are looking at MNCs as distinctive organisational 
forms, which are exposed to different environments. The focus of this research 
is the study of MNC subsidiaries and the implementation of control 
mechanisms in them. The interest of many scholars has focused on the 
application of organisational theory to the area of international business by 
emphasizing the importance of institutional contexts in the development and 
management of these firms. Following this line of enquiry, one aim of this 
thesis is to enhance understanding of what factors influence the implementation 
of control devices in MNC subsidiaries, considering the context in which they 
are embedded. A second aim is to shed some light on how these factors 
influence the implementation of these devices in such firms. 
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This thesis looks at the implementation of these devices in two British and two 
German MNC subsidiaries in Venezuela. They have operations in two 
industries: oilfield services and business software. A cross-case comparison of 
four MNC subsidiaries (SAP subsidiary for the Andean and the Caribbean, 
exBaan Ve, Preussag Venezuela and Lasmo Venezuela), based on extensive 
fieldwork, is the empirical ground for the research. 
Rationale for the Study 
There is an academic interest in the effect of national institutions on the 
operations of MNCs. Extensive research has been carried out into the effect of 
social institutions in the shape adopted by local firms. The research has had a 
major focus on European institutions to explain the differences found in firms 
from a variety of European origins. However, it has been acknowledged that the 
internationalisation of firms exposes them to environments with other 
institutional arrangements, which may differ from the original one. In this 
context, this study attempts to answer questions concerning the implications for 
the operations of MNC subsidiaries of operating in a different context. In order 
to do so, the research focus is the form adopted by control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries and how contexts (country of origin and country of operations and 
sector) affect the implementation of these devices. 
The study of control mechanisms in MNCs is a subject in which academic 
researchers have shown substantial interest. However, it has followed an 
evolutionary process in its study, which has changed the underlying 
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assumptions concerning the nature of the MNC subsidiaries. An initial view of 
a hierarchical relationship between the corporate offices and the subsidiary has 
moved to an increasing understanding of the power of the subsidiary to accept 
or reject impositions from the corporate offices. Different research approaches 
such as the contingency approach have been developed, which defends the idea 
that there are particular circumstances of the environment and specific 
organisation dynamics that explain the selection of control mechanisms. 
Another research approach has been to consider an evolutionary process in the 
adoption of control mechanisms in MNCs. The increasing demands of 
globalisation have created demands on firms to develop more complex devices 
to manage their operations. Finally, the institutionalist stream of thought 
defends the idea that the existence of these devices is explained by the origins 
of the firm. This stream of research has identified some patterns of control 
mechanisms implemented in the MNC subsidiaries according to the country of 
origin of the firm. 
The institutionalist stream has focused attention on the effect of the country of 
origin of the MNC in the existence of these devices. However, the effect of the 
country of operations of the subsidiary is an area with limited research. It can be 
hypothesized, though, that there is an influence from the country of operations 
on the operations of MNC subsidiaries. This research attempts to fill this gap by 
looking at the effects of the country of origin and the country of operations in 
the implementation of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. 
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A key argument of this thesis is that the configuration of these devices in the 
MNC subsidiaries is determined by a set of forces: national influences (parent 
country and country of operations), sectoral factors, and organisational 
influences (corporate offices and subsidiary). The thesis develops a framework 
which considers different perspectives on the analysis of these devices. This 
framework seen the subsidiary as an entity, which integrates the corporate 
mandate (which is influenced by the country of origin of the MNC), deals with 
the opportunities and constraints of the host environment, and is influenced by 
the industry characteristics, all of this filtered by the strategic choices of its 
managers. All these forces affect the subsidiary development and the presence 
of control devices in the subsidiary, too. 
These considerations have influenced the selection of the case studies. MNCs 
from two countries with distinctive institutional arrangements have been 
chosen: Germany and Britain. This selection supports a comparative analysis of 
the country of origin effect. The selection of the country of operations, which 
also have a distinctive nature, is part of this rationale. The effect of institutions, 
which belong to particularistic contexts such as Venezuela on the operations of 
MNC subsidiaries, has been subject to limited research. The research on the 
effect of the country of operations has concentrated largely on market sizes and 
their volatility and complexity, but it has neglected the effect of institutional 
arrangements in the operations of subsidiaries. The thesis shows the effect that 
context with weak institutional environments has on the operations of MNC 
subsidiaries. 
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The inclusion of the sector of operations in the framework of analysis implies 
the selection of MNC subsidiaries that are operating in the same industry, but 
have different countries of origin. This combination across industries looks to 
identify those forces that are common and do not respond to country of origin 
and country of operations effects and can be more contingent. 
The Argument and Approach of the Thesis 
The thesis has a theoretical basis in institutionalist theory. Shared here is the 
view that social institutions affect the shape of firms. Different institutional 
arrangements affect in a distinctive way the operations of firms, leading to 
distinctive organisational characteristics and firm behaviour. The economic 
coordinating mechanisms, shaped by the institutional arrangements of the 
country, place constraints and opportunities in front of the economic actors 
(Hollingsworth and Boyer R., 1998; Lane 1992; Whitley 1992a). The effect of 
institutions in the operations of firms, particularly the country of origin effect, 
has traditionally been studied from a static position. In other words, it has been 
assumed that institutions do not change, therefore, their effect in organisations 
is the same over time. This thesis takes a more dynamic perspective of the 
nature of institutions and concludes that they are subject to change and 
evolution. This opens the space for more hybrid organisations in which 
practices from the country of origin coexist with other set of practices that may 
have other origins. 
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The exposure of MNC subsidiaries to different environmental forces confronts 
makes them with contrasting demands. On one hand, pressures to be 
incorporated with the rest of the organisation and; on the other hand, to localise 
operations and be integrated with the local context. As a consequence, MNCs 
are facing, at the same time, pressures to adapt to the conditions in the local 
environment but also to achieve consistency with the rest of the firm, sharing 
the patterns of the parent MNC (Quintanilla, 1998; Ferner and Quintanilla, 
1998; Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991). 
These two opposite demands are reflected in the type of practices which are 
implemented in the subsidiary. It is argued that MNCs are becoming hybrid 
organisations, which are neither completely integrated nor fully localised. There 
is a process of adoption of practices, which do not always respond to the origins 
of the firm, but which are framed by these origins. This thesis defends the idea 
that MNCs may take a hybrid form, however, there is still a strong country of 
origin effect that shapes their operations. 
The pressure to localise operations in the country of operations varies according 
to the characteristics of the local institutional context. Some contexts with 
strong and complementary institutions create more pressures to adopt host 
business practices (Whitley, 2005). The firms have strong demands to adapt to 
the local environment in order to survive. It would be expected, considering this 
position, that weak institutional contexts would concede more room for MNC 
subsidiaries to implement their practices. However, the absence of institutions 
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on which the subsidiaries can rely to support their operations, as in Venezuela, 
forces them to develop practices and capabilities which mainly respond to the 
local context and have little strategic value for the MNC. Therefore, the 
hybridisation of the subsidiary occurs, with the adoption of local practices and 
the adaptation of the practices imported from abroad; however, the transfer of 
the practices to other sites of the MNC it is very difficult. 
The risk of environmental determinism in this research may be avoided by 
analysing the development of capabilities in the subsidiary. The resource-based 
approach is the framework that complements the institutionalist stream of 
thought. It emphasises the importance of the internal resources of the firm. 
These resources are not only physical assets, but also comprise capabilities, 
organisational processes, knowledge, and so on (Barney, 1991). Accordingly, a 
definition of the firm in terms of what it is capable of doing may be more 
accurate to understand its development of capabilities. According to this, a 
subsidiary can be studied as an organisational form with some level of 
autonomy with its own stock of particular resources. However, the combination 
of the theoretical frameworks of institutionalism and the resource-based view 
indicates that the selection of resources and the type of capabilities developed in 
the subsidiary are shaped by the characteristics of the social context in which 
the subsidiary is embedded. The implementation of control mechanisms in 
MNC subsidiaries depends in a good measure, on the characteristics of the 
context in which resource decisions and managerial choices are made. 
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Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1 presents a literature review on 
MNC theory, which is the basis for the development of the analytical 
framework of the thesis. It reviews the main literature on the management of 
MNC subsidiaries and defines the typology used in this thesis to analyse the 
control mechanisms in the case studies. Hence, the analytical framework of 
thesis is presented. Chapter 2 discusses the methodological underpinnings, the 
research design and the justification for using a qualitative methodology to 
answer the research questions posed in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 presents the 
framework for analysing the effects of the country of origin and the country of 
operations, and discusses the business environments of Germany, Britain, and 
Venezuela, analysing their effects on the operations of firms from the three 
countries. It also develops ideal combinations of control mechanisms in MNCs 
according to the country of origin of the case studies: Germany and Britain. 
Chapter 4 presents the main characteristics in Venezuela of the two industries 
of operations of the MNC subsidiaries: business software and oilfield services. 
The chapter also presents the evolution and major trends of the two industries. 
In Chapter 5 the cases of the oilfield service industry are presented and the main 
control mechanisms are highlighted. Chapter 6 follows the same structure to 
present the business software subsidiaries. Chapter 7 presents a comparison and 
analysis of the four cases. Finally, Chapter 8 summarises the major research 
findings, their implications, the limitations of the investigation and some 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 1: The MNC Subsidiaries and their Management 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter has two main aims. The first is to address the main debates in the 
literature regarding the nature and management of the MNC subsidiaries and 
the existence of control mechanisms in MNCs. This review helps to understand 
the complexity associated with the study of this type of organisation and the 
implementation of control mechanisms in these units. As a second aim, it 
presents an analytical framework, which integrates a multilevel of analysis, for 
studying the presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. The 
framework seeks to incorporate different perspectives, which complement each 
other, in order to analyse the presence of these devices. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it presents the main debate 
concerning the study of the internationalisation of firms. Secondly, the analysis 
turns to the study of the management of subsidiaries, presenting different 
research streams which are concentrated in the study of these units. Thirdly, this 
section illustrates the reasons for the existence of control mechanisms in MNCs. 
It also presents a review of the different classifications developed to study these 
devices. A fourth section describes different perspectives that explain the 
existence of these mechanisms in MNCs. The next section presents an 
analytical framework for studying the presence of control mechanisms in MNC 
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subsidiaries. Finally, the main points of the chapter are summarized in the 
Conclusions section. 
1.2 The Internationalisation of Business Firms 
One of the most influential organizational forms in the world today is the MNC. 
The emergence of the new information and communication tools derived from 
the Internet era has increased the number of firms which have activities across 
borders and maintain multiple units operating in various environments. 
According to Dicken ( 1999), MNCs have become the primary shapers of the 
contemporary global economy. The massive growth of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) from firms and the increase in the variety of sources and 
destinations, although there is still a large concentration of the FDI in 
developed economies, reflect the powerful role that this organisational form is 
playing in the global economy. 
There has been extensive research into the study of international business and 
multinationals. The studies in this area have been concentrated mostly in two 
distinctive streams: one which looks for patterns to understand the reasons for 
internationalisation, and the other which focuses on the study of MNCs as 
organisational forms. The first approach is grounded in macro-economic theory 
of international trade and micro-economic theory of the firm. Dunning's (1993) 
eclectic paradigm illustrates clearly the focus of this stream. It has become a 
leading conceptual framework to analyse the international expansion of 
organisations, and builds upon the interactions among ownership-specific 
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factors, internalisation incentive advantages and location-specific variables. 
This framework incorporates elements from different levels, and assumes 
variations according to nationality of the firm, sector of operation and intra- 
organizational characteristics. In addition, it also identifies key location 
advantages in foreign countries to understand the international production of 
firms (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). The main contribution of Dunning (1993) 
has been to provide a conceptual structure within specific cases can be 
examined. 
Porter's (1990) "diamond" of competitive advantage is another framework 
developed in accordance with this stream of thought, and has been used 
extensively by managers and policy-makers to understand the role of the 
availability of national resources in international competitiveness. It has its 
basis in the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach to industrial 
organization. This framework analyses the relative efficiencies of producing 
products in different countries. It presents four inter-related factors at the 
industry level, which are the key determinants within a nation of its 
international competitiveness in a specific industry. However, Porter's 
framework has been criticised in two areas. On one hand, it neglects the 
systematic advantages created by MNCs from the common governance of a 
number of value-dispersed activities. On the other, it does not consider the 
benefits that the MNC accrues through the ownership of assets which have been 
created on the basis of the competitive advantages of host countries (Rugman 
and Verbeke, 2001). In other words, this framework does not consider the fact 
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that the internationalisation of a firm supports an organisational learning that is 
internalised by the firm with the development of organisational capabilities. 
These give the possibility to MNCs to compete according to capabilities which 
have been developed during the internationalisation of the firm. 
The other stream of research has its focus on the study of MNCs as an 
organisational form. This stream concentrates its research on the analytical 
challenges of understanding MNCs as organisations. It has its roots in the 
strategy-structure paradigm of Alfred Chandler (1962), who stated that 
organisational structure should follow strategy. There is a set of four stages of 
corporate development. Firstly, the entrepreneurial stage: initial expansion and 
accumulation of resources. Second, the rationalisation of resources: the firm 
develops a functional structure. Third, the expansion stage in which the firm 
diversify into new products and markets. The fourth stage is the adoption of the 
multidivisional form, to ensure the efficient exploitation of the diversified 
resources of the corporation. One of the main assumptions of this approach is 
the evolutionary nature of the MNC form. The internationalisation process of 
the MNC is seen as incremental, and the model presumes that there are changes 
in the organisational structure over time. The studies in this area have identified 
internal selection forces, such as production diversification and geographical 
dispersion, as the main drivers of structural change. 
Further research in the study of MNCs as organisational form has applied the 
Integration-Responsiveness framework (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). It has 
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incorporated together with the internal selection forces mentioned above, the 
environment as other factor that influences the MNC evolution. This new 
framework, in which MNCs features from inside the firms but also from the 
environment affect operations, incorporated additional aspects as explanations 
for the selection of specific organisation designs in MNCs. 
With the incorporation of external factors into the analysis of the MNC form, an 
evolutionary approach was developed, producing different models that 
converged on a distinctive organizational form. For Hedlund (1986) was the 
"heterarchy" model; for Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998), the "transnational" 
organization. Common features of these two models were: a) the high levels of 
integration and localisation that had to coexist together in firms; b) the MNC 
was seen as a firm with multiple centres integrated by cross-unit ties with the 
headquarters; and c) the integration of the different units was achieved by 
means of normative controls, shared experience, and internal variety (Westney 
and Zaheer, 2001). 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998), for instance, developed a typology of three ideal- 
types of organisational structures of MNCs, together with a fourth type, which 
they argued is the ultimate and most advanced form taken by firms. The first is 
the multinational model, according to them the most widespread type. It is 
characterised by a decentralisation of operations to allow the local units to 
respond to national market differences. The main devices of control in these 
firms are achieved through personal relationships between top corporate 
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management and subsidiary managers, simultaneously with the implementation 
of financial controls. The strategic view of the operations of the MNC is a 
portfolio of national businesses. 
The second model is the international organisational model. This structure 
involves more control by the headquarters over the subsidiaries' operations. 
There is an important flow of information, knowledge and expertise from the 
centre to overseas units. While local units are free to adapt the new products 
and strategies to the local environment, they are dependent on the parent 
company for new inflows of these. These companies have developed 
sophisticated management systems that provide regular information to the 
centre, which facilitates control over subsidiary decisions but at the same time 
allows delegation. In this type of MNC, the subsidiaries are appendages of the 
parent operations, whose main objective is to leverage the capabilities and 
resource developed in the home market. 
The third type is the global organisation. This ideal model is recognised by the 
centralisation of assets, resources and responsibilities. The operations abroad 
are used to reach foreign markets in order to create economies of scale. 
Activities in the subsidiaries are usually limited to sales and service: their main 
role is to assemble or sell products and to implement policies and plans 
developed at headquarters. Compared to the other two models, the subsidiaries 
have less freedom in this organisational structure. This implies that local market 
conditions tend to be ignored and the possibility of local learning is low. The 
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subsidiaries are tightly controlled, with centralisation of decisions at the 
corporate level. 
Finally, the last type is the transnational model. This model integrates the 
strengths of the three models described above and overcomes their weaknesses. 
The organisational form is more like a network structure, in which there are 
some activities that are best centralised at the headquarters and others which are 
decentralised in subsidiaries. The dispersed operations are integrated through 
strong interdependencies, which are more reciprocal than sequential. This type 
of structure balances the demands of integration and localisation of the 
subsidiaries' operations. In terms of control, they vary according to the 
subsidiary role, which can be to supply local markets or to develop products for 
other subsidiaries. The different roles adopted by the subsidiaries imply the use 
of more varied and complex mechanisms to manage operations. 
In the same stream of study of MNCs, the institutional theory defends the 
opposite idea from the assumption of an evolution in the MNC organisational 
form to a single model. Its main argument is that specific institutional contexts 
shape the forms, practices, and processes adopted by firms. When firms become 
international, they carry with them this heritage from their home country, 
affecting their selection of how to internationalise. Hence MNCs do not 
converge on a single organisational model; there is a continued diversity and 
divergence between firms from different institutional origins. Whitley (1992a) 
has pointed out that in order to understand the nature of managerial structures 
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and practices in diverse environments, it is important to look at the institutional 
contexts for explanations of the forms and strategies adopted by firms. Different 
institutional backgrounds shape firms' operations in general and their 
internationalisation in particular. Thus, the structure and the strategy of firms 
adopted as they internationalise are varied, and are moulded by national 
institutional settings in the parent country. 
The internationalisation of firms, however, implies that they have to organise 
across different institutional settings which set challenges to the original 
patterns of the actions of firms. As Morgan (2001) has pointed out, there is a 
complexity of MNCs associated with their multiple sites of production, 
different types of managers and workers, and the economic processes that need 
to be coordinated across borders. Therefore, it is increasingly important to study 
how these features are managed in different MNCs. The coordination needed to 
organise the diversity of MNCs' operations is reflected in the internal 
management system of the firm, especially in areas such as the internal 
organisational structure and the system of monitoring and accountability. This 
debate highlights the fact that the study of MNCs should consider the influence 
of the origins of the MNCs in their operations, but also that there are other 
factors associated with the internationalisation process that should be 
incorporated in their analysis. 
The study of MNCs can take two organisational forms as the unit of analysis: 
the whole firm or the subsidiaries. There is an increasing tendency in the study 
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of MNCs to look at subsidiaries as the unit of analysis. Two changes in the way 
that MNCs have been understood underlie this shift. First, the change from a 
hierarchical view, in which there is only a centre of power, to a heterarchical 
view of these firms, in which there are many centres of power in the MNC. 
Secondly, the recognition of the effect of contexts on the operations of MNC 
subsidiaries, which in turn opens the possibility of variations among MNCs and 
in the role of subsidiaries within the same MNC. There is an emerging area of 
study which has concentrated on the analysis of subsidiary strategy, 
organizational roles, and the development of capabilities at this level. Different 
theoretical frameworks have been chosen to support the findings. Rugman and 
Verbeke (2001), using the transaction cost-based theory and the resource-based 
view of the firm, have created a framework to study the development of 
subsidiary-specific advantages. Other authors, for instance Birkinshaw and 
Hood (1998), also using a resource-based view, have developed a typology to 
analyse the changes in the stock of capabilities of the subsidiary and charters 
according to the subsidiary ability to add value. 
1.3 The Management of MNC Subsidiaries 
Over the years, there have been different streams of thought in the international 
business literature that have become increasingly interested in the study of 
MNC subsidiaries. "Subsidiary" is defined here to be any operational unit 
controlled by the MNC and situated outside the home country (Birkinshaw, 
1997). Increasing interest in the operations of subsidiaries is linked to the 
recognition of the power of the subsidiary to accept or reject impositions from 
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corporate offices and to the strategic value of some subsidiaries in the MNCs' 
operations. On one hand, there is evidence on the role played by some of these 
units in the generation of knowledge and innovation. On the other, they might 
develop capabilities which demand large amounts of the resources from the rest 
of the company. Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) have highlighted the fact that in 
spite of the attempts to study influential and resource-rich subsidiaries, there is 
a lack of systematic research on the subsidiary dynamics in different contexts. 
In the next section, there is a review of the evolution of the MNC subsidiary 
literature, looking at the different streams of research that have focused their 
study on MNC subsidiaries. 
1.3.1 The Headquarters-Subsidiary Relationship Stream of Research 
Research into the nature of the relationship between the headquarters and the 
subsidiary was the first stream to give explicit attention to the MNC subsidiary. 
The main focus of this stream was to analyse how the centre controls its 
subsidiaries, using a hierarchical perspective in which, the subsidiaries were 
seen as instruments of the centre to expand operations. Issues of centralisation 
and formalisation of decision-making in MNCs (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986), 
types of control mechanisms implemented in MNC subsidiaries (Martinez and 
Jarillo, 1989) and factors that affect the coordination and control activities 
between the headquarters and the subsidiaries (Picard, 1980), among others, 
were the main issues researched in this stream. 
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An important issue that emerged from the study of the headquarter-subsidiary 
relationship was the influence of internal contextual factors, such as subsidiary 
size, dependence on resources from the centre, subsidiary time of operation or 
product diversification on the existence of different control mechanisms in 
MNC subsidiaries (Youssef, 1975; Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Welge, 1981). 
Cray (1984), in his study of 57 subsidiaries of 34 American MNCs, found that 
control and coordination mechanisms respond to a set of organizational 
variables. A subsidiary large in size, technologically complex, located in a 
product division, is very likely to be integrated with the rest of the MNC, but at 
the same time operates with high levels of autonomy. By contrast, a small 
subsidiary sharing simple technology with its parent unit, located at a long 
distance from the centre is subjected to higher levels of control and lower levels 
of coordination. As a conclusion from the study, Cray supports the proposition 
that control is more responsive to internal contingencies faced by the 
subsidiary, and that the coordination activities respond to the complexity of the 
internal system of the firm. 
Another stream in the headquarters-subsidiary literature argues that the 
relationship between the centre and the local unit should be differentiated 
according to the contextual circumstances faced by the subsidiary (Rosenzweig 
and Singh, 1991; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984). 
These studies consider the environment as another variable that affects the 
relationship between the centre and the local units. Rosenzweig and Singh 
(1991), for instance, argue that MNC subsidiaries face dual pressures: they are 
34 
pulled to achieve isomorphism with the local environment, but at the same time 
they face an imperative for consistency within the organisation. Therefore, the 
pressures imposed by environments on organisations are not uniform, and 
different relationships between the headquarters and the subsidiaries occur 
because of these isomorphic forces. 
Prahalad and Doz (1981) developed a classification for the HQ control over the 
subsidiary strategy according to the nature of the organisational context and the 
extent of dependence of subsidiaries on headquarters for strategic resources. In 
the same line of thought, Ghoshal and Nohria (1989) hypothesized different 
relations between the centre and subsidiaries according to the levels of local 
resources and the degree of environmental complexity. These authors identified 
differences in the way that headquarters relate to the different subsidiaries. 
According to Paterson and Brock (2002) this stream of research undertook the 
initial steps towards accepting that subsidiaries may have considerable 
autonomy and influence. It also began to emphasize heterogeneity within the 
MNC, with subsidiaries featuring different characteristics within the same 
organisation. 
In sum, the nature of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship has been studied 
by focusing on different aspects. However, there are common assumptions 
underlying the study of this relationship. Firstly, the relationship between the 
two is influenced by a combination of the objectives of headquarters, which 
seek integration in order to develop economies of scale, or to support 
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knowledge transfer, and pressures from the local environment where the 
subsidiary operates, which look for localisation. Secondly, there are differences 
among subsidiaries of the same MNC. Therefore, the headquarters may relate in 
a different way with each subsidiary according to contingent internal factors 
and the nature of the context of subsidiary operations. Thirdly, the relationship 
between the two parts evolves over time and in a different way with each 
subsidiary. Thus, to achieve a clear understanding of the nature of the 
relationship between the MNC and its different units, the analysis should be 
moved down to the subsidiary level. 
1.3.2 The Subsidiary Role Stream of Research 
This stream has concentrated its research on the MNC subsidiary as the unit of 
analysis, allowing authors to take a detailed look at the strategic roles of MNC 
subsidiaries. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998,1986) defend the idea that each 
subsidiary has a unique role to play in the MNC strategy. This assumption has 
resulted in a number of typologies of the subsidiary role. These classifications, 
in an implicit or explicit way, bring two dimensions into the analysis. They tend 
to be a comparison between the levels of subsidiary autonomy and headquarters 
control, and the degree of integration of the subsidiary with the rest of the firm. 
Different typologies of subsidiaries' role have been developed to capture the 
variety of scope, activities, responsibilities, and strategies of the MNC 
subsidiaries (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998; Taggart, 1998; Birkinshaw and 
Morrison, 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan, 1991; Jarillo and Martinez, 1990; 
D'Cruz, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986; White and Poynter, 1984). Many 
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of these studies explicitly consider the ability of the subsidiary to take 
independent or autonomous action. Table 1.1 summarizes the main 
classifications of subsidiaries, considering a three-item typology according to 
the main activities of the subsidiary. 
Table 1.1 Typologies of Subsidiary Roles 
Authors Local Environment Contributor Role Global Responsibility 
Adaptors 
White and Poynter Miniature Replica Rationalized Global Mandate 
(1984) Manufacturer, Product 
Specialist 
D' Cmz (1986) Branch Plant Globally Rationalized World Product Mandate 
Bartlett and Ghoshal Implementer Contributor Strategic Leader, Black 
(1986) Hole 
Jarillo and Martinez Autonomous Receptive Active 
(1990) 
Gupta and Local Innovator, Global Innovator Integrated Player 
Govindarajan (1991) Implementor 
Roth and Morrison Global Rationalisation Global Subsidiary 
(1992) Subsidiary Mandate 
Birkinshaw and Local Implementer Specialised Contributor World Mandate 
Morrison (1995) 
Taggart (1997) Autonomous, Quiescent Receptive Constrained, 
Independent 
Adapted Irom Sirkinsbaw and Morrison (1995). 
The work of Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) has differentiated the typologies 
according to the main activities of the subsidiary. When the primary activity is 
to adapt products and services to the needs of local markets, when they are 
limited in their geographical scope and when there are severe limitations to 
carrying out value-added activities, the subsidiaries are local environment 
adaptors. White and Poynter (1984) name this type a "miniature replica" 
subsidiary: in this situation the entire range of value-adding activities is in the 
37 
subsidiary. Other authors, using different definitions, also refer to this type of 
subsidiary. Jarillo and Martinez (1990) use the term "autonomous". They argue 
that this type is typical of "multinational" firms that are competing in 
"multidomestic" industries. Gupta and Govidarajan (1991) call them "local 
innovators" and Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) name them "local 
implementers". For Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), they are "implementers". For 
the latter authors, this type of subsidiaries does not have strategic value for the 
MNC. They are not responsible for value-added activities. However, they have 
a commercial value because they make it possible for the MNC to capture 
economies of scale and scope. 
The second broad classification refers to those subsidiaries that have 
considerable expertise in certain specific functions or activities: they have a 
specialised role or they contribute to execute certain activities or functions 
(Quintanilla, 1998). However, these activities are highly coordinated and 
integrated by headquarters (Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995). Jarillo and 
Martinez (1990) name them "receptive" subsidiaries. They use two dimensions 
to classify this type: the geographical localisation of activities and the level of 
integration between the activities performed in the subsidiary, and the same 
activities performed in other subsidiaries. They also point out that "receptive" 
subsidiaries are typical of global firms competing in global industries. Bartlett 
and Ghoshal (1986) describe these type of subsidiaries as contributors. They are 
characterised by having a distinctive capability. Thus, integration with the rest 
of the MNC is required to take advantage of the capabilities developed locally. 
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The last group of subsidiary types with global responsibility is formed by units 
that have worldwide or regional responsibility for a product line or an entire 
business activity; usually they are not constrained in product scope and have a 
broad value scope (White and Poynter, 1984). Birkinshaw and Morrison 
(1995) state that these subsidiaries have achieved decentralisation- 
centralisation: activities are integrated globally, but managed from the 
subsidiary, not the head office. "Active" subsidiaries is the name given by 
Jarillo and Martinez (1990) to units that are in charge of many MNC activities 
that are carried out in close coordination with the rest of the firm, representing 
an active node in a tightly knit network. In Bartlett and Ghoshal's study (1998; 
1986), they are classified as a "strategic leaders". They act as a partner of 
headquarters in developing and implementing strategy. 
This review has presented a distinctive set of classifications of subsidiaries 
according to the type of activities carried out in them. However, they do not 
capture the evolutionary nature that the subsidiary role might have. According 
to Birkinshaw (2001), it has been recognised in the international business field 
that foreign direct investment is a sequential process: frequently, the initial 
investment leads to waves of additional investment. Over time, these flows of 
investment and resources affect the subsidiary role, thus changing the nature of 
the subsidiary operations. 
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1.3.3 The Subsidiary Development Research Stream 
Research on how the process of sequential investment affects subsidiary 
operations and subsequently the subsidiary role is recent. Chang (1995), for 
instance, points out that there is an incremental process of investment in 
Japanese MNC subsidiaries that affects the subsidiary role over time. Malnight 
(1996; 1994) highlights the adoption of a different role by the subsidiary with 
the adoption of a network-based MNC structure. There is documentation of 
case studies that highlights various aspects of subsidiary evolution (see detailed 
accounts of cases, Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Discussion of the development of the subsidiary has taken two perspectives: on 
one hand, external factors to the local unit are the main drivers of this 
evolutionary process, such as environment forces and investment from 
corporate offices (Chang 1995; Malnight, 1994). On the other, internal factors 
within the subsidiary, such as the initiative of subsidiary managers, are the main 
drivers of this development (Andersson, Forsgren, et al.. 2001; Birkinshaw and 
Hood, 1998; Birkinshaw, 1997). However, it seems that this development is a 
combination of the two factors, in which corporate offices have an important 
role in supporting the subsidiary development but there is also a level of 
subsidiary initiative in such development (Andersson, Forsgren, et al. . 2001; 
Rugman and Verbeke, 2001; Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). 
Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) have developed a model of subsidiary 
development emphasizing three main drivers. The first one is head-office 
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assignment. It is linked to changes in factors such as the internationalisation of 
the MNC, subsidiary resource availability, internal competition between 
subsidiaries and the global environment. The initial decisions of headquarters 
managers to allocate activities to the subsidiary are in this category. The second 
driver is subsidiary choice, which includes the desire of subsidiary managers to 
increase autonomy, the entrepreneurial actions of subsidiary managers, and 
increased network value. Local environment is the third driver. It is related to 
the characteristics of the environment in which the subsidiary operates, and is a 
source of opportunities and constraints. Customers, competitors, suppliers and 
government entities are part of this local environment. 
The two authors argue that the three drivers interact and are the main 
determinants of the subsidiary development. In a process of action and reaction 
they become the forces of change on the subsidiary role, which is reflected in 
the evolution of the subsidiary. They define subsidiary evolution as "the result 
of an accumulation or depletion of capabilities over time". These capabilities 
can be understood as charters: businesses or business areas in which the 
subsidiary participates or has responsibility within the MNC (Galunic and 
Eisenhardt, 1996). 
According to the change in the subsidiary capabilities and its effect on the 
subsidiary charter, Birkinshaw and Hood (1998) developed a typology of five 
generic processes of subsidiary evolution. They are presented in Table 1.2. 
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Table 1.2 Five Types of Subsidiary Evolution Processes 
Subsidiary Evolution Process Action Outcome 
Parent-driven Investment (PDI) Headquarters take the decision Establishment of new charter in 
on investment: evaluation of subsidiary. Development of new 
different locations capabilities 
Subsidiary-driven charter Subsidiary identifies new Extension of subsidiary charter 
extension (SDE) opportunities and builds the 
capability. It makes the proposal 
to headquarters 
Subsidiary-driven charter There is the need to increase The result, if the process is 
reinforcement (SDR) subsidiary's competitiveness effective, is to reinforce 
with other local units and subsidiary existing charter 
competitors as well. 
Parent driven divestment (PDD) The corporate offices take the Diminution or loss of the 
decision to divest. Evaluation of subsidiary charter. Atrophy of 
various locations the existing capabilities 
Atrophy through subsidiary There is inaction from the Loss or diminution of charter in 
neglect (ASN) subsidiary. Atrophy of the subsidiary 
capabilities and loss of 
competition 
Source: Birkinshaw and Hood (1998). 
In the analysis of subsidiary development, there are two main points that it is 
important to discuss. Firstly, it is assumed that the nature of the subsidiary role 
is not static. The role of the subsidiary can change over time in different 
directions: the subsidiary can increase its charter and its value for the MNC or 
can lose it, affecting its role in the firm. Secondly, there is a combination of 
different factors that in turn play a role in the evolution of the subsidiary. Some 
of the factors that might affect this evolution are external: decisions of 
corporate offices on the one hand, and pressures and opportunities from the 
environment in which the subsidiary operates on the other. The other group are 
internal to the subsidiary, linked to the decisions of the subsidiary managers, 
such as to develop initiatives at subsidiary level that can affect the relationships 
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between subsidiary and headquarters and across subsidiaries. The concept of 
subsidiary development reinforces the idea that the study of subsidiaries is a 
complex task, which requires the integration of different levels of analysis to 
develop an accurate picture of the nature of their operations. 
An area in which the development of the subsidiary is reflected is in the control 
mechanisms implemented at this level. The role of the local unit and the 
strategy that it develops impact the relationship between the headquarters and 
the subsidiary, which influences in turn the forms of controlling and monitoring 
the subsidiary operations. In addition, the strategy of the MNC is grounded in 
the subsidiary through the implementation of devices that align the subsidiary 
performance with such strategy. Therefore, it is important to study the 
implementation of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries in order to 
understand how an MNC implements its strategy at the subsidiary level but also 
to investigate which are the forces that affect the configuration of these devices 
in MNC subsidiaries. 
1.4 Control Mechanisms in MNC Subsidiaries 
The study of control mechanisms has attracted the attention of many scholars. 
The Aston studies, which were concerned with the study of organisational 
characteristics, identified a set of variables that influence the configuration of 
organisations (Pugh, Hickson, et al. . 1969; 1960; 1950). Variables related to 
forms of control such as specialisation, standardisation, formalisation and 
centralisation were identified as shapers of the structure of organisations. 
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Further studies developed definitions for control activities. Control has been 
defined by Ouchi (1977: 97) as "a process of monitoring, evaluating, and 
rewarding, and the data which are processed by this system may consist of 
measures of behaviour and outputs". Another definition of control is from Child 
(1984) that states "control within organisations is a process whereby 
management and other groups are able to initiate and regulate the conduct of 
activities so that their results accord with the goals and expectations held by 
those groups". A more general definition is presented by Das and Bing-Sheng 
Teng (2001: 258) : "Control is generally viewed as a process of regulation and 
monitoring for the achievement of organizational goals". 
Common elements in the definitions of control are, on one hand, that control 
systems are designed to control behaviours of individuals and the outputs 
generated by those individuals, and on the other, that control devices are 
aligned to a set of strategic goals. Thus, control system may respond to forces 
both the strategic and operative levels. 
The achievement of organisational goals is also linked to issues of coordination 
among the different parts of the organisation towards those goals. Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989: 490) defined a coordination mechanism as "any administrative 
tool for achieving integration among different units within an organisation". 
Following the same line of thought, Van de Ven et al. (1976) affirm that 
"coordination means integrating or linking together different parts of an 
organisation to accomplish a collective set of tasks". Coordination is a recent 
44 
term which became popular when it was found that in organisations activities 
such as specialisation and the division of labour need to be balanced with the 
integration of the different areas of the firm. 
The definitions of control and coordination are intertwined. Control 
mechanisms are the devices designed to support coordination and the 
achievement of organisational goals. Some authors, such as Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989), use the terms of control and coordination as interchangeable. 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998) and Edström and Galbraith (1977) define them as 
control and coordination mechanisms. Others define as control mechanisms 
some coordination activities carried out within the firms (Marschan, Welch, et 
al.. 1996; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). For the purposes of this thesis, control 
mechanisms are conformed by those devices designed to control the behaviour 
of individuals, the outputs that result from the actions of these individuals, and 
also those devices created to support coordination among the different units of 
the firm. 
Control mechanisms have been classified in many ways. The reason to use 
different types of control and coordination mechanisms in MNCs is an issue 
that has been addressed by several scholars in the area of business studies. 
Different classifications of these mechanisms have been developed (Harzing, 
1999; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1998; Hennart, 1991; Martinez and Jarillo, 
1989; Child, 1984). These classifications, generally, are built on two dimensions: 
one is the dimension of formal/structured or informal/subtle control 
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mechanisms (Marschan, Welch, et al. 1996; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Baliga 
and Jaeger 1984); and the second dimension is linked to the nature of the 
device; personal and direct or, by contrast, impersonal and indirect (Hennart, 
1991; Edström and Galbraith, 1977; Ouchi 1977). 
Under the dimension of formality/informality, for instance, Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989) offer two broad classifications of control mechanisms. They 
classify as formal mechanisms: the organisational form of the firm, 
centralisations of decisions, standardisation and formalisation of procedures and 
norms, planning activities, reports, evaluation of financial performance and 
direct supervision. By contrast, informal mechanisms are those activities such 
as cross-departmental relations, informal communications, and socialisation 
activities among the members of the organisation. Baliga and Jaeger (1984) 
combine the formal and informal dimension with another, the object of control 
(output/behaviour). They identify four types of controls: formal performance 
report, company manuals, shared norms of performance, and philosophy of 
management. On the other dimension; personal and impersonal, there is Ouchi 
(1977), with a classification that differentiates the control of behaviour or 
output and the implementation of other types of control called "ritual", to be 
used when it is difficult to measure output or to identify behaviours to change 
or reinforce. Edström and Galbraith (1977) identify three types of control in 
MNCs: firstly, personal and direct types of control exerted by expatriates in the 
subsidiaries; secondly, an indirect type of control through indirect bureaucratic 
methods; and a third type of control by socialisation, which means that 
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individuals learn and internalise behaviours and rules, obviating the need for 
procedures and hierarchical communication. 
Child (1984) developed a more elaborate approach to control activities in 
organisations with the creation of four strategies of control. Those strategies of 
control were originated from his previous studies replicating the Aston Study 
(Child, 1973; 1972). He combined variables such as centralisation-delegation, 
formality-informality, and the degree of supervisory emphasis. The four 
strategies are: personal centralised, bureaucratic, output and, cultural controls. 
The adoption of each strategy, and how they are combined, varies according to 
the circumstances that the organisation is facing. Child justifies the presence of 
each strategy of control through contingency elements such as firm's size, 
levels of delegation required, nature of the task and educational background of 
the members of the organisation. 
Harzing (1999) has developed according to two dimensions, direct or indirect 
and personal or impersonal mechanisms, a classification of control mechanisms 
in MNCs incorporating the different types presented here. The author assumes 
that control mechanisms in an explicit or implicit way are designed to control 
behaviour: the difference lies in how the control is exerted, which can be 
personal or impersonal. Her classification also considers the nature of the 
mechanism: whether it is designed explicitly to control activities or behaviour 
or it is created for another function and implicitly supports control activities 
within the firm. Harzing's (1999) two dimensions are: 
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. Personal and impersonal types of control: the former type is founded on social 
interactions among the people. The latter is based on devices that are used to 
control behaviour. 
"Direct or indirect types of control: direct control is designed to impact 
individuals' behaviour explicitly (e. g. through norms and procedures). By 
contrast, the indirect type of control attempts to control behaviour indirectly 
and implicitly. 
The combination of these two dimensions creates four types of control 
mechanisms which are shown in Table 1.3. 
Table 13 Classification of Control Mechanisms in Two Dimensions 
Personal/Cultural ImpersonallB u reaucraticfTech nocratic 
Personalised Centralised Bureaucratic Formalised Control 
Control 
Indirect/Implicit Control by Socialisation and Output Control 
Networks 
Source: Harzing (1999). 
Output Control 
The focus of this mechanism is on outputs rather than behaviour. A distinctive 
characteristic is that instead of focusing on a specific pattern of action that must 
be followed, there are certain goals, results or targets which are specified and 
need to be achieved by employees. Ouchi (1977), for instance, classifies as 
output control the control exerted through the identification of targets to be 
achieved by employees. Output-based is another type of control defined by 
Hennart (1991), which falls into this category. When the reward of the 
employee directly relates to his output and not to his behaviour, the main target 
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of the control is the output generated by the employee. Martinez and Jarillo 
(1989) consider financial performance, technical reports, and sales and 
marketing data as output controls. In line with this, the performance reporting 
system, whereby subsidiaries submit different data to headquarters, is classified 
as an output control by Egelhoff (1984). Other activities related to the 
legitimisation of past action are also classified in this category, such as the use 
of "responsibility accounting" systems (Child, 1984), and moulding future 
action, such as strategic and operative planning, and budgeting (Martinez and 
Jarillo, 1989). 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control 
The aim of this type of control is to influence the behaviour of individuals 
through impersonal devices. The most characteristic features of this category 
are written definitions of jobs, procedures and rules to follow. Often, they are 
associated with standardisation of procedures, used as patterns to implement 
bureaucratic control, which helps in taking decisions on standard information 
about work organisation. Child (1984) argues that this type of control permits 
the superior levels to delegate without losing control over what is going on. It 
allows delegation of decision-making within a predefined framework. Edström 
and Galbraith (1977: 250) refer to it as "a mechanism to control behaviour 
indirectly by relying upon procedures and records as methods for limiting 
discretion". In the category of structural and formal mechanisms, Martinez and 
Jarillo (1989) have one subcategory of formalisation and standardisation, which 
includes devices such as written definitions of jobs, procedures and rules to 
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follow presented previously. Ouchi (1977) and Baliga and Jaeger (1984) also 
define a category of bureaucratic controls. The former author focuses on the 
understanding of process before exerting direct control on behaviour. The latter 
authors address the utilization of a limited and explicit set of rules, which 
delineates desired performance and regulates the behaviour of individuals. 
According to Harzing (1999), the large size of MNCs would cause them to rely 
on a considerable number of bureaucratic formalised controls to manage the 
operations of subsidiaries. 
Personalised Centralised Control 
The mechanisms of control that belong to this group refer to centralisation of 
decision-making at the top level of the organisation and the use of personal 
surveillance to follow the execution of decisions. In the case of MNCs, the level 
of autonomy of the subsidiaries on one hand, and the presence of expatriates on 
the other, are the major examples of this type of control. Hennart (1991) defines 
as hierarchy control when the control is exerted by explicitly telling the 
employee what to do, and observing his behaviour to ascertain that he is 
following orders. Martinez and Jarillo (1989) and Child (1984) label it direct 
supervision, and centralization/decentralization of decision making through the 
hierarchy, respectively. Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998) argue that centralisation is 
a mechanism to support coordination in MNCs. By leveraging the firm and the 
management resources that are at headquarters, rapid decision-making is 
facilitated at the top level. Edström and Galbraith (1977) point out that the 
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presence of expatriates in subsidiaries might correspond, among other reasons, 
to a type of control that is personal and direct. 
Torbiom (1994) highlights three reasons to use expatriate managers in MNC 
operations: needs of control, requirements of coordination, and the creation of 
mechanisms to facilitate knowledge transfer. The first category is the use of 
these managers when there is a strong need to control operations in the local 
site, because there are high levels of investment, important research and 
development activities or because the level of control required cannot be 
achieved by other means. The second reason is coordination activities. High 
levels of interdependency between activities such as the production of parts of a 
product carried out in different sites create demands for integration. These 
activities require mutual and constant adjustment, and the expatriates facilitate 
this integration. The third reason, knowledge transfer, deals with the transfer of 
these managers because of the lack of specific knowledge in the subsidiary 
context. The shortage can arise because of the weakness of the host country's 
educational system or because of requirements for specific knowledge. 
Control by Socialisation and Networks 
This category, according to Harzing (1999), is very broad. It combines 
mechanisms that do not control fixed targets, are not bureaucratic, and are 
neither direct or very formal. The author identifies three sub-groups within this 
cluster. 
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Socialisation: the firm may use other devices to support the cohesion of the 
organisational group, such as statements on organisational vision and mission. 
Advances in technology have also facilitated the use of communication tools to 
support the development of a corporate culture in MNCs. Some authors 
highlight the relevance of the selection process as a mechanism to support 
socialisation (Hennart, 1991; Child, 1984; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Ouchi, 
1977). This type of mechanism seeks to support a homogeneous organisational 
culture, looking that the personnel share the same organisational values and 
goals. Members of the firm thus become socialised into the same culture, which 
provides cohesion to the group. The presence of expatriates in MNC 
subsidiaries can support socialisation as a type of control. As Edström and 
Galbraith (1977) point out, international transfers are channels to support 
organisational development in MNCs. The expatriate managers are acculturated 
in the company way of doing things, which they carry with them to the 
subsidiary. The transfer of these managers disseminates the decision-making 
style that assures the correct function of the structure. 
Formalised Lateral or Cross-Department Relations: this sub-category also 
refers to the exchange of information, but through temporary formal groups 
such as task forces, cross-functional teams, integrative departments and 
committees (Martinez and Jarillo 1989). Short transfers of expatriate managers 
to subsidiaries are also in this category. Another example of these devices is the 
recent creation of "virtual teams" composed of members from different 
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subsidiaries, who work together for a period of time without knowing each 
other and use communication tools to carry out the work. 
Informal, Lateral or Horizontal Exchange of Information: non-hierarchical 
communication makes it possible to compare performance and other issues. It 
acts as a subtle way to control operations. Activities such as training, corporate 
and regional meetings, and management transfers, help to develop informal 
networks that support informal communication and coordination among the 
MNC personnel (Marschan, Welch, et at., 1996; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). 
1.5 The Existence of Control Mechanisms in Organisations 
The previous classification of control mechanisms does not mean that the 
existence of one mechanism inhibits the presence of another. The assumption is 
that MNCs may implement different combinations of them. The occurrence of 
such devices is explained in different ways by different authors. They can be 
classified roughly into four strands. 
The first strand uses a contingency approach as a source of explanation for the 
existence of specific combinations of control mechanisms. Particular 
circumstances of the environment and organisational dynamics explain the 
selection of these devices. An assumption of this stream is that there are no 
universal principles which can guide their implementation. Child (1984), for 
instance, defines contingent factors such as types of markets, employee skills 
and experience, environmental variability, task characteristics, and size of the 
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organisation, as the shapers of the control devices elected by organizations. 
Authors of the headquarters-subsidiary relationship research stream often 
explain the existence of specific control devices with similar contingent 
variables (Gates and Egelhoff, 1986; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Egelhoff, 1984; 
Cray 1984). Taggart and Hood (1999), in their study of German and Japanese 
subsidiaries in the United Kingdom (UK) and Ireland, found that highly 
autonomous subsidiaries were smaller and had high local responsiveness. Low 
levels of autonomy of the subsidiary were linked to a globally integrated and 
faster-growing MNC. Harzing (1999), in her study of control mechanisms in 
MNCs, also found that contingent variables such as size, interdependence, 
uncertainty, and heterogeneity/diversity were explanatory variables for the 
differences in control mechanisms found in MNCs. In sum, the contingency 
approach explains the existence of these mechanisms to variables linked to the 
industry of operations of the MNC and to features of the organisation itself. 
The second stream of study associates the different types of control with an 
evolutionary process of MNCs. Martinez and Jarillo (1989) defend the idea of 
evolution in the presence of control mechanisms. They review research on 
control mechanisms from 1952 to 1988, and show the change from a previous 
concentration on the study of formal and personal mechanisms to an extension 
of the research that examines the more informal and subtle ones. The 
explanation for the shift in the academic research is a consequence of evolution 
in practice. The context of the firms is changing, making more complex their 
operations and compelling them to adopt less hierarchical forms with a 
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decentralisation of operations and the adoption of "network" based international 
operations. There is an increasing demand to control operations by other more 
subtle and informal means than the traditional ones: more formal and personal. 
Edström and Galbraith (1977), in their analysis of control mechanisms in 
MNCs, defend the idea that control strategies are accumulative, not alternative 
mechanisms. Firms tend to use different combinations of control strategies that 
are complementary. 
The third stream studies the selection of these mechanisms in MNCs according 
to the country of origin of the firm. Authors within this group argue that the 
country of origin of the MNC determines the selection of control devices. Early 
studies of control mechanisms identified differences in the control strategies of 
firms according to the country of origin of the MNC (see, e. g., Egelhoff, 1984). 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998) identify different mechanisms of control according 
to the country of origin of the MNC. For instance, centralisation of decision- 
making in headquarters is a typical pattern of Japanese MNCs. By contrast, US 
companies rely more on formalisation and standardisation of procedures as 
control devices, allowing more decentralisation of decisions to the subsidiaries 
and European MNCs rely more on socialisation. The dominant coordination 
process is through the recruitment, selection, and acculturation of key decision- 
makers. 
Harzing (2001) points out differences according to the country of origin, 
analysing the reasons for international transfers in MNCs. American and British 
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subsidiaries use expatriate managers to control operations abroad in less degree 
than their Japanese and German counterparts. The former rely more on output 
and bureaucratic controls. Research on German MNCs has found that they rely 
more on bureaucratic and personal forms of control to manage their operations 
abroad (Ferner and Varul, 2000; 1999; Neghandi, 1983). Harzing and Sorge 
(2003), in their study of the country of origin effect in the implementation of 
organisational practices in MNCs, found that the presence of control devices is 
clearly and directly related to the country of origin of the MNC. This stream of 
study focuses its analysis at the national level: its main assumption is that the 
presence of specific control devices in MNCs lies in the effect of national 
institutional arrangements on the firm operations. 
The last stream of research looks for the existence of these devices in the micro- 
political activities within the firm. Political processes in organisations are key 
determinants of the blend of control mechanisms in MNCs (Ferner 2000). A 
specific combination of control devices reflects the political realities within the 
firm and the struggle for control and autonomy of different interest groups. 
There are formal systems of control implemented by the centre, whose main 
objective is to align subsidiary actions with firm goals. This formal system of 
control is accompanied by informal controls from the centre, such as the power 
to approve investments and budgets, and knowledge transfer (technology or 
personal resources) from the headquarters to the subsidiary. There is a natural 
tendency of the subsidiaries to reject controls imposed from the centre and to 
struggle to increase their autonomy. The power of the subsidiary comes from its 
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knowledge of its local context; of markets and institutional settings, and from 
the initiatives of products and services developed locally, which can be 
exported to other subsidiaries. The strain created by this struggle between the 
centre and the periphery is reflected in the implementation of control devices in 
the subsidiary. Table 1.4 summarises the distinctive elements of each stream on 
the explanation for the presence of control mechanisms in MNCs. 
Table 1.4 The Four Streams on the Explanation of Control Mechanisms in AINCs 
Stream of Research Distinctive Characteristics 
Contingency " The characteristics of the environment and organisational dynamics are 
Approach the forces that influence the presence of control mechanisms 
" Focus on the industry and organisational levels 
Evolutionary Process " Evolution of the MNC is key factor to understand the presence of control 
Approach devices 
" Focus on organisational level 
Institutionalist " Country of origin is the main factor, which explains the combination of 
Approach control mechanisms 
" Focus on national level 
Political Approach " The political process within the MNC are powerful forces, which 
determines the presence of these devices 
" Focus on organisational level 
This review of control mechanisms in MNCs highlights two interesting points. 
Firstly, academic researchers have shown substantial interest in the study of the 
control strategies of MNCs. The initial approach has a hierarchical perspective 
and was mainly concerned with how the centre should control the operations of 
the subsidiary to align its behaviour with the strategic objective of the firm. The 
evolution of the study of MNCs and an increasing understanding of the power 
of the subsidiary to accept or reject impositions, incorporate into the analysis of 
control mechanisms in MNCs other variables such as subsidiary size, 
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characteristics of its markets, subsidiary capabilities and nature of subsidiary 
context. 
Secondly, there are various perspectives which have been adopted to investigate 
the presence of these devices on these firms. Each perspective has focused its 
analysis on different levels. The contingency theory looks at the industry and 
intra-firm levels to explain the presence of these devices. In the same line of 
thought, there is the evolutionary approach, which argues that changes in the 
environment and structure of firms, due to increasing competition, are reasons 
for the adoption of subtler devices. The institutional approach mainly focuses 
on the national level, searching for an explanation of patterns of control in the 
institutional context in which firms have originated. Finally, the political 
approach is more concerned with infra-firm processes and how formal and 
informal relationships of power coexist and affect the existence of these devices 
in MNCs. 
This debate on the reasons for the presence of control mechanisms poses 
important questions: How do the institutional settings from the country of 
origin of the MNC and the country of operations of the subsidiary affect the 
implementation of these devices? What are the explanations for the differences 
and similarities found in MNC subsidiaries regarding their control systems? 
One aspect that has been neglected in the study of control devices in MNC 
subsidiaries is how the institutions from the country of operations may affect 
the existence of these devices at subsidiary level. Although there are many 
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studies of the effect of the host context on the subsidiary role and its 
development, there is a dearth of studies of how the host context affects the 
implementation of control mechanisms (an exception is Sharpe, 1997). Apart 
from considering contingent factors such as the size of local markets and the 
volatility and complexity of these markets, the effect of host institutions on the 
implementation of these devices is an area with little research so far. 
The main argument of the institutionalist approach, which emphasises that 
differences in the presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries is due 
to the effect of particular institutional arrangements, can also be applied to the 
country of operations of the subsidiary. Those arrangements influence the 
operation of the subsidiary, pushing for adaptation to the institutional 
environment, the implementation of control mechanisms might be affected by 
it. 
According to the literature review presented here, the study of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries is a complex phenomenon because of the 
multiple factors that intervene in their implementation. In this order of ideas, 
the presence of control mechanisms has received only partial explanations and 
has been subject to a narrow focus on the analysis of their presence in MNCs. 
The review of the different streams of research that explain the presence of 
them highlights the need to analyse them from various perspectives which 
complement each other. Therefore, it is important to develop an analytical 
framework that includes various levels of analysis, to capture the complexity of 
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their existence in MNC subsidiaries. A framework, which accomplishes this 
task, is presented in the next section. 
1.6 An Analytical Framework for the Study of Control Mechanisms in 
AINCs 
This section presents a framework to analyse the. existence of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. Frequently, MNC research has considered 
this organisation as a single unit, giving little attention to subsidiaries as 
particular organisations that are exposed to particular forces. As organisational 
units, they have their own internal managerial dynamics, which are the result of 
a combination of resources, capabilities, and managerial decisions in a 
particular context. 
A research model is developed to understand the existence of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. It seeks to integrate the different forces that 
influence the presence of these devices, according to the literature review. The 
framework integrates the different elements, which in turn, may also affect the 
existence of control devices in MNCs. It is used to understand the presence of 
these devices in the case studies of the thesis, German and British subsidiaries 
in Venezuela. 
The analytical framework is built on the integration of the different spaces in 
which the subsidiary is embedded. The previous literature review highlighted 
how forces coming from different levels affect and shape the subsidiary 
60 
operations and subsequently the presence of control devices. The basic 
framework presented here has its origin in the integration of these levels, 
covering simultaneously the firm, the industry, and the countries. It looks to 
explore how and to what extent the macro level (institutional environments) and 
the meso level (industry or sector of operations) affect the micro level, which is 
linked to the operations of the firm, particularly the operation of the subsidiary. 
A framework that integrates the three levels of analysis is designed to 
understand the existence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. 
Similar frameworks have been used in management literature, particularly in 
the international business field (Christmann, Day, et al., 1999; Quintanilla, 
1998; Weber, 1995; Canals, 1995; Pettigrew and Whipp, 1991). Christmann et 
al. (1999) developed a model of determinants of subsidiary performance, 
incorporating different levels into the analysis: country of operations, industry 
structure, and firm features such as control exerted by corporate offices, size of 
the MNC and type of subsidiary strategy. They found that the most determinant 
factor of subsidiary performance was the characteristics of the country of 
operations of the subsidiary. Moreover, the host country effect impacted the 
characteristics of the industry within the country, making a clear distinction of 
how developing and developed countries may affect subsidiary performance. 
Quintanilla (1998), in his analysis of the implementation of human resource 
(HR) practices in German subsidiaries in Spain, incorporates in the national 
level of analysis, two effects, country of origin and country of operations 
effects, developing a framework which is built in three levels: national, industry 
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and firm. In spite of these studies, however, there have been few additional 
attempts to understand the subsidiary behaviour using a multilevel analysis and 
considering the subsidiary as the unit of analysis (Christmann et al., 1999; 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Porter, 1990). 
The framework is presented in Figure I. I. Its application provides an 
understanding of the presence of control mechanisms in a specific moment of 
time. The intention of this framework is to give an explanation of the presence 
of these devices according to a set of factors which emerge from the integration 
of different levels of analysis. 
Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework of the Configuration of Control Mechanisms in NMNC Subsidiary 
Subsidiary 
Development 
Parent Gwntry 
Influence: Finn size/ Output Controls 
ABS multinationality 
Bureaucratic Formalised Controls 
HR policies and practices Hit Count*Y 
influence 
Personal centralised Controls Ngg 
Subtle mechanisms Industry 
(Nature, features 
And dynamics) 
The literature review showed that the existence of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries is driven by five forces, three of which affect the whole MNC and 
two that affect directly the subsidiary. First, there is a set of institutions in the 
home country of the MNC that determines many aspects of the firm. Second, 
the firm operates in an industry that has its own dynamics. Third, the MNC has 
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a set of characteristics which are the result of its own evolution which affects 
the whole operations of the firm. Fourth, the subsidiary has its own 
development that is shaped by a group of features that affect the whole firm but 
also by other variables that only influence the local unit. Fifth, there are the host 
country institutions that impact the operations of the local unit. The existence of 
control mechanisms in this thesis is analysed according to these driving forces. 
They are also used to present the case studies in the following chapters of the 
thesis. 
Home-Country Institutions 
Whitley (2001) argues that, in spite of the increasing global expansion of firms, 
they remain influenced by the institutional arrangements of their country of 
origin. His argument is based on the fact that there is a lack of strongly 
institutionalised global governance norms that could standardise modes of 
specific economic coordination, and in this way mitigate the effect- of the 
original economic arrangements in which the firm is embedded. He defends the 
idea that the characteristics of the FDI of firms, such as where and when they 
invest, and how they are subsequently managed, are shaped by governance 
structures and capabilities developed by firms in their home business system. 
According to this, the management of the international operations of a firm is 
determined largely by the effect of the home institutional composition, which in 
turn moulds how headquarters manages the relationship with subsidiaries. 
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The nature of the corporate offices-subsidiary relationship is reflected in the set 
of control mechanisms that are initially implemented in the subsidiary. 
Therefore, the analysis of these devices starts with the identification of the 
forces from the home business of the MNC, which affect the shape that these 
mechanisms take, and from there, the identification of potential combinations of 
them according to the country of origin of the MNC. Chapter 3 presents a 
framework to analyse this effect, and the characteristics of the home country of 
the MNCs according to this framework. 
Host-Country Institutions 
The effect of the home-country institutions on the operations of the MNC has a 
mirror image, but at subsidiary level. As was discussed, the subsidiary 
development is determined largely by the condition of the environment of 
operations. These forces are linked to the characteristics of the market and 
position of the subsidiary within it, but they are also linked to the nature of host 
institutions and the predominant economic arrangements there. The increasing 
debate on the effect of institutional contexts on firms operations assumes that 
there are also national institutions of the country of operations that affect the 
operations of the subsidiary. For instance, it is argued that MNCs that belong to 
arm's length environment (e. g., Britain) may easily adapt to host environments 
than MNCs which are linked to more coordinated economies (e. g., Germany 
and Japan) (Whitley, 2001). 
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Geppert et at. (2003), for instance, argue that national contexts impact the 
formulation of strategy, on one hand via home country institutions, and on the 
other, the implementation of this strategy on the subsidiary through host 
country institutions. The characteristics of the host-country institutions are 
analysed in Chapter 3 under the same framework discussed above. In addition, 
Chapter 4 analyses the sector of operations of the MNC subsidiaries in 
Venezuela. 
Industry 
The third driving force is the industry. It is important to identify the features of 
the industry that define competition within it. Dunning (1993) highlights the 
importance of sector of operation in the path taken by the firm to 
internationalise. Porter (1986) states that to understand the behaviour of firms, 
its analysis has to be taken down to the industry level. These forces of 
competition are connected to elements such as attributes of the product and 
services, industry life cycle and rivalry between competitors and types of 
buyers. MNCs operate in an industry that puts pressures on firms to develop 
strategies and structures to fit with industry characteristics. 
Powell and DiMaggio (1991: 70) point out that "Organizations tend to model 
themselves after similar organizations in their field that they perceive to be 
more legitimate or successful". According to this, there should be a certain level 
of convergence of firms operating in the same sector. The industry analysis has 
to be seen as an intermediate level of study between the effect of national 
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institutions on the firm's operations and a more micro level that is focused on 
the analysis of variations inside the firm. MNCs in the same industry but 
coming from different environments may show diverse patterns of work 
organization as a consequence of the distinctiveness of the context where they 
originate. Nevertheless, isomorphic forces at industry level pull to homogenize, 
making firms look similar in some of their characteristics. Hence the industry is 
a space where differences among MNCs due to their institutional background 
are reconciled, and this might explain the similarities found in control 
mechanisms in organizations in the same industry, yet coming from different 
contexts. 
MNC International Operations 
The fourth driving force responds to one aspect that is interior to the 
organisation. The growth of international operations of one firm generates an 
organisational learning, which is inherent to a maturity stage of operating 
abroad. This learning creates advantages for the firm that are reflected in the 
development of its capabilities. The development of capabilities brings the 
implementation of devices which support and reinforce the use of these 
capabilities as distinctive advantages for the organisation. Several authors have 
highlighted the influence of size and multinationality on the implementation of 
control mechanisms in MNCs (Harzing, 1999; Malnight, 1996; Hulbert and 
Brandt, 1980). 
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Subsidiary Development 
The presence of certain control mechanisms in subsidiaries is intertwined with 
the development of the subsidiary. The subsidiaries as entities may change their 
behaviour. They can modify it over time, as was previously discussed in the 
literature. They are affected by changes in the environment on one hand and by 
transformations inside the firm on the other. They also develop their own 
strategy to cope with these demands. Thus, they are in a permanent process of 
change and evolution. 
As was discussed, the fifth driver is the subsidiary's own development. The 
study of the control devices has to consider the subsidiaries' development to 
understand their presence in the subsidiary. Following Birkinshaw and Hood's 
(1998) model of subsidiary development, it is important to study three main 
drivers that influence the subsidiary. Firstly, the corporate mandate, which is 
reflected in the reasons to set up a subsidiary in the country. These reasons 
determine the initial role assigned to the local unit, the initial resources 
transferred to it and the relationship with the corporate offices. Secondly, it is 
important to look at the evolution of capabilities and charters in the subsidiary 
due to actions, initiatives and decisions carried out by subsidiary managers, 
which in turn may affect the initial role of the subsidiary and consequently the 
initial mechanisms set up to control its operations. Thirdly, the other area to 
consider is the effect of the local context on subsidiary operations. This 
environment is the main source of opportunities and constraints in the 
operations of the subsidiary. Thus, to capture subsidiary reality, it is important 
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to explore the characteristics of the subsidiary market and how the subsidiary is 
positioned in this market, which is the aim of Chapter 4. 
There are some final comments to be added to the analytical framework 
presented and discussed here. Firstly, it is important to highlight the fact that 
there is an implicit assumption that control devices are additive rather than 
complementary. This means that one firm can have a considerable reliance in 
all of them or by contrast one firm may rely heavily only on one or two. 
Secondly, the analytical framework presented above explains, according to the 
variables described, the existence of control devices in a specific moment of 
time, implicitly assuming that variations of the variables may affect the current 
combination of control devices. Thirdly, in Harzing's (1999) typology HR 
practices were classified as control devices in each of the categories created. 
However, in the framework developed in this thesis they are grouped as a 
separate category. The rationale for that is that they have to be analysed as a 
system to understand their impact as mechanisms of control; if they are 
investigated separately their overall role in this area may be diluted. It is 
important to study the interconnectedness and integration of different personnel 
practices to have a more integrated approach in their study (Hendry, 1996). 
1.7 Conclusions 
A main point to highlight in the conclusions of this chapter is the complexity of 
the study of MNCs in general and in particular the implementation of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. The increasing interest in the study of 
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subsidiaries as units of analysis is linked to their added-value to MNC 
operations. However, their study is an arduous task because of the several 
forces that influence their operations. Different forces influence their existence, 
which can be classified at different levels: national (parent-institutions and host- 
institutions effects), industry, and organisational levels. The latter has to be 
divided into two sub-levels: organisational, which affects the whole firm; and 
subsidiary, which only affects the internal dynamics of the subsidiary. All types 
of forces are reflected in the analytical framework presented in this thesis to 
study the presence of control devices in MNC subsidiaries. 
The intention of this framework is to undertake an analysis that considers a 
more complete approach with the inclusion of features from different spaces of 
analysis, which has been often neglected in the study of MNC subsidiaries. The 
literature review presented in the first part of the chapter has shown how the 
study of MNCs has shifted from a hierarchical position, where the whole 
organisation is the unit of analysis, to an increasing interest in the subsidiary as 
the unit of analysis. This in turn has opened the space to understand subsidiaries 
as units with their own dynamics, where the centre is another variable that may 
influence their operations. 
An innovation of the integrative framework for analysing the presence of 
control devices is the incorporation of the effect of the country of operations 
from two perspectives. First, it includes the market in which the subsidiary 
operates and how its position within the market affects the development of the 
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subsidiary operations and, in turn, the existence of control devices. Second, the 
effect of the host environment is not only focused on these features, which have 
been the common approach: it also integrates the influence of host institutions 
on subsidiary operations and consequently on the control devices implemented 
in the subsidiary. 
The incorporation of these factors in the study of MNCs, as was discussed in 
the literature review, has been rare. The thesis aim, with the incorporation of 
this feature, is to give a more integrated analysis of the existence of these 
devices and overcome the partial explanations of their presence in MNC 
subsidiaries, closing the gap in the literature. The next chapter explains how this 
task is accomplished, and how the analytical framework presented here is 
applied to the study of MNC subsidiaries to answer the research questions of 
the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Research Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter explains the methodology followed to answer the research 
questions of the thesis and to develop the analytical framework to study the 
presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. A qualitative 
methodology, using theory generation from the case study method, is proposed. 
The theoretical framework incorporates a multilevel analysis, and in-depth case 
studies are investigated to develop the framework. This chapter has five key 
sections. First, it presents the philosophical position of the researcher. Second, 
there is a discussion of the theory generation from the case study method. 
Third, the framework design and the rationale behind its selection are discussed. 
Four, the research design is presented, in which, there is a description of the 
different steps followed. Finally, the main conclusions of the chapter are 
highlighted in the final section. 
2.2 Philosophical Position 
The international business area has been researched, frequently, from a 
positivist position (see for example Kogut, 2001 for a detailed review of 
research in the area). This influence has cascaded down to the study of the 
presence of control mechanisms in MNCs, which has taken in many cases a 
positivist approach. In this sense, much of the research in the area has identified 
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a set of variables which has affected the implementation of these control 
devices by using a nomothetic methodology (Harzing and Sorge, 2003; 
Harzing, 1999; Chang and Taylor, 1999; Jarillo and Martinez, 1990; Cray, 
1984; Egelhoff, 1984; Baliga and Jaeger, 1984; Ouchi, 1977). The selection of 
the sample of this research has followed a statistical logic: to obtain as many 
cases as possible and have a representative sample of the population in terms of 
its size. The application of quantitative methods has reduced this research to the 
identification of a set of common variables that explains the presence of control 
mechanisms in MNCs. This type of research ignores diversity and is 
concentrated on generalisations, selecting the variables that are common in all 
cases. Ragin (1989) has highlighted the fact that in this type of methodology the 
cases of the sample lose their identities and they are disaggregated into 
variables: the differences among the units of the sample are not relevant. The 
focus of the analysis is what variables answer the research question, and the 
development of a model that fits with all cases, resulting in an unequivocal 
answer to the research question. 
For instance, Harzing (1999) in her study of control mechanisms in MNCs used 
the survey method in 22 subsidiaries from nine HQ countries (USA, Japan, UK, 
France, Germany, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and the Netherlands). The 
research identified a set of variables which influenced the presence of these 
devices. The positivist bias of the research did not allow this researcher to 
investigate how and why these variables were affecting the presence of these 
devices. Moreover, it assumed a constant conjunction of events or laws in any 
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situation, as occurs in the natural sciences, an assumption that in the social 
sciences has attracted considerable criticism. 
A position on the side of critical realism has been adopted in this thesis to 
overcome the limitations of the positivist view of research in the area. Critical 
realism has been developed by two contemporary philosophers of social 
science: Roy Bhaskar (1979; 1978) and Rom Harre (1975; 1972). Critical 
realism, with its assumptions, overcomes the limitations of the positivist 
approach, without moving to the extreme of the impossibility of objective 
knowledge, which defends the position that there is no reality and the 
assumption that what is known is merely the product of discourses (Ackroyd 
and Fleetwood, 2000). 
There are three basic contentions in this perspective of critical realism. First, 
social phenomena exist not only in the mind but also in the objective world 
(Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000; Miles and Huberman, 1994). This reality can 
be understood primarily through the structures and mechanisms of the world, 
rather than through empirical events (Tsang and Kwan, 1999), and these 
structures follow a causal criterion through which reality can be explained 
(Archer, 1998). The position taken by critical realism, in which the social world 
exists independently of its identification by human beings, takes a middle 
position between a realist view of the nature of reality and a nominalist 
position. In this sense, the existence of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries is real; however, its analysis focuses on causal relations that 
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explain the existence of these devices, looking at differences and similarities 
among the units of analysis rather than a set of variables that are common in the 
cases of the sample. 
The second premise is the "transfactuality" of mechanisms (Archer, 1998), 
which means that the mechanisms and structures are only contingently related 
to observable and particular empirical events. According to Archer (1998): "if 
society is only like itself, meaning that it is contingent that any particular social 
structure exists, then we are committed to providing a particular kind of 
explanation". This explanation is not concerned with the experiences and 
perceptions, or with events and actions; by contrast, it looks at the causal 
mechanisms, powers and relations that are permanent conditions, and at the 
continually transformed outcomes of human agency (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 
2000). The presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries is studied 
under this premise; therefore, to really capture the complex relations associated 
with their presence, an in-depth method should be used to truly understand how 
and why these causal connections have developed. 
Third, knowledge is a representation of reality; but, it is a partial explanation. 
Knowledge as universal causal laws governing the social world is almost 
unattainable (Tsang and Kwan, 1999). The interaction between contextual 
constraints and individual freedom makes social transformation a continuous 
process. Therefore, the consequences or outcomes can not be deduced or 
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predicted, what can be achieved are explanations of the causal mechanisms that 
govern human actions (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000). 
In terms of this research, to take a philosophical position on the critical realism 
side means some assumptions concerning the way in which the research project 
is carried out. First, the analytical framework developed in the thesis is subject 
to replication to support or discredit the findings. It is believed by some social 
scholars that replication is important to validate or disprove propositions or 
theories in social science (Tsang and Kwan, 1999; Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
Yin, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989). However, this replication has a different 
perspective compared to the replication in the natural sciences. The framework 
developed in Chapter 1 explains the presence of control mechanisms through 
causal relationships rather than by predicting their existence. The causal 
relationships are built on similarities and differences among the units of 
analysis (e. g., the MNC subsidiaries). 
Second, a suitable research method, in accordance with the philosophical 
position adopted by the researcher, is the case study method. According to 
Easton (2000) the case study method is a useful tool to describe empirical 
events and trace links over time, digging deeper; it allows the analysis to move 
from the actual to the real domain. An important advantage of the case study is 
the possibility to identify causal mechanisms that underlie the process of the 
implementation of control devices, asking why they are presented, building 
causal relations from different sources of data, and collecting data from 
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different actors and incorporating into the analysis different perspectives and 
perceptions. 
Third, there is a comparative aspect in the design of the research. Changes in 
the nature of social research have moved researchers to pay more attention to 
cross-national diversity and to contextualise findings (Ragin, 1989). Theories, 
which are based on nomothetic ideas, have declined in the social sciences with 
the increasing development of theories and tools that are focused on diversity 
and causal complexity. Therefore, social research has become more oriented 
towards comparative research, because diversity is associated with contexts, 
which in turn stresses the existence of different realities that do not support 
universal laws. The original idea of the research project was to study the effect 
of the country of origin in the implementation of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries. It was not possible to study this phenomenon through case studies 
from the same country of origin: the research has to assume a comparative 
nature, with cases from different countries. The comparison of cases looks for 
explanations of similarities and differences among them. This aim is aligned 
with the philosophical position of critical realism, and cannot be achieved by 
studying cases separately. 
2.3 Theory Generation from the Case Study Method 
As was stated above, the research methodology followed is the case study 
method. Yin ( 1994) states that a case study is a type of empirical enquiry that 
investigates a current phenomenon within its real context, especially when the 
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boundaries between the phenomenon under study and the context are not clearly 
evident. The study of contexts through different features (e. g., the effect of the 
home-country and host-country institutions) implies that its analysis is an 
important part of the research. The aim of the application of the case method in 
this thesis is to develop explanations through the analysis of cases. Several 
processes of the development of theory from the case method have been 
discussed. For instance, Glaser and Strauss (1967) have designed a 
comparative method to develop grounded theory. Yin ( 1994) has defined a set 
of steps to design case study research. Miles and Huberman (1994) have 
formalised a number of procedures to analyse qualitative data. Eisenhardt 
(1989) has outlined a roadmap for building theories from case study research. 
Finally, Pettigrew (1997) has developed a "processual analysis" which builds 
theory from the use of longitudinal comparative case study research. 
Building theory from case studies is the research strategy followed in this 
thesis. Eisenhardt (1989) stresses that this strategy is useful when there is the 
need to provide freshness in perspective to a topic that has been researched 
extensively (e. g., the existence of control mechanisms), adding new elements to 
its explanation (e. g,. the effect of country of origin and country of operations), 
and when the researcher is looking for explanatory relations and the study 
describes patterns of relations (e. g., a philosophical position on the side of 
critical realism) (Huberman and Miles, 1994). Table 2.1 shows a process of 
how to build theory from case study research. 
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Table 2.1 Stages to Build Theory from Case Study Research 
Stages Activities 
Defining the research frame and " Theory development 
aims of the investigation " Definition of research questions 
" Development of conceptual constructs 
Selecting cases " Case study design: unit of analysis and case selection 
(single or multiple case studies) 
" Data collection methods 
" Crafting of instruments and protocols 
Conducting fieldwork and " Data collection: gathering different sources of evidence 
preliminary data analysis " Data analysis: adjustments to the data collection 
instruments and protocols 
Defining a preliminary analytical " Development of a preliminary framework: the explanation 
framework of relationship between the subject of analysis and the 
initial constructs, and the inclusion of other constructs 
which emerge from the analysis of the data 
Data Analysis " Within-case analysis and cross-case analysis: reframing the 
analytical framework 
" Searching for additional information in the fieldwork 
Enfolding Literature Comparison of the emergent framework with the existing literature 
(similar and conflicting perspectives) 
Reaching closure " There is a final product in terms of concepts, conceptual 
framework, propositions or possible mid-range theories 
" Evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
research 
Adapted from Yin ( 1994) and Eisenhardt (1989). 
There is a debate on how much shape a qualitative study should have in terms 
of the pre-existent conceptual framework. There are divergent positions 
regarding this issue, in the qualitative research. On one extreme, there is the 
group of anthropologists and social phenomenologists who consider social 
processes too complex to be approached with explicit conceptual frameworks. 
They prefer to gather data with no preconceptions and then inductively ground 
the theory on the findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The other extreme 
defends the idea that the qualitative study needs a tight design: a pre-existent 
conceptual framework, well-defined research questions and clear interview 
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protocols. Wolcott (1982) clearly defends this position, arguing that "is 
impossible to embark upon research without some idea of what one is looking 
for". 
Eisenhardt's (1989: 536) position is that "theory-building research should begin 
as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no 
hypothesis to test". Instead of starting with a well-defined framework, she 
argues that the literature on the subject should help to define possible constructs 
that, in turn, explain the subject of study. By contrast, Yin (1994) defends the 
idea that theory development as part of the design phase is fundamental. Miles 
and Huberman (1994) argue that the researcher should develop some 
conceptualisations about the phenomena but not a full theory. In this sense, 
these conceptualisations should help to develop a preliminary conceptual 
framework or a priori conceptual constructs that help in the development of the 
research questions and in subsequent stages of the research, such as sampling 
and data gathering. This research stands with the last position mentioned above. 
The research project of this thesis defines a preliminary theoretical framework 
that helps to develop the research questions, and to select the cases. However, 
through an iterative process of induction (data-driven) and deduction (theory- 
driven), the analysis of the cases is carried out. The result of this process is the 
framework presented in Chapter 1. The final result is the development of an 
analytical framework that arises from this open-ended process. Other 
researchers, such as Pettigrew (1997), have linked his "processual" analysis to 
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this cycle of deduction and induction to make comparative analysis among case 
studies. 
2.4 The Framework Design 
Clark (2000) has stated the need to incorporate different levels of analysis in 
order to understand, describe and explain the actions of organisations. He 
defends the idea that the context of operations matters and should be included 
in the study of firms. The context, according to his view, has to be divided into 
nations and sector of operations. The latter has to be included because of the 
importance of understanding the relationship between the peculiarities of the 
product and how it influences consumption patterns, and how this relationship 
affects the development of capabilities in the firm to survive and grow. In a 
previous work, Clark and Mueller (1996) also highlight the importance of 
incorporating the specificities of the firm to investigate organisations. There is 
another level to incorporate, the intra-firm level, which has concentrated the 
majority of attention of research but from a position that has not included the 
context as other level of analysis (Clark, 2000). 
Pettigrew (1997) also argues the value of studying processes in organisations 
using a number of levels of analysis. He points out the idea that the analysis of 
the finn's processes should consider the outer and inner contexts. The outer 
context includes the economic, social, political, competitive and sectoral 
environments in which the firm is embedded. The inner context refers to the 
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cultural and political environment within the firm that, in conjunction with the 
outer context, shapes features of the process of the firm. 
This research proposes a multilevel of analysis, which incorporates the effect of 
the context of operations of the MNC in conjunction with intra-firm 
characteristics. Consequently, there are three levels in this research on control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries in this thesis. First, there is a national level: 
the study is focused on the presence of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries, and includes features from both the home-country of the MNC and 
features from the host-country of operations of the subsidiary. There is a second 
level, which is the analysis of the sector of operations of the 1\lNC and the 
effect of markets and product features on the operations of firm. The third level 
is the intra-firm level, which incorporates features from the MNTC and the 
subsidiary, as presented in Chapter 1. 
This type of analysis implies that there are changes in organisations and 
contexts over time which affect each other. According to Clark (2000), this type 
of analysis takes organisation theory from a universal time-space free solution 
(a positivist view of knowledge) to the explanation of hidden structures and 
mechanisms that explain patterns of events, which is consistent with the 
philosophical position adopted in the research. 
In the following sections, the reasons that justified the choices mentioned above 
are presented, how the fieldwork was conducted is explained, and the analytical 
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tools applied to the data to reach the final analytical framework are described. 
The theoretical validity of the research and its rigour are also explained. 
2.5 The Research Design 
As mentioned, the aim of this thesis is to identify the forces that underline the 
presence of control devices in MNC subsidiaries. The unit of analysis of this 
investigation is the MNC subsidiary, the case study design is a multiple-case 
design, and the research framework has a multilevel analysis. The research case 
selection is four case studies: two from the oil service sector and two from the 
business software sector, the home-countries of the MNCs are Germany and 
Britain, and the host-country of the subsidiaries' operations is Venezuela. The 
focus of the study is to identify the types of control mechanisms implemented 
in the MNC subsidiaries and explain the reason for their presence. The research 
investigates the underlining structures and relationships that explain the 
presence of these devices in the MNC subsidiaries. 
2.5.1 The Preliminary Design 
The design of the research took as a first consideration the selection between 
single or multiple case designs. A distinctive characteristic of the investigation 
is its interest in the effect of the context (parent-country and host-country 
effects) on the presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. The study 
of this feature shapes the nature of the research as comparative. In other words, 
it should incorporate MNC subsidiaries from different countries to clearly 
identify the parent-country effect on the existence of control mechanisms in the 
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subsidiaries. A multiple-case design is the most suitable option to make this 
type of comparison. An important advantage of multiple cases is that the 
evidence from them is often considered more compelling and the study is 
regarded as more robust (Herriot and Firestone, 1983). 
After the decision on the type design, it was important to estimate the number 
of cases to be analysed. As a preliminary analysis at least two cases were part of 
the sampling. Yin (1994) argues that one logical idea behind selecting case 
studies is the selection of cases that envisages contrasting results but for 
predictable reasons. In this case the selection of MNC subsidiaries from 
different origins follows this logic; therefore, it was decided to select MNC 
subsidiaries from two different countries of origin. An innovative approach of 
the study was the analysis of the effect of the institutions of the country of 
operations on the presence of control mechanisms. Because of the incorporation 
of this new feature, it was decided to concentrate the study only on subsidiaries 
operating in one country: to include more than one country of operation would 
make the study too complex. 
It was also decided to incorporate, as another criterion in the selection of cases, 
polar types of MNC subsidiaries according to the type of sector of operations to 
make the sample more robust. Eisenhardt (1989) states that case studies may be 
chosen to fill theoretical categories and to provide examples of polar types. 
According to Pettigrew (1997), the selection of polar types helps to construct a 
much better theoretical argument and to discern the underlying process. In the 
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initial literature review, it was found that an important explanation for the 
presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries was linked to contingency 
factors (Chapter 1 explains this point) therefore, the selection of the cases 
should consider this feature. The best option was to consider polar types of 
MNC subsidiaries, from the same country but different sectors. Figure 2.1 
shows the logic of the design. 
Figure 2.1 Sample Design of the Research 
M\C MXC D1 NC 
Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary Subsidiary 
from Country from Country from Country 
A operating in B operating in 
* 
B operating in 
country C country C country C 
Industry X ustry Y 
2.5.1.1 Selection of the Country of Origin of the MNC subsidiaries 
In the past, as many of the contributors to organisation theory have been located 
in the US, they have tended to take it as the universal background for the 
formulation of theory (Searle, 1995). However, recently, international 
differences have been increasingly acknowledged, and a more international 
perspective has emerged with more awareness of the different backgrounds 
(Clark, 2000). 
According to Ferner (1997) the majority of comparative literature concentrates 
on American and Japanese MNCs. The study of European companies usually is 
carried out by lumping together them as monolithic group and comparing them 
with Japanese and American organisations. However, many studies of MNCs 
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have highlighted large differences among European countries (Ferner et al., 
2001; Ferner and Varul, 2000; Harzing, 1999; Quintanilla, 1998; Lane, 1998; 
Doremus et al., 1998) 
Two European countries, Germany and Britain, were selected as countries of 
origin, and two reasons account for that. Firstly, in economic terms they are 
powerful economies in Europe. In terms of foreign investment the two countries 
are considered among the fifth largest foreign direct investors in the world 
(Dicken, 1999). According to UNCTAD (1999), Britain and Germany are 
among the countries with the biggest MNCs (this survey only includes non- 
fmancial MNCs measured by foreign assets and number of employees). 
Secondly, these countries present different institutional arrangements (e. g., 
financial system, corporate governance, and educational and training system) 
that may have different effects on organisations (see Lane 1992). Therefore, the 
different nature of the social and institutional arrangements in Germany and 
Britain make MNC subsidiaries from these origins interesting cases to compare. 
2.5.1.2 Selection of the Country of Operations 
The selection of the host country had a main criterion, a country with different 
institutional arrangements to Germany and Britain. Venezuela seemed an 
interesting case to study. It is a country classified as upper-middle-income, a 
classification given generally for developing economies (see: 
www. worldbank. org). Another important aspect of the Venezuelan institutional 
context is its fragmented nature. It is useful to contrast societies such as 
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Venezuela, where there is a lack of coordination among the different 
institutions, with other societies where their institutional arrangements 
complement and reinforce each other. This fragmentation amongst institutions 
means that "the rules of the game" are not clearly developed and actors have to 
learn how to operate around institutions as much as with them. Venezuela is a 
country with high levels of uncertainty and instability, characterised by a 
precarious institutional environment where economic variables and regulatory 
mechanisms are volatile. There is a dearth of studies on the effect of a country 
with such a distinctive character on MNC subsidiaries whose origins are in 
contexts with more coordinated institutional arrangements. Finally, there is a 
lack of research on Venezuela in particular, and South America in general, 
using the institutional approach. In addition, the access to firms in Venezuela is 
facilitated for the researcher because of her knowledge of the language, culture 
and networks with firms from her previous work in the country. 
2.5.1.3 Selection of the Industries 
The selection of the industries, as was argued above, considered polar types in 
order to cover the whole spectrum of factors from this level. In order to 
consider this criterion, these polar types were selected following the typology of 
Porter (1986), of multidomestic and global industries. MNCs from these 
industries have different relationships between the corporate offices and the 
subsidiaries. In the case of multidomestic industries the subsidiaries look to 
satisfy local markets and they compete on a country basis. The MNC enjoys a 
competitive advantage from the one-time transfer of know-how to the foreign 
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location. On the other hand, there are global industries in which the competitive 
position of one firm in one country is significantly affected by its position in 
other countries, and vice versa (Porter, 1986). MNC subsidiaries in this industry 
are more dependent on flows of know-how, technology, capital and key 
personnel from other subsidiaries or corporate offices. As a first step, 
information about the MNC subsidiaries from Britain and Germany, to select 
the companies, was requested from the chambers of commerce of the two 
countries in Venezuela. The idea was to search for potential matches of German 
and British MNC subsidiaries in the same industry. Another selection criterion 
was to choose subsidiaries with at least three years of operation in the country. 
It was important to look at local units with experience of operating in the 
country to study the effect of the host country on the presence of control 
mechanisms in the MNC subsidiaries. As a result and due to the nature of the 
criteria for selecting the cases, there were not many options. The potential 
matches were in the oil services and business software sectors, and the 
pharmaceutical industry. 
The oil service sector is considered multidomestic because of the nature of its 
operations. Firms operating in the sector, frequently, offer their services to 
governments through concessions, or they are contracted by national oil 
organisations to carry out specific activities in the areas of exploration and 
production. As a result, they have to respond to demands of the local clients, 
their operations are aimed to satisfy local markets, and they compete locally to 
obtain concessions and contracts from governments and national oil companies. 
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By contrast, the business software sector and the pharmaceutical industry have 
a more global nature. They are dependent on products and services developed in 
their Rand D (research and development) centres, they are more standardised 
and require little adaptation, which in turn makes them less reliant on the local 
environment. The specific characteristics of the sectors that MNC subsidiaries 
belong to are explained in Chapter 4. 
2.5.1.4 Selection of the AMNC subsidiaries 
After the identification of the potential matches according to country of origin 
and sector of operations, the contact with the MNC subsidiaries was initiated. 
At this stage, an important condition was to choose the ones which assured the 
greatest chance of access. 
Preliminary contacts with different MNC subsidiaries such as Siemens de 
Venezuela, Bayer de Venezuela, and Aventis, were carried out with negative 
results in the first two cases. In the pharmaceutical sector some interviews were 
carried out in the British MNC: Glaxo-Welcome, and in the Franco-German 
MNC: AVENTIS. However, further access to the two subsidiaries was not 
allowed. Attempts in the business software sector were more successful in 
gaining access to two MNC subsidiaries: SAP subsidiary for the Andean region 
and the Caribbean, and Baan Venezuela, a distributor of Baan. The latter MNC 
has a Dutch origin but was acquired by a British conglomerate before the time 
of the research. Despite its character as distributor, Baan Venezuela works very 
closely with the British MNC because of the nature of the sector, supporting 
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this selection of Baan Venezuela. The selection of this case, as discussed in 
Chapter 6, is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it supports the analysis of the 
institutional legacy of the MNC and its effect on the operations of the 
subsidiary. Second, it sheds some light on the influence of the context of 
operations in the changes of the subsidiary. The two local units operated in the 
technology industry, and are examples of a global industry. The characteristics 
of this industry are explained in detail in Chapter 4. 
Access to a British oil service subsidiary, LASMO Venezuela, was obtained. 
and was a possibility to obtain access to a German oil MNC subsidiary; 
Preussag Energie Venezuela. These two subsidiaries are representative of the 
multidomestic industry, the other type of industry under research. The main 
characteristics of the cases are presented in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2 Description of the Case Studies of the Research 
Multinational SAP AG Baan Preussag Energie LASMO 
Subsidiary SAP for the Baan Venezuela Preussag Energie Lasmo Venezuela 
Andean Region Venezuela 
and the Caribbean 
Country of Origin Germany Britain Germany Britain 
Industry Global Global Multidomestic Multidomestic 
Date of subsidiary 1996 1995 1998 1997 
establishment 
Employees in 160 46 280 279 
subsidiary 
Baan was not a "pure case" in its origins. Initially, the MNC was founded in 
The Netherlands and was acquired by a British conglomerate. However, the 
criteria of the sample design with comparisons across countries and industries, 
and the limitations in terms of potential cases, made Baan a suitable case. It 
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allowed a comparison across country and the comparison across industries, 
which was another important criterion of the sample design. 
2.5.2 Fieldwork: Collecting the Data 
It was decided that semi-structured interviews and secondary data were to be 
the two main methods of collecting data for this research. Semi-structured 
interviews were one of the most suitable methods, as the research is looking for 
the underlying forces that intervene in the presence of control mechanisms 
through the study of different factors that interrelate, such as country of origin, 
industry and country of operations. As secondary data, information was 
collected on sectors of operations and industry, MNCs' annual reports, Internet 
MNCs' corporate pages and newspaper-documentary sources. This combination 
between primary and secondary data helped to enhance, triangulate, and 
validate information from the interviews. Eisenhardt (1989) highlights the fact 
that theory-building from case study research typically combines multiple data 
collection methods. Yin (1994) has also pointed out that a major strength of the 
data collection in case studies is the opportunity to use data from diverse 
sources, which helps to avoid potential problems of construct validity. To have 
multiple sources of evidence provides different measures of the same 
phenomenon. 
The design of questions for the semi-structured interviews considered 
constructs from the literature. Table 2.3 presents the main topics covered in the 
interviews. It is worth noting that all the topics presented in Table 2.3 were not 
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covered in the initial stages of the data collection: some of them were added as 
result of the iterative process of analysis of the initial data (e. g., the category of 
changes over time of the activities, responsibilities, and control mechanisms in 
the subsidiary). 
Table 2.3 Topics covered in the interviews 
Section Topics covered 
Background of the Interviewees " Education 
" Position in the firm 
" Previous position in other firms 
Subsidiary. 
1. Position and responsibilities of the " Level of centralisation/decentralisation of activities 
interviewee to the subsidiary 
2. Presence of control mechanisms " Identification of different devices to control 
operations in the subsidiary (e. g., human resources 
policies and practices, and expatriate managers) 
3. Subsidiary size, main activities and " Subsidiary typology 
evolution 
4. Relationship of the subsidiary with " Type of MNC 
other units and corporate offices, 
MNC strategy for the region, 
evolution of the MNC 
5. Change over time of the activities, " Identification of the forces that intervene in the 
responsibilities and control presence of control devices 
mechanisms in the subsidiary 
6. Product characteristics " Nature of the industry 
Host-Country Effect " Education and Training System 
" Effect of the Venezuelan environment (e. g., state, 
financial system, economy) in the operations of the 
subsidiary 
" Adaptation of the MNC subsidiary to the local 
context 
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Different questions were developed to cover these topics and some of them 
were changed or were added to the initial analysis, pennitting more accurate 
questions to facilitate the understanding of many subtle processes. In many 
cases some interviewees were interviewed more than once to clarify 
information. Table 2.4 shows the interviewees' positions, together with the 
number of interviews carried out in each MNC subsidiary and with experts on 
the Venezuelan context. Fieldwork was conducted in different stages: from the 
autumn of 2000 until the summer of 2002.66 interviews in total. 
Table 2.4 Distribution and Number of Intervie"s 
Interviewee Position Number Interviewee Position Number 
SAP for the Andean Region and the Baan Venezuela 
Caribbean 
HR m. +n. iý ct t Lýý. ýI I Customer Care Dircctor 
(local) 
Venezuelan and Caribbean Alliance I Administration and HR 
Manaeer (local) Director (local) 
Busine' Development Manager (local) I Sales and Marketing Director 1 
(local) 
Support Consultant (local) I Technology Manager (local) 
Sales Manager for oil and gas sector I Consultant Department 
(local) Manager (local) 
Andean New Initiatives and marketing I Technical Support Manager 
manager (local) (local) 
Andean HR manager (local) 2 Indirect Sales Director for the 2 
Latin America Region 
(expatriate) 
Consultanc} Manager (local) I European Sales Manager 1 
(expatriate) 
Indirect sales manager (local) I Total 9 
Andean Finance Director (local) 
Total II 
Preussag Energie Venezuela LASMO Venezuela 
Operation, A ice-pre ident (expatriate) I Head of Planniets and 
Re ortin_ (expatriate) 
Administration Vice-president I Senior Exploration Geologist 
(expatriate) (expatriate) 
Finance and accounting manager (local) I Field Development Planning I 
Manager (expatriate) 
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Standardization leader and special I Legal Manager (expatriate) 
projects (expatriate) 
Administration manager (local) I Senior Economist (expatriate) 2 
Reservoir Engineering supervisor (local) I Commercial and New 1 
_ 
Business Manager (local) 
Petroleum Development Manager I Oilfield Engineering 1 
(expatriate) 
(expatriate) 
Planning and Controlling Manager I HHRR and Administrator 1 
Manager (local) 
(expatriate) 
Security Manager (local) I Senior Economist (local) 
HHRR supervisor (local) 1 Ex Finance Director (head 1 
quarters) (expatriate) 
IT Supervisor (local) I Junior Economist (local) 1 
Community Advisor (local) I Former HR Manager 1 
(expatriate) 
Geologist (expatriate) 1 Senior Exploration Geologist 1 
(local) 
Former gathering project manager I Total lnterNievrs 14 
(expatriate) 
Internal Controller (expatriate) I 
Total 15 Experts on Venezuelan Number 
Institutions 
Glaxo-'Wellcome Number Director of the Venezuelan- 
Cierman Chamber of 
Commerce (expatriate) 
Finance Director (local) I Director of the Venezuelan- 
British Chamber of 
Commerce (expatriate) 
_ Human Resources Director (local) I General Manager of the 
Venezuelan- British Chamber 
of Commerce- (expatriate) 
Total 2 Executive Director of the 
Venezuelan office for the 
promotion of the foreign 
imvestment (CONAPRI) 
Aventis Number Expert on the education and 
training: system in Venezuela 
C ontmercial Controlling \I. rn. r, r I Expert on the Venezuelan 
financial system (expatriate) 
Finance Control Area Supervisor (local) I Associate Managing Director 2 
of Kom/Ferry International 
Finance Director (expatriate) I Total 9 
HR Supervisor (local) I Expert on ERP systems 2 
Total 4 Total number of interviews 66 
The majority of the interviewees in the case of the MNC subsidiaries occupied 
managerial positions. The rationale of this choice was that managers were the 
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executors of control mechanisms in the subsidiaries and could elucidate the 
different reasons for implementing them. The schedule for the interviews was 
organised by reviewing first the organisational chart of the subsidiary and then 
by selecting key positions for obtaining data for the study: usually, heads of 
departments and top management (general managers, vice-presidents and 
directors). However, it was not always possible to interview the members of the 
latter group. In addition, according to the position of the interviewee, a set of 
questions was selected to obtain a more accurate picture of the activities and 
presence of control mechanisms in each area. All the interviews were recorded, 
some in English (interviews with expatriate managers) and others in Spanish. 
They lasted on average one and a half hours. 
2.5.3 Data Analysis 
The analysis of the data in the research involved- several steps, and different 
tools were used to aid the analysis of it. Figure 2.2 depicts the iterative model 
used to develop the theoretical framework of the research. An iterative process 
of deduction and induction, linking the literature with the research findings, 
ended in the final theoretical framework presented in Chapter 1. 
The initial literature review helped to develop the initial constructs which better 
facilitated the design of the interview questions. They were used to collect the 
data from the first case: the British oil subsidiary. The analysis of this data 
started with the writing-up of a report on the case. According to Eisenhardt 
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(1989) and Miles and Huberman (1994), although this process is simply 
descriptive, it is central to the generation of insights. 
Figure 2.2 The Iterative process of Deductive and Inductive Analysis in Case Study Research 
I 
C.. ceptualisia= 
Literature 
Review 
, .... - --AL 
= 
Final framework to explain 
Initial First Analytical Second analytical the presence of control 
Constructs Framework framework mechanisms 
in MNCs 
subsidiaries 
---------- 
Op[ntionalisins 
------ -------- -------------- 
Fieldwork first case: 
IF 
Fieldwork Business 
IF 
Fieldwork: 
British oil software sector. German oil 
Subsidiary (Report and German and British subsidiary 
Data Analysis) subsidiaries (Reports (Analysis and 
and Data Analysis) comparison of 
the four casts) 
Iterative process of induction deduction 
A first analytical framework was developed from the analysis of the British oil 
subsidiary case and the comparison of the findings with the current literature. 
Using replication logic (Yin, 1994), this preliminary framework was used to 
carry out the interviews in the business software subsidiaries. A second report 
with the comparison of the two cases was written, with a less descriptive and 
more analytic approach. However, new insights emerged from the data of the 
last two cases that had to be further explored in the existing literature. The 
preliminary analytical framework was modified to incorporate the new findings. 
The collection of the data from the last case, the German oil subsidiary, 
followed again the replication logic, looking for information according to the 
analytical framework developed. Finally, the comparison of the four cases 
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across countries and industries was carried out, with the result of the final 
framework of the research. This helped to write the chapters of the thesis that 
present the cases, Chapters 5 and 6, according to the different features that 
explained the presence of control mechanisms in the subsidiary. This iterative 
process in the analysis helped to avoid the risk of constructing case studies only 
from a descriptive perspective, suffering from a lack of connection with 
theoretical concepts (Yin, 1994). 
Three activities were undertaken to carry out the analysis: data reduction, data 
display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Data reduction is the process of selecting, simplifying and transforming the data 
from written-up field notes and interview transcriptions. Data reduction 
techniques used in this research can be listed as follows: 
9 Contact Summary sheet: A summary of the main information on the 
contacts (people interviewed) in each subsidiary. 
9 Codes: labels assigned to data collected during the research. This helps to 
reflect on the data and organise it. 
" Reflective remarks: raw field notes (researchers' thoughts about 
interviewees, doubts about the quality of information, new insights and 
causal relationships) 
9 Memos: they are conceptual elaborations that come from the analysis of 
the data. Their aim to tie together different pieces of data in clusters, and 
also they define causal relationships. 
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Finally, ATLAS/ti, a software to analyse qualitative data, was used. It helped to 
define codes and clusters, and classified information according to them. This 
software is effective with large amounts of qualitative data, allowing coding 
and re-coding. 
The data display was the activity of organising, compressing and assembling 
information that permitted conclusion-drawing. Matrices and graphs were the 
main data display tools in the research. A case-ordered descriptive matrix, for 
instance, was elaborated with the different control mechanisms in each 
subsidiary, grouped according to the typology used and listed by departments 
and looking at similarities and differences among the case studies. In addition, 
graphs were drawn to determine causal or explanatory relationships, which 
might explain the presence of control mechanisms in the MNC subsidiaries. 
The conclusion drawing and verification underlined regularities, patterns and 
explanations, and causal flows. The preliminary frameworks were the result of 
conclusions drawing, and they were adjusted using this process of data 
collection, data reduction, data display and conclusions verification. The 
suggestion of Miles and Huberman (1994) on noting relations among the 
constructs and building a logical chain of evidence was followed. The 
verification process was carried out by checking field notes and interview 
transcriptions, and in some cases, going back to the informants to clarify 
information. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
The different activities of the research design, the selection of the cases, the 
collection of the data and its analysis, were developed to obtain external and 
internal validity, and reliability. The external validity was achieved through the 
development of theory in the research design with the definition of theoretical 
constructs, which were used to develop the initial interview questions. The 
replication logic followed in the selection of the cases was another tactic 
suggested by Yin ( 1994) to obtain external validity. Activities such as the use 
of case study protocols are tools to strength the reliability of the research and 
the different activities in the data analysis, such as data reduction, data display 
and conclusions drawing/verification make more robust the internal validity of 
the research. 
The iterative process of induction and deduction followed in this research 
allowed a comparison of the emergent concepts and causal relationships with 
the existing literature, which either supports the research findings or, by 
contrast, contradicts them. As Eisenhardt (1989) states, this strategy increases 
the confidence in the results (internal validity) and reduces the risk of having 
findings which are idiosyncratic to the specific cases. 
One of the main critiques of qualitative research is the difficulty of 
generalisation from case study findings to a population or universe. It is 
important to highlight the fact that the generalisation from case study research 
is an "analytic generalisation" and not a statistical generalisation, in which 
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theory is developed from the analysis of one case and other cases are analysed 
to support the same theory or to modify it according to the findings from the 
analysis of the rest of the cases (Yin, 1994). The development of a framework 
to understand the presence of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries 
provides a systemic explanation that can be used in further research to analyse 
the presence of these devices. However, it is important to highlight the fact that 
the findings of this research are not universal; as was stated in the philosophical 
position of this research, they represent explanations of reality and are subject 
to replication in order to support the causal relationships explained in the 
framework. 
99 
Chapter 3: The Influence of the Country of Origin and the 
Country of Operation on MNC Subsidiaries 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter discusses the effect of different social institutions on the 
operations of firms. It takes as a basic ground that firms are built out of specific 
institutional contexts that shape their structures, practices and procedures. The 
same premise is applied in studying their internationalisation. MNCs carry with 
them a legacy that shapes their strategies and structures, which is the result. of 
their social embeddedness in a specific institutional context (Morgan, 2001). 
Chapter 1, in the presentation of the analytical framework of the thesis, 
highlighted the importance of studying the home-country institutions to 
understand the implementations of control mechanisms in MNCs. This chapter 
fulfils this aim analysing the institutions from the country of origin of the 
MNCs. In addition, the chapter also sheds some light on the nature of the 
institutions of the country of operations. As was also discussed in Chapter 1, the 
subsidiary development is linked to the opportunities and constraints deriving 
from its country of operations. These can be understood through the study of 
the institutions and economic arrangements of this country. This chapter also 
fulfils this second aim. 
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This chapter is organised as follows. First, it discusses the rationale of having a 
country level of analysis to understand the presence of control mechanisms in 
MNC subsidiaries. Second, the debates on the influence of the country of origin 
in MNCs are presented. Third, the debates on the influence of the country of 
operation on MNC subsidiaries are also discussed. The following section 
highlights the main institutions of Germany and Britain and how they have 
influenced the shape of local firms and MNCs. In this section, ideal types of 
control mechanisms according to the country of origin of the MNCs are also 
developed. The fifth section describes the main institutions in Venezuela and 
how they have affected the evolution of local firms. Finally, the main 
conclusions of the chapter are presented. 
3.2 Country Level of Analysis 
A topic of much recent debate concerning the study of MNCs is the extent to 
which MNCs reflect features of their country of origin. The globalisation 
enthusiasts and those favouring the model of stateless organisation argue that 
firms are becoming more alike, and there is no identification with a particular 
national culture or set of government industrial policies (Ohmae, 1999). Finns 
are converging towards a model of stateless organisation that has developed to 
satisfy universal needs and markets. The development of communications, the 
high levels of capital flows among countries, the diffusion of technologies, and 
the high mobility of managers are some of the reasons which account for this. 
101 
A counterpart to this argument is the position that, despite the pressures towards 
convergence, firms remain highly distinctive. This is because organisations are 
embedded in unique institutional arrangements that shape their organisational 
actions. Clark and Mueller (1996) emphasize that "firms are so embedded, 
constrained and encultured by their national homes that the room for corporate 
agency and its zones of manoeuvre could be, and perhaps is, rather small". The 
same proposition is applied to MNCs: some authors argue that they are so 
embedded in the national institutions of their country of origin, that these still 
shape corporate decisions (Morgan, 2001; Whitley, 2001; Doremus et al., 
1998; Pauly and Reich, 1997). 
Doremus et al. (1998) highlight the fact that national histories have an impact 
on the internal structure of the MNC and the development of its core 
competencies. They make clear the differentiation in the way that MNCs from 
different countries organise and develop competitive advantages. Authors such 
as Porter (1990) claim that national features are crucial factors to the 
achievement of international standing of firms, and that different features from 
their national context facilitate the development of competitive advantages of 
firms and their internationalisation process. Dunning (1993) explains the 
internationalisation of firms through a set of tangible and intangible factors, 
some of which are associated with the conditions and institutions of the country 
of origin of the firm. Kogut (1993) argues that the country of origin is a factor 
to be included in the study of the behaviour of MNCs, because of its 
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explanatory power. Dicken (2003) states that there are distinctive institutional 
arrangements and practices that produce particular kinds of MNCs. 
Context matters as a factor that influences the operations of MNCs. The 
analysis of MNCs has to consider the influence of the country of origin of the 
firm as a level of analysis. However, when the study of MNCs is focused on 
subsidiaries as the unit of analysis, another context that it is important to 
incorporate into any study is the country of operations. In recent years, there is 
an increasing recognition of the fact that the country of origin effect on MNC 
subsidiaries can be mediated by the characteristics of the country of operations 
(Geppert et al., 2003; Dicken, 2003; Quintanilla, 1998). Country of origin and 
country of operations are referred to in this chapter as the kinds of institutional 
contexts that are associated with distinctive patterns of economic organisation 
that affect the structures and processes of firms. 
During the `80s and `90s a new approach focused on the study of social systems 
of production emerged. A basic premise of this research stream is the 
assumption that the behaviour of firms is shaped by the economic and 
institutional context in which they are embedded. According to this, the fact 
that organisations are shaped by their institutional context means that 
organisations have different capacities and develop different capabilities 
depending on the context to which they belong. This is reflected in the 
existence of different social systems of production that are influenced by a set 
of collective institutions at regional, sectoral, or national levels (Hall and 
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Soskice, 2001). There are a variety of approaches in the institutional stream that 
look at this aspect. Their focus has been mainly in three institutions: financial 
system, the state, and the education and training system (Hall and Soskice, 
2001; Whitley, 1999; Whitley, 1992a; Lane, 1992; Sorge and Maurice, 1990). 
Whitley (1999; 1992a) incorporates these elements together and develops 
patterns of economic organisation called business systems (BSs). He defines a 
BS as "distinctive patterns of economic organization that vary in their degree 
and mode of authoritative coordination of economic activities, and in the 
organisation of, and interconnections between, owners, managers, experts, and 
other employees". These BSs are frameworks to study different economic 
arrangements that affect firms' structures and practices in different countries. 
An underlying assumption of this institutional stream of thought is that the 
economic coordinating mechanisms, which are shaped by the institutional 
arrangements of the country, place constraints on the definition of needs, 
preferences, and the choices of economic actors (Hollingsworth and Boyer R. 
1998). 
The varieties of capitalism is another approach to analyse the behaviour of 
firms that is rooted in institutionalism and incorporates these three elements as 
well (Hall and Soskice, 2001). It also focuses on the study of the effect of 
institutions on the behaviour of economic actors. The approach considers the 
firm as the centre of the analysis and assumes an actor-centred position, in 
which multiple actors seek to fulfil their own interests in a strategic interaction 
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with others. According to the different arrangements that firms implement to 
resolve their coordination problems, the framework presents two types of 
political economies: liberal market economies and coordinated market 
economies. 
A liberal market economy is characterised by coordination of the economy 
activity through hierarchies and competitive market arrangements (e. g., the 
US). By contrast, in the coordinated market economy, firms depend more 
heavily on non-market relationships to coordinate activities with the other 
economic actors and to develop their core competencies (e. g., Germany) (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). Although these classifications are very useful to typify 
types of economic arrangements, they are ideal types and do not consider the 
possibility of change and evolution of the institutional environment. Institutions 
are exposed to change and this factor should be included in the analysis of the 
effect of institutions on the behaviour of firms. 
According to the institutionalist perspective, there is considerable influence 
from institutions on the behaviour adopted by firms. They are sources of 
explanation for the structure, practices, and capabilities developed by firms that 
belong to a particular institutional context. Although the international character 
of their operations recognizes MNCs, at least in their initial origins they are 
linked to a specific institutional context which has shaped their activities. The 
next section reviews the current debate over the effect of the country of origin 
on MNCs. 
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3.3 The Influence of the Country of Origin on the Operations of MNCs 
Within the institutionalist literature, it has become commonplace to differentiate 
market economies according to the nature of institutions. Significant variations 
in the organisation of firms and markets across Europe have been highlighted 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001; Whitley, 1999; Doremus et al., 1998; Lane, 1992; 
Whitley, 1992b). These variations across countries are reflected in the nature of 
firms linked to a particular context, which is also the case of MNCs. 
There is a discussion over to what degree MNCs continue to be embedded in 
their country of origin in the management of their operations. This discussion 
implies two extreme positions. On one hand, there is the position that MNCs 
organise their operations abroad according to the home base mode. Therefore, 
the MNC as a distinct organisational form does not exist and they have to be 
seen as national firms with international operations (Hu, 1992). On the other 
extreme, there is the position that argues the idea that MNCs are organisational 
forms in which their competitive strategy is not shaped by national origins. 
Their capabilities are derived from assets that can be developed anywhere in the 
world and can be combined in globally optimal manners according to 
circumstances (Lane, 1998). The rationality of the decisions in MNCs that 
make them being stateless firms is subject to debate according to some authors, 
who emphasise the role of the strategic interaction and political issues among 
multiple actors and levels in the firm, which very frequently affect the decisions 
taken by MNCs ( for more detail see Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2005). 
106 
Hu's (1992) main argument is that firms remain rooted in their origins. MNCs 
are organisational forms in which corporate offices that are embedded in the 
parent country exert control over the subsidiaries. In addition, the largest bulk 
of the workforce is concentrated there. By contrast, the subsidiaries have 
distinctive characteristics that are shaped by host institutions, practices and 
values. According to his perspective there are clear difficulties for the MNCs to 
become global corporations, in other words, they remain local firms with 
international operations. 
Whitley (1998) has a similar view of the impact of internationalisation on the 
nature and behaviour of firms. He highlights the fact that the conditions 
required for significant change are so rigorous and numerous that it is unlikely 
that changes in the characteristics and strategies of firms can occur. The fact 
that MNCs have to deal with different environments is going to create 
differentiation in terms of structures and procedures, but it is unlikely that the 
core characteristics of the firm will change because of this. 
Other authors such as a Ferner (1997) take a more middle ground position. He 
highlights the fact that the behaviour of MNCs in the country of operation can 
take different forms. There are two alternatives: one which is the complete 
transfer of the patterns from the country of origin to the subsidiary, and the 
other which is the full adoption of local practices from the subsidiary side. 
However, he stresses that there are difficulties to achieve either of these. It is 
unlikely that an MNC subsidiary is fully integrated or fully localised instead, 
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the local unit can become a hybrid model in which host country norms mediate 
the influence of the parent country. This hybrid model shows a distinctive 
influence from home country institutions on the design of strategy and in some 
organisational practices in the MNC. However, the firm will have another set of 
organisational practices, which may respond to other effects such as 
globalisation, organisation, or host country effects. The MNC adopts a hybrid 
form because of this combination of practices from different origins. Lane 
(1998) defends a similar argument, arguing that MNCs are becoming hybrid 
firms. There is a tendency among MNCs to become transnational companies, 
which are decentralised in terms of assets, activities and functions. However, 
the path to become this type of MNC is shaped by specific national features in 
each country. There is a process of hybridisation among firms, which 
eventually leads to change in their identity but not its complete abandonment. 
Whitley (2005) has stated that there are different degrees of hybridisation in 
MNCs. The adoption of practices in MNCs, which may not accord with the 
traditional choices of local frets from the country of origin, is subjected to 
certain conditions. For instance, the implementation of practices in MNC 
subsidiaries because they have pressures from their context of operations might 
be easier for companies belonging to arm-length environments. However, to 
integrate these practices into the rest of the MNC and become a hybrid 
organisation is unlikely to occur because there are no pressures from other 
contexts (e. g., home or international environments) to enable this. In addition, 
MNCs that are linked to certain institutional environments with strong 
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institutions that support each other (e. g., Germany and Japan) can have 
constraints from the local context to develop certain organisational capabilities 
at home. In this case, they might adopt new organisational practices in the 
MNC subsidiaries that facilitate the development of new capabilities within the 
firm but at subsidiary level. In this case the hybridisation will be only at 
subsidiary level. 
Another argument related to the degree of hybridisation of firms has been 
developed by Lane (2001; 2000; 1998; 1992). There is the possibility of 
managerial strategic choice in the adoption of new business practices in MNCs, 
despite the constraints imposed by the home BS. There are limitations to the 
free transferability of a "business recipe" from one national context to another. 
Although, there is adaptation from the BS in response to challenges from the 
global economy system, they occur under the previous frame of the BS, which 
shapes its absorption. Therefore, the possibilities of radical organisational 
change in MNCs are rare. The key for the adoption of a hybrid form in MNCs 
relies on the level of integration of their operations. MNC subsidiaries with 
high levels of autonomy and resources become embedded in the host countries. 
A learning process occurs and there is the adoption of new structures and 
practices, and the development of new capabilities, which make the MNC 
subsidiary to take a hybrid form. If the MNC corporate offices and the 
subsidiaries are highly integrated and the BS allows the absorption of the 
practice, there is a process of reverse diffusion (Edwards, 1998). The new 
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practices and capabilities will change the MNC structure and processes creating 
a strong organisational effect 
The levels of hybridisation in MNCs, according to other authors such as 
Quintanilla and Ferner (2003) are also explained by the characteristics of the 
sector of operations, which can act as a mediator of the influence of the parent 
country on MNCs (Whitley et al., 2003; Ferner and Quintanilla, 2002). The 
addition of this level generates further complexity in the study of this type of 
firms. According to Quintanilla and Ferner (2003) the study of this 
organisations should put less emphasis on looking for great tendencies and to 
concentrate on how complex processes work in particular situations. Elements 
of convergence (in some areas), coexist with features of divergence (in others). 
Sectoral particularities account for one of the explanations for the differences 
on the levels of hybridisation found in MNCs from the same country. A basic 
premise of this approach is the assumption of a distinctive effect from the 
parent country of the MNC (e. g., the "Americanness" of US MNCs and the 
"Germanness" of German MNCs); however, it has to interact with features of 
the sector that pull in a certain direction in the adoption of business practices 
within MNCs. This perspective assumes a less static nature of a BS; by 
contrast, they are subject to change and evolution. This more dynamic nature of 
the BS opens room for the adoption of novel organisational practices in MNCs, 
which might be different from domestic ones (Edwards and Ferner, 2002). 
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Finally, the levels of hybridisation may vary in the MNC. The need of the MNC 
subsidiary to localise and adapt to the local context influences the incorporation 
of local practices into the local unit. However, this integration in the firm may 
be at two levels, local or global. If the MNC has a multinational form with little 
coordination among its local units, with decentralisation of activities and 
responsibilities, it would be more difficult to integrate the practice to the whole 
organisation. The hybridisation would be local rather than global and the 
identity of the firm will remain the same. By contrast, if the organisational form 
of the MNC allows more coordination and integration among local units the 
chance to incorporate the new organisational practice of the subsidiary to the 
whole firm would be larger. In this case, there will be a grater chance to impact 
the identity of the firm. The hybridisation will have a global rather than local 
character. 
In sum, different perspectives explain the levels of hybridisation in MNCs. The 
adoption of novel organisational practices, which are detached from the country 
of origin of the MNC, are explained by different factors (e. g., sector, level of 
integration of the MNC, or technology). However, there has been little 
emphasis on how the country of operations of the MNC subsidiary influences 
the adoption of novel practices, and the development of transferable 
capabilities, in the local unit. The next section reviews the different positions 
taken to explain the effect of the country of operations in MNC subsidiaries. 
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3.4 The Influence of the Country of Operations on MNC Subsidiaries 
The study of MNCs has moved a step further with the addition of the effect of 
the country of operations on the MNC subsidiaries. However, this is an area 
that has been rarely researched, and posits a different view of the traditional 
hierarchical relationship among corporate offices and subsidiaries. In this new 
approach, the effect of the context of operations on subsidiary behaviour, is 
investigated under a different set of assumptions about the subsidiary as an 
organisational unit. First, it is assumed that the subsidiary is an entity with some 
level of autonomy from corporate offices, 'with a more active role in the 
decisions that might affect its operations. Second, the adoption of new 
practices, and the integration of capabilities developed at subsidiary level by the 
rest of the MNC imply that the subsidiary might influence the rest of the 1VNNC. 
This position is contrary to the long-established view, in which subsidiaries 
have a more passive role and only respond to a corporate mandate. By contrast, 
this novel approach supposes that subsidiaries are entities with their own 
dynamics, are struggling to develop their own identity, and increase their range 
of power (Quintanilla, 1998). 
MNC subsidiaries struggle with opposing demands. On one hand, there are 
forces from corporate offices that pull for integration. These forces are shaped 
by features from the country of origin, sector of operations and even the 
strategic choices of the firm. On the other, the context of operations of the 
MNC subsidiaries demands localisation, to adapt to a regulatory environment, a 
set of local institutions and markets. They can become hybrid organisations, 
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which show features that are explained by elements outside of their context of 
operations such as the nature of the institutions in which they are embedded 
(Ferner, 1997; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994). 
The country of operations effect on MNC subsidiaries varies and it creates 
different levels of hybridisation. For instance, when there is a strong 
institutional system MNCs have more pressures to comply with it than in a 
weaker institutional environment (Muller-Carmen et al., 2001). 
Whitley (2005) states that the stronger and more complementary are the host 
economy institutions, the more probable is the adoption of host business 
practices by the TVINIC subsidiaries. In this case, the effect from the host country 
is the dominant one. By contrast, in host environments in which the social 
institutions are less complementary and act independently, there is more room 
for subsidiaries to adopt a wider range of business practices. A parent country, 
organisational and globalisation effects may be dominant ones. 
In sum, the country of operations matters and its effect on MNC subsidiaries 
varies. Strongly regulated institutional regimes, in Femer's words, or strong and 
complementary institutions, in Whitley's ones, add more pressures to the 
subsidiaries to adopt business practices embedded in such contexts. On the 
other hand, weaker institutional environments or less cohesive and deregulated 
ones open more opportunities for MNC subsidiaries to adopt different business 
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practices, which are influenced by the country of origin of the MNC or respond 
to global or organisational effects. 
The study of the effect of the country of operations can be not only through its 
power to mediate the home country effect or other organisational influences in 
the adoption of business practices in the subsidiary, but also through its effect 
on the development of capabilities at subsidiary level (Morgan and Whitley, 
2003; Morgan et at., 2003; Geppert et al., 2003; Morgan, 2001). Any subsidiary 
has its own social characteristics associated with the country of operations. The 
nature of the host BS is so powerful that it provides the conditions to develop 
capabilities in the subsidiary, which might enhance or not its position within the 
MNC. In other words, the development of capabilities in the subsidiary, which 
are highly valuable or scarce in the MNC, is affected by the opportunities and 
constraints that the context of the country of operations offers to the local site. 
The last position on the effect of the country of operations combines different 
elements, to analyse the development of subsidiaries. The country of operations 
affects the subsidiary development, as well as other features such as the parent 
country, and elements internal to the subsidiaries (Belanguer et at., 2003; 
Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998). There is a set of forces from the country of 
origin of the MNC, such as its origins within a particular BS, the characteristics 
of the local markets, the type of technology that the organisation uses, its 
corporate culture, and strategies that shape the local unit. However, the country 
of operations and certain institutions within it is another shaper of the 
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subsidiary. Organisational changes in the MNC subsidiaries may be led by the 
subsidiary; however, the decisions of the subsidiary are framed by corporate 
policies and institutional arrangements from the parent and host countries. 
This review of the different positions on the effect of the country of origin and 
the country of operation highlights some points which are important to mention. 
Firstly, institutional contexts are a valuable source to explain the behaviour of 
MNCs. There is a link between the origins of MNCs and how the economic 
institutions have shaped the path taken by them. Moreover, these institutional 
arrangements also affect the internationalisation process of the firm and the 
transfer of business practices to its subsidiaries. However, this effect from the 
country of origin is mediated by the characteristics of the context in which 
MNC subsidiaries operate. The characteristics of the institutional arrangements 
in the country of operation play an active role to shape the adoption of 
practices, on one hand, and the development of capabilities in the subsidiary, on 
the other. In the same order of ideas, all these activities are intimately related to 
the nature of the control mechanisms implemented in MNC subsidiaries. 
Secondly, there are variations in the power of the country of operations to affect 
the operations of subsidiaries. Some of them exert a larger influence than 
others. For instance, when the institutions are more complementary or there is a 
highly regulated environment, and the BS acts more cohesively, the influence 
of the host context is greater. Thirdly, the positions adopted to explain what 
features influence the operations of the subsidiary range from a deterministic 
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view, where the context is the main influence on the operations of the 
subsidiary, to another which combines the deterministic view with a more 
voluntaristic position of the managers of the subsidiary that gives them the 
possibility to choose among a set of alternatives that shape the subsidiary 
development. However, the number of alternatives is restricted by the 
conditions of the country of operations, which supports some choices more than 
others. 
Finally, causal relationships are clearer in the case of the effect of the country of 
origin in the MNCs, but not in the case of the country of operations. More 
research in this area is needed, particularly in contexts in which the institutions 
are not complementary and they do not work as a coherent system. The next 
section, as a first step to understand the effect of the country of operations in 
MNC subsidiaries, discusses two divergent institutional arrangements, British 
and German, on MNCs from these origins. After this, the potential effect of the 
country of operation in MNC subsidiari es is discussed with the analysis of 
Venezuela as a country of operations. 
3.5 Country of origin effect on German and British MNCs 
This section presents the main institutions of the countries of origin of the 
MNCs chosen in the research: Germany and Britain. As has been argued, there 
is a strong connection between the shape adopted by firms and the nature of the 
institutions. This section highlights the link between the institutions of the two 
countries and the practices, structure and international strategies developed by 
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firms. In addition, it presents ideal types of control mechanisms according to 
the country of origin of the MNCs. The main institutions analysed are the state, 
the financial and the education and training systems, which are considered to be 
crucial institutions in shaping the characteristics of firms (Whitley, 1999; 
1992a; Lane, 1992). 
3.5.1 Main Features of the German Model and their Effect on Local Firms 
Germany has been characterised as a coordinated market economy in which 
firms depend on non-market relationships to coordinate their activities and 
develop their capabilities. This form of coordination frequently involves 
extensive relational or incomplete contracting. Control activities are carried out 
through networks and the exchange of information within them, and there is 
more reliance on collaborative relationships rather than competitive ones to 
build the competencies of the firm. Firms interact strategically, and the result of 
this interaction depends on the presence of supportive institutions (Hall and 
Soskice, 2001). The model in Germany is characterised by strong institutions, 
which are complementary, in the sense that the presence of one institution 
increases the efficiency of others. 
Other authors, such as Whitley (2001), refer to the German institutional context 
as a collaborative business environment. This type of business environment has 
a number of important institutions that together lock key actors into each 
other's actions, encouraging cooperation among them by limiting exit 
opportunities. The state plays an important role in this type of business system. 
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In the case of Germany, it is not directly involved in the coordination of 
economic development, but encourages private associations to coordinate 
activities, and supports a strong public training system in collaboration with 
employers and unions. Germany is also recognised by its highly regulated 
nature and strong institutions. In addition, the regulated environment has 
developed a rational-legal bureaucratic pattern of administration, which has 
influenced the management of firms through bureaucratic coordination (Lane, 
1997). 
There are institutions with distinctive characteristics in Germany, which have 
shaped the nature of indigenous firms. The financial system is one of them. 
Zysman (1983) distinguishes two types of financial systems, each of them are 
affecting in a different way the relationships between banks, industries and 
firms. The first type is a capital-market based system, in which the resources are 
allocated in competitive markets based on prices. Markets are large and liquid, 
which through a commodity process trades and prices resources. Most investors 
in this type of system deal with portfolios of shares, which can be traded in 
secondary and tertiary markets. The financial systems of the US and Britain, for 
instance, are examples of a capital-market based system. 
The second type is a credit-based financial system, which on one hand can be 
subjected to strong intervention from the government or state agencies to 
administer capital or on the other be dominated by financial institutions. This 
type, typically, has weak and illiquid capital markets. The state or banks 
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allocate capital to particular sectors or activities, because of the concentration of 
capital in a few hands (e. g., universal banks), or the regulation from the state 
(e. g., control of interest rate) creates a situation in which the demand for capital 
exceeds the supply of it. 
Germany is a case of a credit-based financial system dominated by financial 
institutions. It has been based, traditionally, on bank credit to support the 
growth of firms, affecting the development of stock markets in the country 
(Lane, 1992). Banks play an important role in supporting industrial 
development in the country through their participation in floating companies, 
providing long-term credits, being shareholders with an important participation, 
managing the shares of others and occupying positions on the supervisory 
boards of companies. The implications for German firms of having funding 
from this sort of shareholder is that it supports long-term investment and means 
the acceptance of low dividends, making hostile takeovers difficult as means to 
increase the return of shareholders (Jürgens et al., 2000; Scott, 1997; Lane, 
1992). Therefore, the investment of firms is more strategic because they do not 
face competitive pressures to maximise returns in the short term (Vitols, 2003; 
Ferner et al., 2001; Vitols et al., 1997; Streeck, 1997). In addition, monitoring 
activities in firms are carried out through networks, which are initiated between 
managers and technical personnel inside the firms, and continue with personnel 
in other firms. Other types of economic actors (e. g., unions, suppliers and 
clients) are closely involved with companies: this fact forces the latter to share 
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information with the former regarding its performance, which in turn is another 
mechanism to monitor operations (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Company growth financed by bank credit has not diminished the family-owned 
nature of German firms. Family-owned companies are a majority among the 
small and medium enterprises, and among very large corporations too. The 
nature of the financial system and the greater protection against hostile takeover 
afforded by this are some of the reasons for this presence (Ferner et al., 2001; 
Lane, 1992). There is a dual board structure in firms, with supervisory and 
executive boards. The existence of two different boards has implications for top 
managers within the firms. The supervisory board traditionally acts as a filter 
for the demands of the shareholders, and the chief executive and the rest of the 
management team do not generally face the same pressures as their Anglo- 
Saxon counterparts. However, this feature of the German corporate governance 
has changed in recent last years, with the management team facing more 
responsibility for the performance of the company. The European Union has 
developed standards to manage the operations of firms in the region. For 
instance, the European Commission has recommended a "cooling-off period" of 
five years before an executive of a European firm moves up and joins its 
supervisory board. This is contrary to promotion practices in Germany in which 
former chief executives move straight up to supervisory boards (The 
Economist, 2004). 
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The state is another institution that influences the development of the German 
firms. It has limited capacity of direct intervention in the economy, because it 
has fragmented sovereignty and there are constitutional limitations on 
discretionary government action (Wood, 2001). The European Central Bank 
dictates economic policies for the European region looking for monetary 
stability without intervention from the European states. The federal cartel office 
is responsible for competition policy, and industrial policy is on the hands of 
the Länder. The decentralisation of government functions to autonomous 
institutions and the constitutional limitations on government interventionism 
has kept the federal government to intervene much directly. It is more 
concerned on creating a stable environment for business (Schmidt, 2002). The 
state has concentrated its efforts on providing infrastructural supports such as 
for research and development activities, promoting social cohesion through a 
generous welfare system, and equitable living conditions across the country 
through a redistributive system of revenue sharing across the Länder (Streeck, 
1997). 
Firms show less opportunistic behaviour because of the established rules of the 
competitive game, which also permits strategic decisions to be made with 
reasonable expectations on the calculation of the outcomes from the investment. 
There is high commitment to a specific product or technology (Whitley, 1999). 
There are also strong constitutional protections (e. g., the right of unions and 
employee associations to regulate wages and working conditions without 
intervention from the government). The result of this type of state is 
predictability and stability of government policies: the political innovation is 
relatively minor and the economic agents can develop stable expectations, 
developing lasting relationships with one or another (Streeck, 1997). The 
German state fits what Whitley (2005) refers to as an inclusive corporatist 
state, which is interested in actively involving business associations in the 
economic development and to give them the role of state agencies, which look 
for predictable and reliable patterns for the achievement of development goals. 
According to his view, this type of state develops cohesive patterns of labour 
organisation that encourage firms to work in coordinated ways with them, and 
with unions and state agencies. Firms regulated by a state with these 
characteristics have a closer integration of management and labour, and 
productive tasks, and a more communitarian approach to problem resolution 
(Lane, 1998). 
Another characteristic of the German economy is the extensive use of labour 
with high industry-specific and firm-specific skills, which requires a training 
system capable of providing workers with those skills. Industry employer 
associations and trade unions supervise the training system, and pressure firms 
to take apprentices and avoid "free-riding" behaviours of the training efforts of 
others. The skills required by an industry are negotiated, and training protocols 
are developed according to the needs of each industry and sector. In this way, 
the system balances the supply and demand for labour. On one hand, it supplies 
personnel with the skills required by industries and sectors; on the other, it 
assures that there is a demand for graduates from the training system (Hall and 
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Soskice, 2001). As the training system shows high levels of technical 
specialisation, which are aligned with the needs of industrial sectors, the 
education of German managers is dominated by technical background (e. g., 
engineering) with specialisation in specific areas (Streeck, 1997; Fox, 1992; 
Lane, 1992). This technical background of the German managers is reflected in 
the great emphasis of German firms on technical functions, including a 
considerable connection between development and production activities 
(Harzing et al., 2002). 
The levels of cohesion and coordination among the institutions of the German 
business environment have also facilitated the development of long-term 
employment contracts. The relationship between employers and workers is 
shaped by distinctive patterns of labour organisation that have allowed firms to 
engage in continuous discussions with unions and state agencies. Employment 
and labour relations are organised in ways that encourage cooperation, which is 
also supported by the long-term nature of the relationship between employers 
and employees (Whitley, 2005; Vitols et al., 1997). 
As is discussed above, German institutions have distinctive effects on local 
firms. Table 3.1 presents a summary of the main characteristics of the local 
firms shaped by the nature of the German institutions. 
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Table 3.1 Main Characteristics of German firms according to the Influence of Social Institutions 
Institution Characteristics of the Firm 
Financial " Supports the development of specific industries or sectors 
System "A long-term horizon on the nature of the investment of firms 
" Monitoring activities of firms through personal networks 
" Close relationship among the firms and unions, suppliers and clients 
" There is a concentration of family-owned and family-managed enterprises 
State " Reduces opportunistic behaviour of firms, and commitment to specific product, 
industry or technology 
" Highly regulated labour environment which shapes the relationships between 
firms and unions to be largely coordinated and to have a communitarian approach 
Education and " Education of German managers has a strong technical background 
Training " Enterprises are highly specialised with strong support to the Rand D and 
Systems production areas 
0 Employees are on long-term employment contracts 
There is a cascade effect on how institutions affect some features of German 
firms and their processes of internationalisation, which is discussed in the next 
part. As Morgan (2001) has argued, MNCs are built in specific institutional 
contexts that have moulded the way they internationalise. There are distinctive 
characteristics of the structure, strategy and practices of firms, which can be 
explained according to the nature of the social institutions of the place that they 
belonged to. In the case of Germany, the strong and distinctive features of the 
German business environment have also affected how firms have moved to 
operate in the international context. 
3.5.1.1 The Internationalisation of German Firms 
There are distinctive characteristics of German organisations in their process of 
internationalisation, which in turn affect the coordination of their activities 
abroad. The deep domestic embeddedness of the German firms, is argued, has 
124 
led them to use predominantly the exporting route to internationalisation (Lane, 
2001; 1998). The strong reliance of German firms on their home base 
institutions have made more attractive for German firms to take the export 
strategy than follow the FDI route. This tendency has changed gradually since 
the mid-'80s. FDI has increased significantly and the increase has been 
particularly strong in the '90s (Lane, 1998). The increase in the volume FDI of 
German firms has taken different forms such as the relocation of basic 
production facilities and the decentralisation of Rand D activities abroad. In 
sectoral terms, there is significant investment in the oil industry in the US and 
the United Kingdom in the second half of the `90s. It has been a decrease of 
German investment in the manufacturing sector during the same period (from 
60 per cent to 33 per cent). The distribution of the investment in this sector is 
concentrated in the chemical industry (35 per cent) followed by motor vehicles 
(17 per cent), and metal and mechanical products (14 per cent). The 
investment in the service sector is concentrated in insurance and business 
services (77 per cent) (Dicken, 2003). 
Whitley (2001) describes German firms as organizations with little experience 
in managing operations in adversarial, weakly institutionalised environments, 
and which find it difficult to conduct activities in contexts different from their 
collaborative business environment. Because of this, the German MNCs limit 
the size and centrality of their initial FDI and concentrate their business in 
familiar environments (e. g., Western Europe) which are easy to control, 
showing signs of late internationalisation compared with their British and US 
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counterparts (Ferner et al., 2001; Lane, 1998). As MNCs, they tend to be 
closely supervised and integrated into the parent country activities, with a 
concentration of Rand D activities and workforce in Germany. The corporative 
nature of the industrial relations in Germany, and the considerable influence of 
German unions account for the concentration of the workforce in the country 
(Lane, 1998). 
Harzing, Sorge, et al.. (2002) stress that German MNCs perform on the basis of 
an existing product template, with low adaptation of this product abroad; they 
try to emphasize interdependencies and take advantage of products developed 
locally. Therefore, they stick to products developed in the parent country and 
there is little room for innovation and different technical and product templates. 
According to Whitley (2001), this feature enables to have more integration 
between the subsidiaries of the firm and the corporate offices, which is 
characteristic of German MNCs; integration that is reflected also in the 
mechanisms that they use to manage their operations abroad. 
Finally, the HR department in German companies shows a pattern which has 
implications for the policies and practices of the HR area in general. For 
instance, it is argued that the personnel function in German firms has a more 
operative than strategic nature (Wächter and Muller-Carmen, 2002; Ferner et 
al., 2001; Ferner and Varul, 2000; 1999). 
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Lawrence (1991) describes the personnel function in Germany as more reactive, 
more legalistic and less autonomously professional. In part, this operative 
orientation of the function is associated with the highly regulated labour market 
in Germany, which in turn makes the main goal of the function the application 
of those regulations (Ferner and Varul, 1999). The concentration of activities, 
which are more administrative and legalistic, may have consequences for the 
implementation of international human resource management (IRHM) in 
German MNCs. It can be more difficult for these MNCs to manage some HR 
practices with a more strategic vision and to develop international pay and 
performance management systems as well (Ferner, 1997). In addition, the 
absence of performance-related payment systems as a type of control can be 
expected in German firms. The non-existence of an HR strategy means that HR 
practices among the subsidiaries are localised, which does not support 
integration of HR practices and policies between the headquarters and 
subsidiary, or across subsidiaries. 
Whitley (1992a) has pointed out that in order to understand the nature of 
managerial structures and practices in diverse environments, it is important to 
look at the institutional contexts for explanations of the forms adopted by firms. 
The internationalisation strategy of firms, their structure, types of products, 
localisation of production sites, and the levels of integration and coordination 
among the corporate offices and subsidiaries are influenced by the country of 
origin of the MNC. Therefore, the control mechanisms developed by an MNC, 
it can be hypothesised, are also shaped by these forces. In the case of German 
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firms, there are features from their institutional environment which have a clear 
effect on the control mechanisms that these firms might develop to control their 
operations. Taking this proposition a step further, MNCs from Germany still 
reflect in their control devices signs of this influence, which in turn makes it 
possible to develop ideal combinations of these mechanisms in relation to the 
country of origin of the MNC. 
3.5.1.2 The Presence of Control Mechanisms in German MNCs 
This section presents the combination of control mechanisms in German MNCs 
according to the influence of a variety of institutions from the country of origin. 
Harzing's (1999) typology of control mechanisms, described in Chapter 1, is 
the framework used to explain their presence. 
The first type of control to be examined is the output control, with special 
emphasis on the nature of the financial controls in the German MNCs. There is 
a causal relationship between the characteristics of the output control and the 
type of corporate governance in firms. Because of the character of the 
coordinated market economy of Germany, which in turn affects the corporate 
governance of local firms, the reliance of German organisations on output 
controls is weak, and they are not orientated to monitor short-term performance. 
These controls are not implemented in the subsidiaries to monitor short-term 
results. Some studies have concluded that there is a tendency in German firms 
to have loose financial controls and not particularly strong pressures for results 
in the short term (Ferner and Varul, 1999; Ferner, 1997). In addition, Ahrens 
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(1997) posits that accounting practices in German firms are not an instrument to 
evaluate performance, but are set up as procedures to legitimise past actions 
rather than to control future performance. 
This proposition has implications for the other forms of control. In the case of 
bureaucratic formalised controls (i. e.,, standard procedures, written policies and 
rules) German organisations show considerable reliance on them (Child et al., 
2001). The great emphasis of these firms on technical functions means that they 
will attempt to perform on the basis of an existing product template. Thus, they 
will try to replicate this product template abroad and transfer practices that 
support this aim (Harzing et al., 2002). The standardisation of procedures plays 
an important role in pursuing this. If the firm develops templates and 
procedures which are homogeneous, they facilitate the integration among the 
different departments. In the particular case of MNCs, this helps to have more 
integration between the subsidiaries of the firm and the corporate offices, which 
is characteristic of German MNCs according to Whitley (2001). There is 
evidence for the extensive reliance of German MNCs on procedural controls to 
manage their international operations (Ferner and Varul, 1999; Harzing, 1999; 
Neghandi, 1983). In line with this, Ferner and Varul (2000) in a study of the 
personnel function in German MNCs, found that British managers perceived 
that it was difficult for German managers to embrace policies that required 
flexibility rather than bureaucratic uniformity. 
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The presence of the other two types of control, personal centralised control and 
control through socialisation and networks, is interconnected with the firm's 
reliance on output controls. In the case of the German firms, the limited 
presence of financial controls to monitor the performance of the subsidiaries is 
balanced with other devices that substitute this function. Personal centralised 
control through the presence of expatriates accounts for this. In the case of 
Japanese MNCs and the high presence of expatriates in their subsidiaries, 
Ferner (1997) addresses this practice as an intensive mode of control that allows 
for the imposition of the central authority through direct presence of these 
managers. The same proposition can be applied to the case of German MNCs. 
The expatriates are substitutes to alternative forms of control, such as financial 
controls to monitor performance. 
Empirical research has shown differences in the presence of expatriate 
managers in subsidiaries according to the country of origin of the multinational. 
In the case of German and British MNCs, there are significant differences 
between the countries. For example, studies of German and Japanese MNCs 
have shown that they are more likely to send out expatriates to their subsidiaries 
than MNCs from other countries, particularly Britain and the US (Peterson, 
2003; Peterson et at., 2000; Ferner and Varul, 1999; Harzing, 1999; Tung, 
1982). As an explanation for the differences found it, is argued that German 
MNCs rely more on informal mechanisms such as communication and 
consultation to control operations. To support this informality, the firm needs to 
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create channels which have to be trustworthy. Expatriates seem adequate to 
accomplish this function. 
Control through socialisation and network has a diverse composition. The 
presence of socialisation as a control mechanism is medium compared to 
British firms. For German firms the meaning of corporate culture is different 
than for Anglo-Saxon corporations. Culture is something that has grown 
organically in the firm over a long period of time. It is based on tradition, long- 
term commitment, and stability (Ferner and Varul, 1999). The concept of 
corporate culture in German firms is less marketing oriented compared to the 
Anglo-Saxon counterparts and is less explicit. As it is seen as something that is 
developed over time, it can be expected that few explicit mechanisms support 
these activities. German subsidiaries will have less pressure to implement 
mechanisms at this level to support the development of similar corporate 
culture in the local units. However, the large presence of expatriates is an 
indirect way to develop control mechanisms through socialisation. Expatriates 
are socialised into the parent company culture before they are moved to the 
local units. They act as carriers of the "company way" of doing things and 
acculturate locals on the practices of the company. In this role, they also might 
develop networks with personnel in the headquarters offices and other 
subsidiaries that support the exchange of information on informal basis. 
However, the development of informal networks in the case of locals can be 
more difficult, there is some evidence that the flows of personnel in German 
firms are largely from the centre to the subsidiaries than vice versa (Ferner and 
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Varul, 1999). In other words in German firms, there is more exportation of 
expatriates than importation of these managers. 
The presence of the last sub-group of control through socialisation and 
networks, e. g., formalised lateral or cross-department relations, is substantial in 
German MNCs. As was mentioned, there is a considerable integration of the 
operations of the German MNCs subsidiaries with corporate offices. This 
integration has to be supported with subtle mechanisms, in which formalised 
lateral or cross-department relations are useful devices. The integration of 
operations within the MNC supports the development of projects across 
subsidiaries. Ferner and Varul (1999) found, in their study of German firms 
with operations in Britain, that they tended to work together more as a team 
across divisions and centres than their British counterparts. The creation of 
these intra-firm projects in which expatriates and also locals participate 
supports the development of devices for informal exchange of information. 
There is a distinctive pattern of the combination of control mechanisms in 
German MNCs, according to their characteristics. Table 3.2 presents the 
combination of them. 
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Table 31 Presence of Control Mechanisms in German AMNCs 
Personal/Cultural ImpersonallBureaucratic/Technocr 
atic 
DirecdE_xplicit Personalised Centralised Control: Bureaucratic Formalised Control: 
High High 
(Peterson, 2003; Peterson et al., 2000; (Child et at., 2001; Ferner and 
Ferner and Varul, 1999; Harzing, 1999; Varul, 1999; Harzing, 1999; 
Tung, 1982) Neghandi, 1983) 
Indirect/Implicit Control by Socialisation and Networks Output Control: 
" Socialisation: Low 
Medium (Ferner and Varul, 1999; Ferner, 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999) 1997; Ahrens, 1997) 
" Informal exchange of 
information: 
Medium 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999) 
Formal lateral relations: 
High 
(Ferner and Varui, 1999) 
The typology of Control Mechanisms is from Harzing (1999). 
This section has listed and described the main institutions that have shaped 
organisations in Germany. According to the influence of institutions such as the 
state and the financial and education systems, local firms have distinctive 
characteristics which are reflected in their structure, business practices and type 
of agreements between employers and employees. The section has also 
described the main features of German MNCs according to the institutions of 
the country. Finally, ideal combinations of control mechanisms in the firms 
according to the effect of institutions have been discussed. These combinations 
have been developed taking into consideration how the nature of German firms, 
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which is shaped by the main institutions of the country, is reflected in the way 
that German MNCs control their operations abroad. 
In the next part, the main features of the Britain model are presented, and how 
its institutions have influenced the development of local firms. This section also 
discusses how this development has shaped the internationalisation of the 
British MNCs and the implementation of control mechanisms in MNCs 
subsidiaries. 
3.5.2 Alain Features of the British Model and their Effect on Local Firms 
The institutional context of Britain has different characteristics compared to 
Germany. From an institutional point of view, Britain is classified as a liberal 
market economy. In this type of economy, firms rely heavily on market 
relations to resolve their coordination problems. Competitive market 
arrangements and hierarchies are the main forms of coordination among the 
different economic actors. There is an arm's-length exchange of goods and 
services, on a competitive basis and using formal contracting. Buyers and 
suppliers adjust their willingness to offer and demand goods and services, 
according to the price signals generated by the markets (Hall and Soskice, 
2001). The case of Britain is characterised by little institutional support for non- 
market forms of coordination and an important goal of institutions is to monitor 
formal contracting among the different economic actors. 
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Britain has also been classified as an arm's length BS (Whitley, 2001), which 
provides highly flexible entry and exit arrangements for economic actors, but 
within a strongly institutionalised formal system of rules that support formal 
contracting. The state has more a role of regulator than coordinator, compared 
to Germany. The existence of formal contracting facilitates delegation and trust 
between owners of firms and managers. Owner control is exerted at arm's 
length through financial markets. 
The nature of the institutions in Britain is different compared. to the German 
ones. The financial system, for instance, is a capital-market based system 
(Zysman, 1983). As was described, this type of system allocates resources in 
competitive markets based on prices. Because of this, firms are attentive to the 
price of the shares in the equity markets and'to current earnings. Mergers and 
acquisitions, even through hostile takeovers, are frequent when the market 
valuation of a firm declines. As the main source of financial funding for the 
firm is equity markets, which have dispersed investors, they require publicly 
available financial information on the performance of the firm. The absence of 
networks that can provide investors with such inside information on the 
progress of the firm reinforces these requirements (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
There are important implications of the nature of the financial system in Britain 
for the corporate governance of firms. Anglo-Saxon firms are mainly managed 
in the interests of shareholders and focus on the maximization of short-term 
profits (Harzing et al., 2002). Compensation systems are designed to reward the 
top managers for increases in net earnings or share prices; therefore, the 
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evaluation of their performance is linked to issues such as the current 
profitability of the company (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
Contrary to German companies, family ownership has declined among British 
firms. There has been a shift from personal shareholding to institutional 
shareholding, with an increase in the number of firms that are controlled 
through a group of interests (Scott, 1997). This has important implications in 
the way management is organised in Britain. There is a clear separation 
between management and ownership, with high levels of autonomy delegated 
to the chief executive, and the formulation of strategic decisions undertaken 
within committees of top managers. This level of autonomy of the managerial 
team comes with higher levels of accountability from this group concerning the 
performance of the firm. Incentives align the performance expectations of top 
management with those of shareholders (Vitols et al., 1997). 
The state of Britain, compared to its German counterpart, provides a strong 
contrast which in turn affects local firms in a different way. Central government 
enjoys high levels of power with a high degree of policy autonomy. Therefore, 
there is little support from local governments and other independent authorities 
such as unions in the implementation of these policies (Wood, 2001; Lane, 
1992). 
The state in Britain has become a more regulatory state moving from one 
focused on leaving business alone to organise and regulate itself in the `80s to 
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one in which independent agencies and laws regulate business activities. Its 
current nature is more like an arbiter of the rules of the game (Schmidt, 2002). 
The strong institutionalised formal system of rules and procedures in this type 
of BS support a role for the state which is more concerned with regulating the 
interaction of economic actors than coordinating them, thus enhancing 
competition in the market place. This type of state gives autonomy to individual 
firms, unions and other groups to freely organise (Whitley, 2005; 1999). There 
is a set of formal systems of rules and procedures, which allows firms, 
managers and owners to make strategic decisions on the operation of firms in a 
rational manner. However, there is little interdependence between collective 
actors, and few organisations are locked in to destiny of others. 
The development of capabilities and competences is carried out individually by 
the firm and are not shared with other firms or customers and suppliers 
(Whitley, 2001). Institutions operate in a less coordinated manner when 
compared with their German counterparts. As a result, there is little 
development of local networks with other firms, or with state agencies and 
other organisations (Lane, 1998). 
The education and training systems show distinctive characteristics. The formal 
education system provides education that is focused on general skills, which are 
more valued by employers and employees. Firms are reluctant to invest in 
industry-specific skills or to develop apprenticeship programs. The character of 
low-skill economy of Britain does not reinforce the learning of specialised 
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technical skills on the employees. The education of managers in the country has 
a more generalist approach: it is more likely that they have accounting 
backgrounds and a takeover mentality (Lane, 1992; Fox, 1992). The more 
generalist background of British managers is reflected in the value that firms 
give to functions such as marketing and finance and the concentration of efforts 
to develop those activities within the enterprises (Harzing et al., 2002; Ebster- 
Grosz and Pugh, 1996). 
The relationship between employers and employees has a different nature in 
Britain. Strategic decisions by firms to grow or increase profitability are linked 
frequently to mergers and acquisitions. These decisions affect employees, 
which can be dismissed because of downsizing practices. Employees face short 
job tenures and fluid labour markets, which reflect the short-term nature of the 
relationship among the two parts. The market regulates the nature of the 
relations between employers and employees, and this is reinforced by the lack 
of obligation that firms have to establish representative bodies for employees 
and the little power that unions have compared to their German counterparts 
(Hall and Soskice, 2001). Table 3.3 presents the characteristics of British 
firms according to the influence of institutions from the country. 
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Table 3.3 Alain Characteristics of British Firms According to the Influence of Social Institutions 
Institution Characteristics of the Firm 
Financial System "A short-term horizon on the investment of firms, which looks for profits in 
the short-term 
" The monitoring of the firm is through publicly available financial 
information 
" The growth of the firm, frequently, is through mergers and acquisitions 
" Very independent relationship among firms, unions, suppliers and clients 
" Shift in ownership from personal shareholding to institutional one 
" Separation between ownership and management, high levels of autonomy 
to the top management 
State " There is no development of specific sectors or industries; there is no 
concentration of firms sharing similar skills and technology 
" Set of formal rules and procedures allows firms to plan and take decisions 
rationally 
" Firms can adopt leading edge business practices because of the low 
interdependence between collective actors 
Education and " Managers and employees with a generalist background 
Training Systems " Employees have short job tenures and face a flexible labour market, 
therefore, short-term employment contracts 
" Firms are concerned with the development of marketing and finance 
activities rather that production and Rand D functions 
As in the case of the German institutions, the internationalisation of British 
firms is also affected by how they originated. The next section presents the 
main characteristics of British MNCs. 
3.5.2.1 The Internationalisation of British Firms 
The internationalisation of firms that belong to Britain have specific 
characteristic in how they have moved abroad. British firms have a tradition of 
international operations since the colonial era. They have preferred the FDI 
route to expand abroad, instead of following a strategy of going international 
through the export model. Between 1987 and the late `90s the investment of the 
manufacturing and services sectors increased just fewer than 40 per cent the 
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former and around 45 per cent the latter. There are two industries, food, drink, 
tobacco and petroleum and chemical products, which account for more than 60 
per cent of FDI in manufacturing sector. In the service sector, finance, 
insurance and business services account for 61 per cent of total investment 
(Dicken, 2003). In addition, they have been less focused in geographical terms 
on the home region, with more operations in dissimilar environments and have 
extensive geographical expansion (Lane, 1998). The long history of 
internationalisation in the case of British firms has made them less 
embeddedness in the home environment (Schmidt, 2002). This is also reflected 
in the geographical expansion of the British investment around the world. 
As there is little concentration of firms by industry or sectors, the British firms 
have more experience in managing activities across different kinds of industry 
and business environments (Whitley, 2001). The British firms, typically, have 
grown through mergers and acquisitions and not always the diversification has 
been in related areas of the firm. The diversification of products, technologies 
and markets means that the top management has less detailed knowledge about 
specific industries and markets than managers from less diversified firms. 
Therefore, they delegate operational decisions to managers in the subsidiaries, 
which is reflected in their limited integration into the parent operations. 
Financial measures of performance and planning become relevant to 
counterbalance the levels of delegation to the local units (Whitley, 2001; Child 
et al., 2001). 
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Low levels of integration between the corporate offices and subsidiaries are also 
reflected in high local responsiveness and low headquarters dependence for 
British subsidiaries, which follow a more multi-domestic strategy (Harzing et 
al., 2002; Whitley, 2001). 
British MNCs still show a concentration of operations, assets and workforce in 
the home country. However, compared to their German counterparts the 
proportion is smaller. The large British MNCs have more internationalisation in 
terms of assets and operations, particularly in the Rand D activities (Lane, 
1998). MNCs from this origin are embedded in a less regulated environment in 
which unions are less powerful; therefore, there are fewer restrictions on 
moving capital and resources abroad. 
The HR function in British MNCs is more strategic in its design. There are 
elaborated formal mechanisms for measuring and rewarding management 
performance, such as performance-related payment systems (Edwards et al., 
1996; Sisson, 1995). In addition, compared to German firms, British MNCs 
follow decentralised bargaining structures. There is also evidence in British 
MNCs of the implementation of innovative HR practices, such as profit-sharing 
schemes and quality circles programs, (Marginson et al. , 1993). This more 
integrated vision of the function means a set of global rules that can be designed 
at corporate level which are shared by the MNC subsidiaries. 
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The link between institutions and the development of firms has been presented 
in this section. As in the German case, there is a highly distinctive pattern of 
internationalisation among the British firms, which is also reflected in the way 
that these firms manage their operations abroad; this influence can be observed 
in the control mechanisms that British MNCs implement in their subsidiaries. 
3.5.2.2 The Presence of Control Mechanisms in British MNCs 
Previous findings suggest that there are some differences, looking at the control 
mechanisms in British MNCs, compared to the devices implemented in the 
German MNCs. The first type of control to be examined is the output control, 
with special emphasis on the nature of the financial controls in the firms. 
As can be expected, the financial devices in firms from a liberal market 
economy show sophisticated mechanisms to control the financial operations in 
the MNCs subsidiaries. The firm's valuation in equity markets becomes crucial 
to secure funding, either from the stock market or through bank lending. In 
addition, the lack of corporate networks capable of providing investors with 
inside information makes them more dependent on quarterly balance sheets and 
public information (Hall and Soskice, 2001). Therefore, the credibility of this 
type of information has to be high, and firms need to develop complex financial 
mechanisms to support their sales forecasts and profits predictions for coming 
years. These mechanisms are designed to monitor short-term results and cost- 
efficiency, which is linked to Whitley's (1992b) proposition on the propensity 
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in British firms to "internalise" risk rather than share it with financial 
institutions. 
There is a stronger need to develop frameworks of rules and systems to align 
decision-making in the subsidiaries to the goals of the firm. British enterprises 
depend on bureaucratic formalised control to manage their operations abroad. In 
this way, they allow local responsiveness in the subsidiaries, but at the same 
time, they assure some consistency in practices and decisions within the MNC. 
It has been found that impersonal control mechanisms, which include output 
and standardisation devices, are mechanisms heavily used by British and US 
MNCs (Harzing et at., 2002). 
The existence of the other two mechanisms, expatriates' presence and control 
by socialisation and networks, is affected by the existence of output controls 
and bureaucratic formalised devices. There is evidence about the limited 
presence of expatriates in British MNCs. Egelhoff (1984) points out that 
European MNCs make greater use of expatriates than their British and 
American counterparts. These findings are supported by other research on 
European MNCs (see, for example, Ferner and Varul, 1999; and Harzing, 
1999). The implementation of sophisticated financial controls, which monitor 
closely the subsidiary operations in general, and specifically its financial 
outputs, makes less necessary the presence of expatriates to exercise this 
function. In addition, the tendency of British firms to diversify products and 
services means they operate in a decentralised style. To support this 
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decentralisation, it is more appropriate to implement impersonal mechanisms, 
such as standardisation of procedures, written policies, and standard rules. 
The use of expatriates as a control mechanism has a partial influence on other 
control devices such as socialisation. Assuming that the expatriates act as 
carriers of the organisational culture, through their knowledge of "the company 
way", their absence in MNCs subsidiaries limits the transfer of this learning. 
However, the vision shared by British MNCs of the corporate culture as a 
management tool that can be introduced to support organisational change 
reinforces the creation of devices to achieve this objective (Ferner and Varul, 
1999). Thus, socialisation as a control device in British MNCs is medium. The 
other type of network control, informal exchange of information, is affected by 
the multidomestic structure adopted. by firms. The development of an informal 
network, which might be a subtle form of control among the subsidiaries, is 
constrained by the decentralisation of operations and by the little presence of 
expatriates in the British MNCs. 
Finally, formal lateral relations might not be abundant. As the British MNCs 
have a propensity to give autonomy to their subsidiaries and are likely to 
operate on a decentralised way, the presence of formal lateral relations is rare. 
Table 3.4 indicates the composition of control devices that might be found in 
British MNCs according to features from their country of origin. 
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Table 3.4 Presence of Control Mechanisms in British MNCs 
Personal/Cultural Impersonal/Bureaucratic/Technocratic 
DirecdExplicit Personalised Centralised Control: Bureaucratic Formalised Control: 
Low High 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999; Harzing, (Harzing et al., 2002) 
1999; Egelhoff, 1984) 
Indirect/Implicit Control by Socialisation and Output Control: 
Networks High 
" Socialisation: (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
Medium 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999) 
" Informal exchange of 
information: 
Low 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999) 
" Formal lateral relations: 
Low 
(Ferner and Varul, 1999) 
Typology of Control Mechanisms from Harzing (1999). 
Institutions influence the development of local firms, and the 
internationalisation of them. The adaptation of MNC subsidiaries to the country 
of operations is strongly determined by the features that they bring from their 
country of origin. However, the country of operations and the nature of its 
institutions might have a different effect on the operations of the MNC 
subsidiaries (Whitley, 2005; Morgan, 2001). According to the inheritance that 
the MNC subsidiaries bring with them, they might react in different ways to the 
particularities of the new environment. The next section analyses the main 
institutions of Venezuela, the country of operation of the case studies, and how 
they affect the activities, business practices and capabilities of local firms. 
MNC subsidiaries operating in this context are exposed to the same set of 
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forces as Venezuelan firms. However, their background might affect in 
different ways how they react to the new environment. 
3.6 The Characteristics of Venezuelan Institutions and their Influence on 
Local Firms 
The Venezuelan institutional context has important differences, compared to 
German and British institutional environments. Whitley (2001,1999) has drawn 
from the study of Chinese family business a classification of such an 
institutional context called particularistic. One of the main characteristics of this 
environment is the lack of strong institutions that support the coordination of 
economic actors or regulate their interactions. Whitley (2001) stresses that 
formal institutions are unreliable and too weak to structure the behaviour of 
economic agents in these kinds of societies. As we explain further Venezuela 
institutional environment is a type of such environment. 
The development of distinctive patterns of economic organisation is 
conditioned by two main features (Whitley, 2005). On one hand, the 
complementarity created by key institutions governing property rights, capital 
markets, labour markets and authority relationships is fundamental to develop 
differentiated systems. On the other, the role of the state in providing a stable 
and predictable environment for economic actors, supporting internal cohesion, 
and implementing consistent policies is crucial for the development of these 
patterns of economic organisation. 
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In the Venezuelan institutional context, it is difficult to find these conditions. 
There is little coordination and complementary among Venezuelan institutions. 
The structure and outcome of institutions such as the educational and financial 
systems have not become adapted to the interests of the productive system, 
either through actions by the state or any other coalition of actors. In addition, 
the role of the state to support a predictable environment has been poor and the 
policies implemented have been erratic. The political story of the country and 
the constitution of the state, it has not been able to enforce its hegemony over 
other institutions and the various groups in society to develop the type of 
complementary institutions that exist in Europe, the US and Japan. This 
fragmentation amongst institutions means that "the rules of the game" are not 
clearly developed and actors have to learn how to operate around institutions as 
much as in them (Morgan and Marquez, 2003). The result is no trust in formal 
institutions and procedures, which makes social relationships in this type of 
context highly personal and particularistic (Whitley, 1999). 
The Venezuelan state is one of the most important institutions in the country. 
This state has been characterised by its weak institutionalised formal system of 
rules that support the interaction of different groups. This is explained, in part, 
by the changes in the political regimes in the country in the last two centuries. 
Venezuela has been a country subject to radical changes in its political actors 
since its independence from Spain in 1830. Presidential regimes did not follow 
formal periods for specific numbers of years. For instance, a conservative party 
governed the country until 1864 and from then, the liberal party led the country 
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until 1899. In that year a coup took place and a military government ruled until 
1945 (Carrera et al., 1998). 
Military governments ruled the country until 1958, when a democratic regime 
was implemented. Democracy continues under a dual-party system of 
conservatives and liberals. This dual-party system continued until the late 
nineties when an ex-military officer won the elections with a coalition of 
different political groups which grouped people with left-wing and right-wing 
orientations (Bautista, 1997). 
The political regime, with governments with different political ideologies, does 
not support the development of a strong regulatory framework. Before 1945, 
with each new government the constitution was changed and the political 
institutions were dissolved. During the time of the dual party system, consistent 
policies concerning the regulation of the interaction of different economic 
actors were not developed. There was no compromise by each new government 
with the policies, plans and programs of the previous one. The economic 
guidelines and priorities in education, health and other social programs changed 
from one presidential period to the other. For instance, in 1997 the new 
government changed the constitution after 50 years and carried out significant 
reforms to the legal system (Petkoff, 2000; Bautista, 1999). 
Another distinctive characteristic of the state in Venezuela is its leading role in 
the industry development in the country. Political reforms have been made to 
148 
support the interventionist role of the state (Petkoff, 2000). This role has been 
supported by two factors. First, the state has the right to exploit and manage the 
revenues from oil, huge resources which can support the industrial 
development. Venezuela has one of the biggest reserves of oil and gas, and it is 
one of the top four countries in terms of the production capacity of oil, together 
with Saudi Arabia, the US and Russia (Frances, 1999). 
Foreign companies initiated the exploitation of oil in the country in 1907, 
through concessions given for periods of more than 40 years. However, the 
Venezuelan state recovered the oil concessions in 1974, and because of the oil 
booms in the following years became fmancially strong. A national company 
was created to manage the oil, Petrdleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), the second oil 
company in the world (United Nations, 1999). PDVSA has down-stream 
integration, with activities of exploration, production and commercialisation. 
During the same period, parastatal companies were created in the iron, 
aluminium and financial industries, and regional corporations were organised to 
reinforce the development of certain geographical areas. The state developed 
ambitious economic plans to strengthen and diversify the economy. However, 
this interventionist role of the state was not complemented by changes in other 
institutions, such as the education system. In addition, the changes in the 
objectives of the industrial policy because of the preferences of the government 
did not support the development of specific industrial sectors in the long-term. 
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Second, the state, in order to support the development of national competitive 
advantages, followed an inward development policy. The recommendations 
from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (ECLAC) on an inward policy, promoted its intervention in 
protecting national industry in order to foster its development (Izard et al., 
1976). From the `50s until the late `80s the state followed polices, such as high 
tax barriers for imported products, indirect subsidies to different sectors of 
industry, cheap loans and tax exemptions (Frances, 2001). 
Protectionism of industrial sectors hid a lot of inefficiency, reflected in the lack 
of quality of products. Therefore, the competitiveness of the Venezuelan 
industrial sector in foreign markets was low. For instance, the productivity of 
these sectors in Venezuela was half that of other Latin American economies, 
and one third of the productivity in industrialised economies (Baptista, 1999). 
The interventionist role of the state and the frequent changes in the objectives of 
industrial development exposed the state to rent-seeking activities of social 
groups. This behaviour of economic actors reinforced the low capacity of the 
state to coordinate activities between social groups, because cooperation 
amongst them would mean each obtaining fewer resources. The incentives are 
oriented towards competition and towards obtaining the largest quantity of 
resources from the state. 
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This instability of the system has affected the growth of companies, and due to 
the impossibility of the state to provide a stable and predictable environment, 
lobbying practices from firms have been important to obtain protection. It has 
been difficult for Venezuelan firms to develop complex and stable 
organisational capabilities because their strategy is focused on gaining political 
power or other forms of support rather than exploiting market opportunities. In 
addition, they are diversified vertically and horizontally because responsiveness 
and flexibility are keys to cope with the volatility of the environment (Naim, 
1999). 
Another main institution in Venezuela is the financial system. It can be 
classified as a credit-based system with strong intervention from the state. This 
intervention was, first, based on fixing interest rates. After the `80s, it became 
indirect through the interest rate of -loans that the central bank gives to 
commercial banks and through the interest rate of the government bonds, which 
are offered to finance the public deficit. 
The main source of funding for firms has been banks. Until 1995, they were 
structured as business groups that provided different financial services. The idea 
behind this type of organisation was a holding structure with diversification of 
the operations in the sector. The state also created public banks to support 
economic development and regulated interest rates for specific sectors such as 
the agriculture (Kelly, 1997). 
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The banking system is relatively concentrated. In 1992, of the 44 banks in the 
country 7 held more than 50per cent of the savings and loans of the financial 
system, and it was much the same in terms of capital. Many regional banks has 
operated until 1995, and satisfied local necessities and provided capital for 
small and medium enterprises. However, the regulation of the financial system 
changed in 1995, supporting the implementation of a universal bank model. 
This regulation forced the banks to increase their social capital. In many cases 
mergers and acquisitions occurred, leaving small and medium enterprises 
without support and concentrating even more the bank system (Garcia et al., 
1998). 
The small size of banks forces large firms to borrow money abroad. In addition, 
the instability of the economy frequently leads to the devaluation of the national 
currency. Firms hold considerable amounts of money in international banks to 
protect against the internal economic volatility. These foreign deposits make it 
easier to obtain funds from international sources. These characteristics of the 
system have also conditioned the type of investment of firms. They look for 
short-term results and profits to protect themselves from the volatility of the 
local economy. 
The main source of profits of local banks is financial transactions, because of 
the short-term nature of the funding of firms. This reinforces the limited support 
provided by the financial system in developing industrial sectors. The family 
ownership of Venezuelan companies and their small number have not 
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contributed to the development of stock markets and consequently, takeovers 
are not frequent. Another characteristic of the Venezuelan financial system is 
that the shareholders of banks borrow money from them to invest in their own 
business (Kelly, 1997). 
The nature of the Venezuelan state has created crony capitalism. In this type of 
capitalism those who are close to political authorities receive economic favors 
from the government. Usually, these favors are not complete transfers of 
wealth, such as forgiving taxes or providing subsidies, they occur by the 
provision of economic entitlements (Krueger, 2002). For instance, it has been 
common in Venezuela to assign contracts in different sectors such as electricity, 
oil and other mineral resources to people close to the government in charge. 
The existence of crony capitalism is reinforced in countries with political 
instability, such as Venezuela. Political instability tends to create commitment 
problem among social actors. In this type of context, social groups will have 
strong incentives to punish their opponents, reward their allies, levy high taxes 
on everyone else, and confiscate property in order to finance their political and 
military activities (Haber, Maurer, et al., 2002). A type of particularistic 
institutional context is created as consequence of the crony capitalism in which 
the regulatory framework is weak and the social institutions do not act as a 
coordinated system. 
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As a consequence of the institutional system, the business groups in the country 
are characterised as having mutual shareholders and a wide diversification in 
different industrial sectors. They are family-owned enterprises, which have 
growth according to the business opportunities that the government may offer, 
with family members in top managerial positions in the associated companies. 
In 1980, of the 70 biggest manufacturing firms in the country, including 
parastatal enterprises and MNCs, 39 were family business (Naim, 1999). The 
expansion of the group, frequently, is to support the operations of other firms 
within the group. Firms coordinate their activities using their personal ties. 
Therefore, cooperation among these companies is based on personal 
connections. 
he market orientation of firms is local because of the weak development of 
stable and complex capabilities in firms. There are difficulties to obtain from 
the social institutions in the country the right resources to support the 
development of capabilities. In addition, the volatility of the economy, which 
has affected the planning of firms in the long term, is another factor that 
influence the absence of competitiveness of Venezuelan firms. 
The characteristics of the education and training systems in Venezuela are very 
different from countries such as Britain and Germany. It shows poor 
coordination with other institutions and economic actors such as firms. There is 
a system of vocational education and training (VET), but this is not considered 
part of the formal education system. There is no involvement by unions in the 
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curriculum design, and the relationship between industry and technical 
institutions is weak. 
The poor coordination between the education and training systems and unions 
and firms, and the decentralisation of the national curriculum has resulted in a 
heterogeneous workforce. Public and private institutions have different 
curriculum designs for the same careers. Training in technical skills is scarce. 
Therefore, there is a shortage of workers with sector-specific skills. Firms need 
to invest in training to compensate for shortage of people with the right skills. 
However, the weak coordination among firms limits their investment because 
other firms can take advantages of investment in training (Granell and Parra, 
1999). 
The educational background of managers is more generalist than specialist. The 
Venezuelan government has instituted many initiatives to train people abroad. 
These initiatives have opened the possibility to implement foreign business 
practices (Navarro et al. , 1992). This generalist approach is also supported by 
the poor development of the industrial sector, which does not encourage the 
development of managers with a strong technical background. However, there 
is an exception to this tendency in the oil industry. 
MBA studies are the preferred background for managerial positions, and 
specialisation in areas such as marketing, finance, human resources and 
production is accepted too (Granell, 1997). However, the loyalty of managers 
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working in family-owned firms is an important asset for a long-term career in 
such companies, even more valuable than training, skills or experience (Naim, 
1999). 
The relationship between employers and employees, in the case of Venezuela, 
has been shaped by considerable regulation from the state. The nature of this 
relationship has changed over the years. During the years of protectionism of 
the state over the local industry, although firms were not competitive, they were 
profitable and they had long-term employment contracts (Naim, 1999). 
However, this situation changed as a consequence of the more open policy to 
foreign investment and the globalisation of markets in the end of `80s. Many 
firms closed and employees initiated moves to other firms. The relationships 
between the two parts changed to a short-term basis, making difficult the 
development of internal careers. Managers move between different industries 
and their expertise is not confined to a specific sector or area (Granell and 
Parra, 1999; Granell, 1997). 
The different characteristics of Venezuelan institutions have been highlighted 
and their effect on Venezuelan firms described. Table 3.5 summarises these 
points. The Venezuelan state has taken a leading role trying to develop the 
industry in the country. However, it has failed in its attempt to develop a 
cohesive set of institutions, which work in a coordinated way and provide a 
stable and predictable framework for economic transactions. This fact has 
reinforced the development of rent-seeking elites. Firms do not act in a 
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consistent form, and there is no clear pattern of coordination and competition 
amongst them. For instance, they can compete fiercely until one of them 
disappears, or they can implement cartel arrangements about production quotas, 
prices and market share. However, competition on prices or quality rarely 
occurs. Because of the characteristics of the system, these agreements are short 
in their nature and long-term cooperative relations between firms and sectors 
have few possibilities of happening (Naim, 1999). 
Table 3.5 Main Characteristics of Venezuelan Firms according to the Influence of the Main 
Institutions 
Institution Characteristics of the Firm 
State " Rent-seeking activities with the sate 
" Poor development of strong and complex capabilities 
" Firms are oriented to satisfy local markets 
" Growth of the firm through diversificatio, i (horizontally and 
vertically) 
" No concentration of firms according to industry or sector of 
operations 
" Support of personal networks to overcome the incomplete 
contracting 
Financial System " Small firms 
" Short-term horizon in the investment of firms 
" Shared holding between banks and business groups 
" Family-owned enterprises 
Education and Training System " Shortage in technical skills 
" Possibilities to introduce leading business practices in firms 
" In-house training without cooperation among firms in the 
same sector 
" Managers have a generalist background 
" Short-term employment contracts 
The incentives of the firm and other economic groups are not oriented towards 
cooperation; by contrast, they compete to obtain the largest quantity of 
resources from the state as individual groups and not as coalitions. The weak 
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regulatory environment of formal contracting also supports the rent-seeking 
behaviour of firms, and personal networks are crucial to business development 
in this context. Networks of friendship, family and political connections, 
become an important asset to cope with the particularistic nature of the 
institutional system. 
These local features in different degrees affect the operation of MNC 
subsidiaries in Venezuela. Degree of adjustments by the local unit to the local 
conditions may occur. Moreover, when they come from different environments. 
They have to interact with local firms that have distinctive characteristics, deal 
with local institutions such as the state, and employ a heterogeneous local 
workforce as well. The outcome from this interaction is shaped by the origins of 
the firm, which will support some forms of adaptation over others. 
3.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has pointed out the significant importance of the country level of 
analysis in understanding the shape of MNCs and their subsidiaries. In this 
sense, institutions from the origin country shape the operations of MNCs. In the 
case of the two countries of origin of the case studies of this thesis, there is a set 
of institutional characteristics that affect the internationalisation process of 
firms: they are summarised in Table 3.6. As can be seen, there are distinctive 
characteristics in German and British MNCs in terms of strategy, structure, 
business practices, and markets and products' orientation. 
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Table 3.6 Main Characteristics of German and British DMNCs 
German MINCs British AINCs 
" Little experience managing operations in " Early experience on internationalisation 
adversarial or different institutional 
environments from the German one 
" Concentration of FDI in familiar business " Diversified FDI which might be in 
environments different institutional contexts from Britain 
" Late internationalisation compared to their " Intemationalisation mainly through a FDI 
British and the US counterparts and they rely strategy 
mainly on a exporting strategy 
" Close relationship to German banks either " MNCs with activities in different sectors 
because they are capital suppliers or because of and industries 
the existence of interlocking directorships 
" Closely supervised and integrated into the " Less supervision and more delegation of 
parent country activities, with concentration of operative decisions to subsidiary level 
the Rand D activities and workforce in 
Germany 
" There is low diversification of products and " High adaptation from the subsidiaries to 
low adaptation to contexts abroad country of operations, following a multi- 
domestic strategy 
" HR function is more operative (legalistic) than " HR function more strategic with the 
strategic (align with the strategy of the firm) implementation of novel practices in the 
area 
The distinctive features of MNCs from the two countries will influence their 
interaction with the Venezuelan context, which has its own institutions that 
demand particular behaviours from firms to cope and survive. Pulling forces 
from the two contexts affect the presence of control mechanisms in the MNC 
subsidiaries, country of origin and country of operations. Because of this, a 
point of departure in the analysis of the behaviour of MNC subsidiaries is the 
country level of analysis. Specific economic configurations support distinctive 
characteristics in MNCs. However, it is important to highlight the fact that as 
firms operate in different industries and sectors, and according to the amount of 
interaction between firms and institutions, the influence of the institutional 
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context can be less or be more powerful. Therefore, the industry is another level 
of analysis that has to be included in the study of the implementation of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. In the next chapter, the evolution and main 
characteristics of oil service and business software industries are explained. 
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Chapter 4: The Oilfield Service and Business Software 
Industries 
4.1. Introduction 
The research questions of the thesis look for explanations on the effect of 
institutions (country of origin and country of operations) in the implementation 
of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. They also look for other variables, 
more contingent, that have an effect in the implementation of these devices. In 
order to answer these research questions, Chapter 2 explains the criteria for the 
research design and the selection of the cases. One criterion is the selection of 
MNC subsidiaries from different sectors. The rationale behind this decision is 
that it can be expected that there will be a sector effect on the implementation of 
the control mechanisms in NNNCs as was explained in Chapter 1. The selection 
of the sectors follows Porter's (1986) typology of multidomestic and global 
industries. Broadly speaking, it may be assumed that MNCs in a multidomestic 
industry will be more decentralised in control terms compared to firms in a 
global industry. This led to the selection of the oilfield service and business 
software sectors as the industries for the cases. 
In the case of the oilfield service is considered a multidomestic industry. In 
spite of the global dispersion of the operations of oil MNCs, the nature of the 
services that they offer, oil services of exploration and extraction to 
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governments or national oil companies (NOC), is a key determinant on the 
characteristics of this industry. They also have to import technology and know- 
how to operate locally, but it has to be adapted to the local characteristics of the 
oil fields and to the type of oil to be extracted. Therefore, firms in this industry 
are highly dependent of the local context. By contrast, the business software 
industry has a more global nature. On one hand, because of the characteristics 
of its product, they have to expand geographically and offer products and 
services on a global basis. Moreover, the product that they offer is more 
standard and requires less adaptation that in the case of the oilfield service. 
Thus, dependency of the local environment is less strong. 
This chapter presents the industry as one of the levels of analysis. The aim of 
this chapter is to understand the characteristics of the two industries in the 
country of operations. It explains how the industry's structure has affected the 
strategy of firms, particularly MNCs. The chapter analyses the dynamics in the 
oilfield services and business software industries in general, and particularly in 
Venezuela. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, it explains the nature of the oilfield 
service sector in Venezuela. In this section, there is a review of the evolution of 
the oil industry and the forces of change in the industry are also identified. It 
highlights the evolution of the oil industry and its effect in the development of 
this sector in the country. The second section presents the business software 
industry in the country of operations. It also describes the forces of competition 
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and the trends in the industry and its effect in the Venezuelan industry. Finally, 
the main conclusions of the chapter are summarised. 
4.2 The Oilfield Service Industry in Venezuela 
Before presenting the analysis of the oilfield service industry in Venezuela it is 
important to review the evolution of the oil industry and in that process, 
identifies the forces of change in this industry. This process of change is an 
important explanation of the characteristics of the oilfield service industry in 
Venezuela. 
4.2.1 The Evolution of the Oil Industry 
The evolution of the oil industry is a good example of how the global business 
environment has changed from one of growth and stability dominated by large 
MNCs to one of macroeconomic instability and increased global competition. 
The radical changes in the industry have affected the type of competition and 
the operations of firms in the industry. 
Two major actors dominated oil production during the twentieth century: 
countries with oil reserves, and oil MNCs that had the technology and 
experience for the extraction of oil. In the first part of the century, the oil 
industry had an oligopoly structure with seven major players called "the seven 
sisters". Five of them were from the US: Exxon, Mobil, Texaco, Amoco, and 
Chevron; one Dutch/British: Royal Dutch/Shell; and one British: British 
Petroleum. They monopolised the extraction and production of oil in the largest 
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oil basins in the world, located in the Middle East and South America and they 
organised a cartel to control oil prices, based on their dominance over the 
production of oil, creating an oligopoly structure in the industry (Turner, 1978). 
There was a tendency of the oil MNCs to grow as mega companies, diversified 
horizontally and vertically. In 1980 the oil firms dominated the ranks of the 
world's largest firms, with revenues greater than the gross domestic product of 
many nations. The largest ones were vertically integrated with a range of 
activities, from exploration, production and refinery activities to retail activities. 
They also diversified horizontally, with activities in the petrochemical, 
minerals, mining and metal industries (Cibin and Grant, 1996). 
Although the dominant power of the oil NINCs in the extraction and production 
of oil lasted for almost half of the last century, in the late `30s, the power of the 
oil MNCs to control oil production and price started to shift slowly to the oil 
countries. Host governments took actions to increase tax payments from the oil 
MNCs or carried out legal actions to expropriate concessions given to the 
MNCs at the beginning of the century. In some cases the legal actions of 
expropriation were successful and the oil government then set up NOCs to 
manage the oil reserves of the country. This was the case with Uruguay, Peru, 
Bolivia and Mexico in Latin America in the `30s, and later in some Middle East 
countries (Turner, 1978). 
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However, the greater demands from the oil governments on the profits 
generated by the extraction of oil did not reduce the power of the oil MNCs to 
control its price. In response, the major exporting countries formed an entity to 
confront the international oil companies and defend the price of oil (Yergin, 
1991). In 1960, the five large oil country producers (they accounted for 80 per 
cent of world's crude oil): Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela, 
created the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which 
had two main aims: first, to control the price of oil through fixed production 
targets, and second to negotiate with the big oil companies the terms of the 
contracts for the extraction of oil (Stonham, 2000; Espinaza, 1996). This 
cartelisation on one hand was effective and decreased the power of the MNCs 
to bargain the oil price, and on the other hand, increased the power of the 
suppliers of oil. 
The commodity nature of the oil plays an important role in understanding the 
power gained by the oil country producers. First, there is an absence of close 
substitutes for this commodity. Second, the supply of oil cannot be easily 
altered to respond to variations in the demand or unforeseen shortfall supplies. 
Oil producers tend to operate at full capacity because of the high fixed costs. 
Third, oil stocks are very expensive to store because of its liquidity and 
inflammable nature (The Economist 1991). Therefore, the increase of oil 
production in the short-term is difficult affecting its price. 
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Following the `70s the oil industry faced high levels of instability and change. 
Different forces, outside and inside the industry, changed its structure and the 
nature of the relationship between suppliers and buyers. The changes in the 
industry also affected the structure of the oil MNCs and incorporated new 
actors to the supply side. The next section analyses the forces of change in the 
oil industry and how they have affected the oil MNCs. 
4.2.2 The Forces of Change in the Oil Industry 
This section analyses the main forces of change in the exploration and 
production sector of the oil industry. The changes in the structure of the 
industry are intimately related to modifications of the relationship between the 
main players, such as buyers and suppliers. The most important explanations of 
the transformation in the industry are attribute to first, the entrance of new oil 
producers, which increased the oil supply making the oil cheaper. Second, the 
decrease of barriers to entry for newcomers to exploit oil reserves; third, a more 
rapid diffusion of innovation and technology which opened the possibility for 
small oil players to access specific technology and to concentrate on specific 
segments such as exploration and production activities; fourth, the volatility of 
the oil price. 
The rivalry of firms in the oil industry increased, significantly, especially in the 
exploration and production activities. Firm rivalry rose with the creation of new 
oil MNCs to compete in the exploration, extraction, refining and marketing of 
oil. An important group of large MNCs was NOCs set up to manage the 
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exploration and production and even marketing operations in the countries with 
the largest oil reserves. For instance, this is the case of PDVSA in Venezuela, 
Kuwait Oil in Kuwait, and Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia. In addition, another 
group of medium-sized oil MNCs was created, such as Elf Aquitaine from 
France, ENI from Italy and Nippon Oil from Japan (Cibin and Grant, 1996). 
Another group of smaller firms operated in specific segments of the industry. 
The proliferation of stock after the `80s opened the possibility of new sources 
of funding such as venture capital funds, which were willing to financed 
projects that promised high returns. Then, small firms were created to operate in 
particular segments of the oil industry, such as upstream exploration and 
production activities, refinery or marketing (Ernst and Steinhubl, 1999; 
Beakley, Gee, et al. . 1997) . The oil 
industry was segmented with firms 
operating only in one or two segments. 
Small companies emerged in Europe and in the US with particular expertise 
such as marginal, deep-water and offshore fields, among other specialisations. 
The creation of these specialised firms was also supported by the existence of 
financial investors willing to invest in small companies that had the expertise to 
carry out exploration activities with lower costs than the large oil MNCs. 
For instance, the creation of small oil firms in the Britain is explained in part by 
this phenomenon. Many of them were created to explore the oil and gas 
reserves in the UK on their on or in partnership with large MNCs. However, the 
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fact that they had expertise in specific techniques opened the possibility for 
them to participate in production projects abroad and not only in exploration 
activities in the parent country (Knott, 1996). 
In sum, the rivalry between established competitors has increased with more 
firms, medium-sized MNCs and small firms, competing to participate in the 
exploration and production activities, in many cases with cheaper operating 
costs than the large MNCs. 
The barriers to entry in the oil industry decreased. Traditionally, the exploration 
and production activities in the oil industry have been carried out under the 
supervision of oil governments. The typical type of agreement grants a 
concession to an oil MNC in areas with proven oil reserves, and the oil firm 
carries out activities of exploration, production and refinery. However, it has 
been a tendency in the countries with the largest oil reserves such as Iran, 
Kuwait, Venezuela and Algeria, to set up their NOCs and carried out their own 
exploration and production activities. Frequently the local exploitation and 
production of oil has been closed to foreign investment. 
Nevertheless, as the price of oil has been affected by increasing competition in 
the oil industry, the profits of the NOCs have fallen. They have changed their 
way to operate to cope with the lower profitability. NOCs have created 
partnerships, production-sharing contracts or joint ventures, and subcontracted 
other oil companies to perform some of their activities. For instance, in the 
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exploitation of mature fields or fields that require specific technology. This type 
of partnership has been very attractive to the oil MNCs as a strategy to enter the 
oil sites, which were closed, to foreign investment. This is the case of countries 
such as Mexico, Iran, Libya, Kuwait and Venezuela (Stonham, 2000). As the 
most profitable area in the oil industry lies in upstream operations such as the 
extraction of oil, the opening of foreign investment to specific activities in 
exploration and production has been opened business opportunity for many oil 
MNCs (Cibin and Grant, 1996; Yergin, 1991). 
The partnership between the oil MNCs and the NOCs has two characteristics 
which are important to highlight. On one hand, the oil MNCs are contractors of 
the NOC which in turn is the main buyer of the oil produced by the MNC. 
Therefore, the local operations of the oil MNCs are set up mainly to respond to 
the local demands of their local client. On the other hand, the outcome of the 
operations of the MNC in the local site is intimately related to the conditions in 
the country of operations. 
Other characteristic of the oil industry after the `70s has been the volatility of 
prices. Three factors account for this. First, oil prices are linked among other 
variables to the success of exploration activities in discovering oil basins that 
not always have the desired results. New oil discoveries are future oil surplus, 
which is going to bring down the oil prices. Second, the demand for oil varies 
with the consumption of countries, which in turn is linked to periods of 
recession or boom in the economic world such as the case of the economic 
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growth of China. Third, OPEC members and NOCs manipulate their oil 
production to affect the price (Stonham, 2000). Figure 4.1 shows the evolution 
of the oil price during the period 1972-2001: the oil price volatility is observed 
in the peaks of periods of high prices followed by periods when the prices fell 
significantly. 
Figure 4.1: Evolution of the Oil Prices during the Period 1972-2001 
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Source: OPEC Report (2001). 
The volatility in the oil prices took the oil MNCs and NOCs to a process of 
rationalisation of costs. Various tactics were adopted such as asset 
rationalisation, staff downsizing, reengineering, total quality management, 
shared services and outsourcing. In spite of the cost reduction process that 
traditional oil MNCs and NOC went through, the former continue to look for 
new fields in which to explore and extract oil. It was particularly relevant to 
search for opportunities of investment in low cost environments in which the 
extraction of oil was cheaper. These environments, usually, were in countries 
with considerable reserves and NOCs exploiting them, such as Venezuela. 
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4.2.3 The Oil Industry in Venezuela 
The Venezuelan oil industry until the `70s had an oligopoly structure with 
foreign MNCs such as Royal Dutch Shell, Creole, Texaco, Mobil and Exxon 
exploiting the oil in the country. In 1974, the Venezuelan state recovered the oil 
concessions and began the Nacionalizacidn del Petröleo, (i. e.,, the 
nationalisation of oil), as was discussed in Chapter 3. The structure of the 
industry changed from an oligopoly to a monopoly, with the creation of a NOC: 
PDVSA, to manage the oil production in the country. 
The activities of PDVSA were integrated vertically, including upstream and 
downstream activities, and mirrored the largest oil MNCs in its structure. Until 
1993, PDVSA carried out all the exploration and production activities in the 
country and had some operations abroad, such as its subsidiary in the US, Citgo 
Petroleum Corporation, the fourth-largest gasoline retailer in the US, with 
activities of refining and marketing. In the `90s the NOC developed a strategy 
to increase its production capacity, and became one of the main oil suppliers for 
the US. The maturity of the industry and the reduction of the power of OPEC to 
control prices, because of the entry of new oil supplies, were reasons to change 
the strategy of PDVSA. In addition, the NOC, to become more cost-efficient, 
invited private investors, national and foreign, to participate in exploration and 
exploitation activities of marginal fields, which required specialised technology. 
The strategy of PDVSA was to concentrate on the more lucrative fields in which 
the costs of the extraction of oil were cheaper. In 1992, a first round offering 
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marginal oilfields to private investors was carried out. In 1997, a third round 
gave the concessions to oil private companies of a set of marginal fields, which 
had low production levels. The opening to private investment did not increase 
the number of oil suppliers because they were contractors of PDVSA. 
In the search of MNCs for new areas to exploit, the "Venezuelan opening" was 
an attractive opportunity. The country holds the largest oil reserves in the 
Western hemisphere and possesses the largest gas reserve base in Latin 
America (Croft and Stauffer, 1995). Venezuela was very attractive for oil 
investors because of its oil reserves, its political stability at that time, the 
advanced oil structure of PDVSA and, more important, the strategy of the oil 
firm to increase its oil production, which meant a regular demand for the oil 
produced by the oil MNCs. 
The type of agreement for the entry of the private oil companies in 1997 was 
significantly different from the agreement drawn up the first time that MNCs 
came to the country. In the first legal agreement in 1922 between the oil MNCs 
and the Venezuelan government, the state received taxes and royalties from the 
extraction of the oil, and the MNC commercialised the commodity and received 
the largest per centage of profits. 
By contrast, agreements made between PDVSA and the private companies in 
"the opening" had a different format. It stated that the participating companies 
did not have ownership of the oilfields: instead, they had to carry the costs 
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associated with exploration activities and they received a fixed fee per barrel 
with provision for capital recovery in the production stage (Espinaza, 1996; 
Peggy, 1994). 
The third round was a success: 130 of the pre-qualified firms were foreign 
companies and 70 were Venezuelan. The international firms were composed of 
85 operating firms, and the rest were financial organisations which were 
looking for opportunities to invest in the country. Lasmo was a medium-size 
British oil firm among the first group, which envisaged in Venezuela an 
opportunity to change its role of investor to being an operator of oilfields. 
Preussag Energie, a division of the German Preussag AG, was also in this 
group. 
The entry of private investors did not change the industry structure significantly 
because PDVSA kept its monopolistic power. On one hand, the new entrants 
were contractors of PDVSA and some of the investment they carried out was 
refunded by the NOC. A dependent relationship was developed between the 
two parts because the oil companies needed the approval of PDVSA for their 
investment plans in order to receive the refund of part of their investment. On 
the other hand, the new entrants could only sell their production to the NOC, 
increasing its monopolistic nature. PDVSA exerted its bargain power by fixing 
the levels of oil production of the new entrants in the Venezuelan oil industry. 
The complexity of the relationship between the oil contractors and PDVSA is 
greater because of the weak nature of the regulatory framework in the country, 
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as was stated in Chapter 3. The use of legal mechanisms to fulfil the terms of 
the agreement is difficult in the country. In addition, PDVSA is a national 
company in which the state participates in the election of its board of directors 
and CEO. The fact that the NOC is a member of the OPEC cartel increases 
pressures to follow the strategy of the cartel, which lately is based on reduction 
of the oil production of the members when the oil price is down. Thus, the 
strategy set by the NOC is vulnerable to changes according to the view of the 
government regarding what the oil strategy of Venezuela should be: increase 
production and have a cheaper oil price and a larger market share, or decrease 
production and boost the oil price. The government's position affects the 
strategy of PDVSA and consequently its relationship with the private investors. 
This effect is analysed in the presentation of the. oil MNC subsidiaries in 
Chapter 5. 
43 The Business Software Industry in Venezuela 
The main product of the business software industry is development of software, 
in the form of packages of standardised software. These packages include 
application packages and systems software. A complementary product of 
business software is the professional service of activities such as software 
customisation, which is the adaptation of some functionalities of the package to 
special customer requirements, and activities connected to the software use like 
consultancy, technical assistance and training services to users (Brouthers and 
Kruis, 1997). 
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The business software industry in Venezuela has had limited development 
because of the small size of the industrial sector in the country. In the next 
section, we explain the forces of competition in the industry and how the trends 
in this industry have influenced the entry of the business software MNCs in the 
country. 
43.1 The forces of Competition in the Business Software Industry 
Enterprise systems (ES) is one category of business software. In the `70s, a 
production-oriented information system was known as a manufacturing 
resource planning (MRP) system. ES is the latest enhancement version of the 
original MRP system. Essentially, it is a single database that collects data and 
feeds it into modular applications created to support several business activities 
across functions (e. g., production, finance or human resources) in one firm or 
group of business units, even those dispersed geographically (Davenport, 1998). 
A rapid growth of ES implementation in firms started in the early `90s. During 
this decade, firms were under pressure to become more cost-efficient and 
response to changes in the environment. Downsizing practices became common 
during this period. Firms needed information on a real-time basis to take 
decisions, and integrated information from different levels, units and functions. 
The ES was an excellent tool to achieve this goal. The sales of ES jumped from 
$2.8 billion in 1991 to $11.8 billion in 1996. During the same period, the 
compound annual market growth rates were 33 per cent in the US, 28 per cent 
in Europe, and 65 per cent in Asia (Baxter, 1997). International Data 
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Company. a consultancy firm in the area. estimates a growth of 10.9 per cent in 
the ES software during 2001-2006 (Byron, 2002). Despite the explosive growth 
of ES. the market has an oligopoly structure with three of the largest firms 
sharing 30 per cent of the market. Figure 4.2 presents the leading ES vendors 
in 2001, according to their market shares. 
Figure 4.2 Market Shares of the ES Leading Vendors in 2001 
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The characteristics of the business software as a product largely explained the 
behaviour of firms in the sector. First, firms in the business software industry 
are driven by the creation of economies of scale on the demand-side in order to 
stay in the market. Because an attribute highly valued by the users of 
technology is the wide use of the product by other customers. The 
multiplication of the users of the product adds more value to the network and 
increases the probabilities of the fine to establish its business software as the de 
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facto industry standard (concept from network externalities Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999a; Shapiro and Varian, 1999b). 
This characteristic of the product has created a tendency of the ES providers to 
specialise according to industry sectors. The specialisation of ES providers by 
industries is related to the nature of the business software. ES has developed by 
modelling best-business practices in an industry: what ES vendors do is focused 
on the development of software, modelling the processes of leading companies 
according to the industry of operations (Curran and Keller, 1998). SAP AG, for 
instance, is dominant in the automotive, chemicals, and oil and gas industries; 
Baan leads in the aerospace, high-tech and industrial equipment and machinery 
industries; and Oracle in consumer products, financial services and higher 
education, and research (Siriginidi, 2000). 
The firms look to increase their market share by creating demand-side 
economies of scale (Shapiro and Varian, 1999a). This effect brings popularity 
and value to the business software, which in turn makes more attractive the 
provider's package to new consumers within the industry, creating a spiral of 
sales for the ES of a specific vendor. Once a customer is "married" with an ES 
provider, there is a lock-in effect, which makes it difficult for the user of the 
software to change to another because of the high costs involved in a new 
implementation. The US was the first big market to be entered, particularly for 
European firms like SAP and Baan, which were the first developers of ES. The 
other main competitors of ES, such Oracle, PeopleSoft and J. D. Edwards, came 
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from the US, which was another reason for the European firms to enter this 
market. 
Second, the development of the product is another issue that demand attention. 
The development of business software requires high investment in Rand D 
activities. Two main streams of activities are the core of Rand D in this 
industry. On one hand, it is important to continue the development of new 
products to be offered to the market. On the other, activities have to be 
developed to refine functions on existing products. The ES is based on 
modelling the best practices of an industry, and because of the rapidly evolving 
industry standards, there is always room to improve the technology and 
functionalities of the software. ES vendors are regularly upgrading the versions 
of the package to add new functionalities to satisfy customer demands or to 
offer a better technology to run the software. The upgrading of version of ESs 
becomes an additional source of profit for firms offering the service (Kumar 
and Van Hillegersberg, 2000). 
In addition, the rapid pace of innovation in the industry has important 
implications for the relationship between ES vendors and users. The continuous 
supply of technology products either to upgrade versions of the software or to 
offer new products causes the vendors to develop a long-term relationship with 
their clients. The purchase of software is also linked to additional services, such 
as service and support centres, consultancy and training activities, which are 
offered on a regular basis. The long-term relationship with clients asks for 
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presence of ES firms on the sites in which they have customers. Software 
providers face strong demands to have global operations in order to provide 
services and support to their clients. 
43.2 The Trends in the Business Software Industry and their Effect on the 
Industry in Venezuela 
One of the major trends in the industry is the adaptation of the software that 
business software vendors have to make to their products. Initially, the largest 
companies, which have considerable flows of information and multiple 
procedures, were the first clients for the software companies. However, in the 
late `90s two events affected the structure of the ES segment. First, the large 
firms in the US, Europe and Asia had installed the software and the potential to 
grow in this segment started to decline. ES vendors had to look to other market 
niches such as large MNCs in other continents (e. g., Latin America), and to 
offer the software to other segments (e. g., small and medium-sized enterprises). 
In order to operate the small and medium enterprise niche, ES vendors had to 
adapt the software and reduce the costs associated with its implementation, and 
introduced a range of individual solutions to make the software accessible to the 
more modest budgets and limited operations, and resources of these firms 
(Nairn, 2000). 
Second, the introduction of e-commerce increased the demand for applications 
that facilitated business-to-business trading and connections between clients 
and suppliers using Internet portals. This second factor affected the competition 
179 
in the industry. Now, the competitors in the ES industry were not only the ES 
providers. The range of competitors became larger: internet application 
vendors, providers of single solutions in areas such as HR and finance, and 
numerous small firms that offered products with new or advanced features. 
These changes in the industry structure make more important the development 
of a long-term relationship with customers. 
The development initiatives vary to support the development of larger number 
of products. For instance, some of the firms continue to carry out the Rand D 
activities in-house, and inject more money into the development of new 
products. In many cases, the expansion of the Rand D activities means a 
decentralisation of these, and the MNC sets up centres abroad grouped by types 
of research. Another strategy implemented by the firms in the industry is to 
make alliances with other business software providers and offer a kit composed 
of the ES software and complementary applications from the other provider. 
Another more radical strategy is to buy business software companies which 
have developed the product. The last strategy allows the ES firm to introduce 
the software quicker into the market and saves the time that it could take to 
develop the software in-house. 
The need of the business software MNCs to expand geographically, as 
explained above, is a reason to explain the set up of the business software 
subsidiaries in Venezuela. In spite of the nature of the Venezuelan economy, as 
has been discussed in Chapter 3, that shows an industrial sector of a few large 
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firms, the pressures on these MNCs to become the facto industry standard were 
a main reason to come to this country. Indigenous firms operate essentially in 
the domestic market. In 2002, the total Venezuelan exports were $25,203 
million, and only $4,560 million were from the private sector: the rest was from 
the export of oil. 80 per cent of Venezuelan firms are small and medium 
enterprises, which are concentrated in the industries of chemicals, food and 
beverages, textiles and metal products (see: www. conindustria. com) 
Venezuelan MNCs are few, some in media and telecommunications (e. g., 
Diego Cisneros group), mass consumption (e. g., Polar group) and the oil 
industries (e. g., PDVSA). Therefore, the adoption of the standard business 
software package, which initially was designed for large firms, is limited 
because of the small size of the firms in the country. The business software 
subsidiaries as their first clients had the largest firms of the country. However, 
they had to move to a larger niche of medium and small enterprises. The 
implementation of business software packages among smaller firms demands 
adaptations to it. These pressures to adapt are reinforced by the network effect 
in the industry. The integration of suppliers and clients of the business software 
user into the network, which in many cases are small or medium firms, implies 
offering a product that fits the needs of these firms. The small size of the 
Venezuelan market makes the competition among software providers very 
strong and the need to expand markets through offering services and products to 
other countries in the region, such as Colombia, Peru, and Central America. 
181 
4.4 Conclusions 
The analysis of the forces of competition in the business software and oil 
industries stresses major differences between the main drivers of competition in 
the two of them. It also shows how the firms in the two industries react in 
diverse manners to cope with the changes in their structure. The industry 
analysis has to be seen as an intermediate level of study, between the effect of 
national institutions on the operations of firms and a more micro level of 
analysis, which is more focused on the analysis of variations within the firm. 
The two industries, oilfield service and business software, presented in this 
chapter have been exposed to different forces of competition. A summary of the 
main characteristics of the two industries is presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1 Main Characteristics of the Oilfield Service and Business Software Industries 
Characteristics Oilfield Service Business Software 
Type of Industry Multidomestic Global 
Industry Life Cycle Mature Mature 
Product Differentiation Homogeneous product Potential for differentiation 
(commodity) (different business software 
solutions and specialisation by 
industries) 
Barriers to entry Decrease of barriers to entry Switching costs and lock-in 
(smaller size of the investment) effect 
Supplier Power Segmentation of the industry, More competition from firms in 
more competition from medium other sectors (e. g., Internet 
and small firms application vendors and providers 
of single solutions 
Adapted form Grant (ZUU2). 
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The evolution of the two industries has influenced the strategy of the firms. The 
ES industry, for instance, has reached a mature stage with the saturation of its 
original market, and has had to look for new developments to reinvent its 
product. The need to develop business software with new functions is 
reinforced by advances in technology such as the Internet, which creates 
pressures to incorporate functionalities that use this feature. The rivalry in the 
business software industry is more intense with the entry of competitors that 
already provide Internet products before. Table 4.2 describes the main strategies 
adopted by firms operating in each industry. 
Table 4.2 Main Strategies of Firms in the Oilfield Service and Business Software Industries 
Oilfield Service Business Software 
Product Strategy " To search for low-cost " To develop new software 
environments products 
" To work for NOCs under " To set long-term 
service agreements relationships with clients 
Organisation structure " To implement flatter structures " Decentralisation of Rand 
and cost reduction programs, D activities 
which could imply " Levels of integration 
decentralisation of decisions between corporate offices 
and activities and subsidiaries to 
facilitate the flows of 
knowledge, products and 
personnel 
Strategy of Pressures to move to low-cost An accelerated international 
Internationalisation environments strategy to become the standard 
software in the industry 
The forces of competition in each industry expose firms to similar trends. For 
instance, business software firms face demands to accelerate their 
internationalisation process and become the leading software for a specific 
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industry. In this way, the business software provider develops demand-side 
economies of scale, which in turn make its product the technical standard 
product. In addition, the development of a long-term relationship with clients to 
become their main software provider is another strategy followed by firms in 
the industry. This strategy of growth explains the entry of software MNCs to 
Venezuela. 
Firms in the oilfield service industry face different trends and adopt different 
strategies. On one hand, the intensification of the number of competitors in 
exploration and production activities, and, on the other, the opening to foreign 
investment of oilfields that traditionally were in the hands of NOCs, have both 
changed the structure of the industry. Increasing competition has affected the 
profitability of firms and two main strategies have been developed. First, the 
firms have designed projects to reduce costs and develop flatter structures. 
Second, they search for oil sites where the exploration and production activities 
are cheaper. 
Overall, there are common trends that firms in the same industry have to face. 
However, according to the characteristics of the country of operations of the 
MNC subsidiary, the industry might have particular characteristics, as was 
discussed in the analysis of the two industries in Venezuela. The strategic 
choice of each firm to tackle them may lead MNC subsidiaries in the same 
industry to follow different actions. For instance, the monopoly structure of the 
oil industry in Venezuela, creates a set of challenges to MNCs in the country 
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that they may not face in other countries. All these elements from the country of 
origin and country of operations, in addition to the characteristics of the 
industry, affect the design and implementation of the control mechanisms in the 
MNC subsidiaries, as is presented in the next chapters. 
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Chapter 5: The Oil MNC Subsidiaries: Preussag Energie 
Venezuela and Lasmo Venezuela 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and discusses Preussag Energie Venezuela (hereafter 
PEV) and Lasmo Venezuela, the MNC subsidiaries from the oilfield service 
industry. The aim of the chapter is to describe the different control mechanisms 
implemented in the two subsidiaries. This chapter and the following one 
provide the basis for the comparison chapter, Chapter 7, where the findings of 
the cases are compared. 
The chapter is organised as follows. Firstly, it presents Preussag AG, a German 
conglomerate, and its ownership structure. Secondly, it describes Preussag 
Energie, the division which carries out the oil operations of the MNC. The next 
section concentrates on the evolution of PEV and the development of 
capabilities in the subsidiary. The fourth section presents the control 
mechanisms implemented in the German subsidiary. The same structure is 
followed to present the second case, which is Lasmo Venezuela, the oil 
subsidiary of a British MNC. Finally, the main conclusions of the chapter are 
highlighted. 
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,. 2. Preussag AG 
The Preussag group initiated its operations in the commodity industry in 1959 
during the privatisation of industrial properties by the German Federal 
Government (The Times, 1959). The group followed the route of many German 
firms diversifying operations in industrial sectors such as steel, plant 
construction. engineering, energy and metals trading. The conglomerate grew as 
one of the largest in Germany. In 2001, the firm had 77,295 industrial workers 
and employees around the globe (Preussag, 2001). 
Preussag's internationalisation began in the early `90s with the acquisition of an 
important portion of the shares of a Dutch mining group. In the subsequent 
years. the firne acquired other firms in different countries such as Canada a 
lead smelting firm). Egypt (oil concession), the US (oil concession) and France 
(non-ferrous metal and heating technology firnen). By 1997. more than half of 
the turnover of the firm was coming from abroad (Preussag, 1998). Figure 5.1 
shows the distribution of the turnover by region. 
Figure 5.1 The turnoser of Preussag b,. regions in 1997/1998 (in D11 millions) 
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Source Prcu%%ag Annual Report (1998). 
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In the mid `90s the maturity in Europe of the raw material markets such as coal 
and steel impacted the profitability of the conglomerate. In 1997, the 
conglomerate initiated a radical change. It tightened its portfolio, divesting 
activities in steel, non-ferrous metals and coal mining sectors, and concentrating 
its growth on sectors such as energy and building engineering. The 
conglomerate also invested in the service sector in areas such as logistics and 
tourism. The expansion in the tourism sector was through acquisitions such as 
the container shipping and tourism businesses of Hapag-Lloyd in 1997, and 
later in 1998, the Thomson Travel Group, a tourism company. The chairman of 
the group, in the company report of 1998, describes the concentration of 
operations: 
We concentrated on strengthening the defined growth areas 
energy and commodities, building engineering and logistics. With 
the acquisition of Hapag-Lloyd we gained a new division- 
tourism- which will give added impetus to Group growth. We 
continue to distinguish between areas of consolidation, selective 
growth areas and dynamic growth areas within the Group 
(Preussag, 1998). 
The new strategy of Preussag was also reflected in the change of the structure 
of the group. A former multidivisional structure of five divisions was 
reorganised into three main divisions: industry (energy, building engineering 
and trading), logistics and tourism, reflecting the disposal of the steel, plant 
engineering and shipbuilding businesses. 
Four years later in 2001, the tourism division represented the largest proportion 
of turnover (57 per cent) of the group. This figure demonstrated the new 
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product orientation of Preussag. Figure 5.2 shows the group turnover by 
regions. The proportion of employees in Germany changed, too. In 1998, from 
a total of 66.563 employees, 43.428 (65 per cent) were in Germany. In 2001, 
the proportion changed to be only 23,894 (34 per cent) employees in Germany 
and 45,656 employees abroad (Preussag, 2001). These changes of the 
distribution of the workforce are evidence of the acceleration of the 
internationalisation of Preussag. 
Figure 5.2 Group Turnover bN Regions 2001 (¬ millions) 
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Source: Preussag Annual Report (2001). 
Preussag, before 1997, had features typical of German MNCs as they were 
presented in Chapter 3. On one hand. it experienced a late internationalisation 
process compared to firms from Britain and the US, with a concentration of 
employees and turnover in Germany. On the other. Preussag concentrated 
operations in familiar environments such as Western Europe. However, the 
realignment of the strategy of the company showed a growing effort to become 
disembedded from its context. The action of the company to move to the 
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service sector seems to look for short-term results. The shares of Preussag 
doubled their price after the group entered the tourism industry segment (Wall 
Street Journal, 1999). In addition, the firm experiences a fast 
internationalisation. Two reasons might explain this acceleration. On one hand, 
the concentration in the tourism industry demands a more international 
workforce. On the other, Germany is a high-cost environment in labour, 
therefore to move operations abroad reduces costs and increases profits. 
5.2.1 The Preussag Ownership Structure 
Preussag has a typical German ownership structure, with German banks and 
founding families in control of the largest proportion of shares. Preussag shares 
are listed on the Frankfurt stock market and they are not listed on Anglo-Saxon 
markets. German shareholders hold three-quarters of total shares, and 85 per 
cent of this portion is in the hands of German institutional investors. 
The German portion of institutional investors remains highly concentrated 
(31.37 per cent) in the hands of the German financial service provider WestLB 
Group. The other shares are in the hands of foreign investors from the UK, 
Switzerland, France and the US. 
The firm has the typical German dual board structure. The supervisory board 
has a strong German composition with a representation of the different 
shareholders: unions and Preussag AG personnel representatives, and the 
chairman of the executive board of WestLB AG are part of this board. Evidence 
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of the long-term employment contracts of German firms, highlighted in Chapter 
3, is in the fact that many of the executive board members have been in the 
group for more than 15 years, and the current CEO was a former employee of 
the WestLB group, the financial investor that holds a high concentration of 
Preussag AG shares (see: www. tui. com). Preussag, despite its strong 
international expansion, remains very German in the composition of its board. 
The internationalisation of the firm has been accompanied by a change in the 
accounting principles of its financial statements. They changed to follow the 
German GAAP to follow International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
The presentation of Preussag and the analysis of its evolution show that the firm 
has distinctive characteristics that are rooted in the German BS but also is 
taking action to become disembedded of its context of origin. In addition, 
Preussag, to cope with mature markets, did not follow a strategy to reorganise 
its businesses: it took its particular way to cope with the new circumstances. 
The next section describes Preussag Energie, the division that is in charge of the 
oil operations of the MNC. 
5.2.2. Preussag Energie 
The energy division of Preussag has its corporate offices in Lingen, Germany, 
and it employs around 700 people. The division had a late internationalisation 
in the early `90s. The oilfields in Germany became mature and it was very 
costly to exploit them, so, the division searched for opportunities abroad. 
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Preussag Energie has concentrated its operations on the upstream sector, on 
exploration and production activities in the oil and gas sectors. This operations 
were usually carry out with partnership with other oil companies that have the 
technical expertise. 
The German Operations Vice-president of the Venezuelan subsidiary described 
the business of Preussag Energie: 
It (Preussag Energie) is not downstream, that means it is not a 
company for refineries or trading, it is more or less an upstream 
company. It is a German based company and in Germany there is 
no future in this type of business because most reservoirs are very 
old. The domestic companies to survive have to go international. 
Its internationalisation began first with partnerships with Norwegian Oil 
companies in the North Sea and later with exploration activities in Kazakhstan. 
The sites where the MINC operates fields are Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Yemen, 
Albania, Qatar, Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, Argentina, Colombia and 
Ecuador, and recently Venezuela. In 1997,65 per cent of the crude oil 
production of the division came from outside Germany (Preussag, 1998). 
Preussag Energie has concentrated its operations in low-cost production 
countries. The initial internationalisation strategy of the firm was through 
partnerships with other oil companies, which carried out the operation of the 
field, and Preussag Energie invested funds. However, in the late `90s the 
company opened subsidiaries to carry out exploration and production activities 
in Ecuador, Qatar, Tunisia and later in Venezuela. 
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An important element in the decision of Preussag Energie to invest in or to 
operate an oilfield is the type of field. The division has developed technical 
expertise in marginal fields and in fields in urban areas, which require a 
particular technology to prevent damage to urban infrastructures on the surface. 
The Venezuela opening was very attractive because of its concessions of 
marginal fields, in particular a oilfield in an urban town. The local finance and 
accounting manager of Preussag Energie Venezuela expressed the opportunity 
that Venezuela represented for the company like this: 
For a firm that has low operating costs (Preussag Energie) 
(compared with firms like Shell and Exxon), Venezuela was very 
attractive because of its huge oil reserves and the supply of good 
oilfrelds. They (Preussag Energie) did not want to be an oil 
company which transported oil, traded oil, nothing like that. They 
knew that to become an operator in Venezuela was only to operate 
afield, so it was ideal for a small oil company. 
According to the strategy of the company to invest in low-cost environments, 
Venezuela looked very attractive in the international expansion of the energy 
division because of its well-known reserves, low exploitation costs and the 
match between the technical competencies of Preussag Energie and the 
possibility to obtain a concession of a marginal field. 
53 Preussag Energie Venezuela (PEV) 
Preussag Energie entered the third Venezuela opening of marginal fields in 
1997. It won a concession as an operator of an urban oilfield called Cabimas, 
located on the East Coast of the country. The Operations Vice-president of the 
subsidiary explained the strategic value of the field for Preussag Energie: 
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Cabimas field is very similar to the oilfields that we have in 
Germany. We are used to working in dense urban centres, like this 
one, and also we have the technology to operate the field (El 
Nacional, 1997). 
The subsidiary initiated operations formally in 1998. A group of expatriates 
were sent to PEV to set up the activities in the subsidiary. The majority of these 
expatriates did not have experience in international assignments and also did 
not know the local language. In the administrative area, the Vice-president was 
a German expatriate, who carried out the initial recruitment of local people. In 
the technical area, a German vice-president was appointed out to organise the 
technical operations, which involved the transfer of a number of technical 
experts from Germany, and to hire a drilling company to start exploration 
activities in the field. 
Since initial operations the subsidiary has had autonomy from the corporate 
offices. The decentralisation of decisions went together with a centralisation of 
responsibility in the hands of the expatriates. A local security manager 
described the role of the Vice-presidents in this way: 
I think they have so much autonomy. They have a scheme in which 
they have to report everything. However, they have freedom to buy 
a building without approval from Germany. They have complete 
power to the extreme that I think they can sell the subsidiary if 
they want to. 
The MNC structure adopted by the division reflects the multidomestic nature of 
the sector. However, this high level of -autonomy is compensated by the 
presence of expatriate managers in key positions in the subsidiary, indicating a 
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more complex picture of the way in which corporate offices control the 
subsidiary. 
5.3.1 Preussag Energie Venezuela market positioning 
The type of agreement between PEV and PDVSA has important implications for 
the operations of the subsidiary. First, the German subsidiary is a contractor and 
its production levels are set by the NOC. PEV is responsible for the extraction 
and production of the oil and PDVSA pays an operating fee per barrel that 
covers operating expenses and profit margin (Croft and Stauffer, 1995). This is 
because the third round in Venezuela did not give to the oil MNCs the 
ownership right to the field. There is a strong bargaining power on PDVSA's 
side. Second, the agreement permitted the recovery of capital and operating 
costs under a scheme of incremental production above a certain level. As the oil 
MNCs were operating marginal fields, in many cases they have to upgrade 
facilities and develop new ones; the approval of the national oil company was 
needed for the upgrading investments because the money expended would be 
returned to the MNCs. 
PEV's dependent relationship with PDVSA shapes in many ways the operations 
of the subsidiary. One aspect of this is the strong need for adaptation in order to 
fulfil PDVSA demands. As was explained in Chapter 4, the strategy of PDVSA 
changes and oscillates between an increase of production levels to a reduction 
of these levels. The concession of the oilfields to private investors was very 
attractive because at the moment of the concession, the PDVSA's plan was to 
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increase its production levels. However, this strategy changed the following 
years and reduction of the production was a new strategy of the NOC, affecting 
the levels of production of the subsidiary. By the time Preussag set up 
operations in Venezuela, the price of the oil was decreasing. OPEC in order to 
stop this fall of the price, decides to cut down the production levels of its 
members. This event affected the strategy of PDVSA and consequently the 
production oil demanded to the oil MNCs. PEV vulnerable position affects the 
presence of expatriates in the subsidiary, on one hand, and the evolution of the 
subsidiary on the other. 
5.3.2 The Evolution of Preussag Energie Venezuela and the Development of 
its Capabilities 
The volatility of the local context has played an important role in the evolution 
of the subsidiary and the type of capabilities that it has developed. PEV was 
important in the portfolio of operations of Preussag Energie, which is under 
pressure to internationalise. It was one of the main operations abroad and it was 
also seen as the entry to obtain further oil and gas concessions in the country. 
The initial idea of PEV was to outsource many of the operations in the 
administrative and technical areas and remain as a small subsidiary with few 
fixed operating costs. However, this idea in the first year of operations changed 
due to mainly three reasons. 
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First, the relationship with PDVSA has been difficult to manage. Political 
changes have occurred in Venezuela over the last few years, which have 
affected the operations of the NOC. The management of PDVSA is highly 
politicised. Access to senior positions in PDVSA is dependent to a high degree 
on political patronage. Therefore as governments change so does the top 
management of PDVSA and so too does its attitude towards managing the 
relation with the foreign MNCs (Espinaza, 1996). In line with this, the demands 
of PDVSA in terms of reports encouraged the creation of a specialised report 
unit to produce such reports. The implementation of the SAP ERP system in 
PDVSA to integrate its operations created a unified reporting system for 
PDVSA's contractors. 
Second, PEV's initial operations did not have tight internal controls over costs, 
investments and profits. However, the company had to tighter these controls 
because the manner in which it was paid by PDVSA. A planning and budgeting 
department was created, with the appointment of German expatriates from 
corporate offices, and an internal controller was sent to the subsidiary to 
manage the internal accounting system, which was constructed to fit in with 
German GAAP requirements. 
Third, PEV had difficulties in managing the relationship with the Cabimas 
community. Although Cabimas was an urban field, it had different 
characteristics compared to the German urban fields, which made difficult the 
extraction of oil. High levels of unemployment and a community with high 
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expectations that the company would solve many of its problems of poor 
infrastructure and lack of public services, brought pressures to bear on PEV. 
Strikes and sabotage in the oilfield operations were common. The social 
institutions in the country were not efficient in solving the problems of the 
community and PEV had to cooperate and act in favour of the community. 
The strategy of the German subsidiary to cope with the context has been to 
adapt to local demands and try to please PDVSA in order to win approvals on 
investments. As a local capability, the strategy of PEV has been to create an 
informal network with PDVSA and other national decision levels. In the words 
of the local administration manager: 
We try to cover all communication channels, try to create ways to 
communicate with them, try to look for support in the Energy and 
Mining Ministry, German Embassy, different governments levels 
like Cabimas county and state governor, to try to put these people 
on our side. 
The first two years of operations of PEV were signalled by an intensive drilling 
campaign, which demanded the presence of many technical expatriates for 
periods of time between two months and one year. The goal was to increase oil 
production fast and to start to recover the return of the investment in three 
years. In 1999, the subsidiary headcount reached its peak, with 328 employees: 
80 expatriates and 248 locals. The subsidiary role was a miniature replica in 
which the subsidiary had to develop a set of activities to support its operations 
and cope with the local context. These activities varied from technology for the 
exploration and production activities which had to be adapted to the 
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characteristics of the Cabimas oilfields to activities to cope with the demands of 
the population of the oilfield town. 
The results of the drilling campaign were not successful and large oil deposits 
were not found. The initial expectations of recovering the investment in 2002 
started to look gloomy and the investment on the Venezuelan subsidiary was 
slow down. A reorganisation of operations was carried out in PEV. It reduced 
its workforce by 30 per cent in 1999: currently, the subsidiary has 280 
employees. Figure 5.3 presents the organisational structure of PEV in 2002 and 
the main positions occupied by expatriates and locals. 
Because of the characteristics of the local context, PEV's has been concentrated 
in de%eloping capabilities to cope with it. A reduction in the investment in the 
subsidiary occurred, as the initial expectations of the German MNC in terms of 
capital recovering and levels of production were not fulfil. According to 
Birkinshaw typology (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) a parent-driven divestment 
on the subsidiary has occurred. 
Some capabilities, which were developed locally, were not diffused to other 
subsidiaries or corporate offices. For instance, the creation of technical 
knowledge because of the incorporation of locals in the technical area that had 
experience in PDVSA and other foreign MNCs. These personnel improved 
internal procedures in the subsidiary, however, this knowledge was used only 
locally. 
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Figure 5.3 PEN' Organisational Chart in 2002 
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The %olatility of the local context has been one of the major reasons for the 
decrease in the strategic value of the subsidiary. The lack of a stable 
en ironment that support the development of plans according to the initial 
expectations of the oil MNC is a major factor to explain the downgrading of the 
subsidiary. However. the lack of international experience of Preussag Energie 
also plays a role on how the subsidiary coped with the local environment. The 
German planning and controlling manager analyses the situation as follows: 
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The way the business was set up and the speed of the investment 
were completely wrong. We should have started more carefully 
and with more revision, thinking more critically, not investing so 
much money and checking the results and maybe investing again. 
We came to the country investing a huge amount of money the first 
2 years. We did not get the results that we wanted and this is 
nothing to do with Venezuela and not very much to do with 
PDVSA. Most of the business case and the deviations from the 
expectations are related with the management in Germany and to 
the management here in the country. The control has been pretty 
loose and very bad decisions were taken. 
The evolution of PEV has signed the configuration of the control mechanisms 
in the German subsidiary. The next part presents the control devices which have 
been implemented in the subsidiary. We will examine them in terms of the 
previously identified dimensions based on the work of Harzing (1999) 
discussed in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 developed combinations of control 
mechanisms according to the country of origin of the MNCs; they are compared 
with the findings of the case studies in the next sections. 
5.4 Output Controls in Preussag Energie Venezuela 
As we referred earlier in Chapter 1 and 3, the main output controls that are 
studies in this thesis are financial. PEV has financial controls that are 
implemented to legitimise decisions and actions that have already occurred 
rather than to control future manager performance and outputs. There are no 
tight financial controls to evaluate the returns on the investment. In spite of the 
significant amount invested in the country, there was an initial lack of financial 
controls in the Venezuelan subsidiary. 
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Financial planning and procedures in the subsidiary have evolved over the 
years. In the first years, investment planning and cost control almost did not 
exist. The only control from corporate offices over investments was the support 
of the costs and expenses. The high levels of integration of German firms are 
reflected in the strong integration of the PEV accounting system with Preussag 
Energie accounting system. PEV is not an independent unit in accounting 
terms. Despite the decentralisation of decisions in the subsidiary, its accounts 
are consolidated at the end of the fiscal year with Preussag Energie corporate 
offices. 
Preussag Energie tightened the financial controls in the subsidiary with the 
creation of a unit for planning and controlling. The poor financial results in the 
second year of operations and the demands on Preussag to increase its returns 
are the reasons for that. A formal process to elaborate the annual budget was 
implemented, which is approved by corporate offices. There is a follow-up to 
deviations from the budget, although its objective is not to control expenses: it 
is rather to learn from deviations and correct them in next round of planning 
activities. 
In this sense, Ahrens (1997) argues that accounting practices in German firms is 
a process to rationalise and legitimise completed operational proposals rather 
than to act as a control and evaluation for future performance. 
The embeddedness of Preussag Energie in the German BS is still present in the 
dual accounting system of PEV. The PDVSA reporting system follows 
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international GAAP and differs from the reporting system of Preussag, which 
follows German GAAP. The subsidiary has an internal controller, who is in 
charge of the accounting system that reports to Germany. In the last year, 2002, 
a project management program has been implemented in the subsidiary aimed 
at making PEV more cost-efficient and more accurate in the analysis of its 
return on the investment. 
There is a monthly reporting system from each department in terms of 
investment and costs. The information from the administrative area is 
consolidated in the subsidiary in the planning and controlling department and 
sent to Germany after the approval of the Vice-president for the area. In PEV 
there is also a dual system of reporting: two lines of report, one from operations 
and the other from the administrative area, which report similar information but 
in different format and to different departments; administration and operations. 
The implementation of the project management program aims to eliminate 
duplication in reporting, with the integration of reports in one system through 
standardisation. The new programme also aims to implement performance 
indicators in the different areas to increase efficiency in the company, adopting 
a more Anglo-Saxon approach in the management of the operations of the 
subsidiary. 
The changes in the financial area were implemented following a corporate 
decision to increase efficiency in operations and to show results in the short 
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term. The German manager of planning and controlling describes the changes 
in the financial controls in PEV: 
Until half year ago the control was very loose, I would say that 
they were not so much interested in what we were doing here. Our 
mother company, we have to go back to the history of the 
company, and until 10 years ago was almost exclusively focused 
in Germany. Then the company decided to go abroad and they 
opened different branches in different countries. On one side you 
have the company and the management in Germany which grew 
up in Germany with operations in Germany and then tried to go 
abroad, and that was always a little bit difficult for them to 
handle. Sometime you got the impression that they don't know so 
much what is going on in the foreign countries as well they didn't 
want to know it... So that was until hat fa year ago... 
The changes in the strategy of Preussag cascades down on how the firm is 
controlling its operations abroad: a more Anglo-Saxon approach to the control 
of costs and the return of the investment is affecting the nature of the financial 
controls in the subsidiary. There is a process of change in the financial controls 
in PEV. The subsidiary has similarities with other German firms in its financial 
controls, however, they are under a process of change which shows a more 
hybrid approach in the implementation of these devices in the subsidiary. 
5.5. Bureaucratic Formalised Control l%lechanisms in Preussag Energie 
Venezuela 
By contrast with what could be expected in a German firm, PEV presents low 
standardisation especially in the technical area. The procedures to follow in the 
technical area are few, particularly to guide the exploration and production 
activities. The small number of operations and the little experience of the 
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company in such as activities are the major reasons for the little reliance in 
standardise procedures. PEV relies on individual knowledge to carry these out. 
The German technical experts are relocated to cover temporarily the activities 
abroad. Nevertheless, there are some international standards from the American 
Petroleum Institute and the Societal Petroleum Engineering Association for the 
exploitation of oil and gas that are followed by the company. After the 
subsidiary was set up, certain procedures in the technical area have been 
developed locally. There is a set of rules and procedures elaborated in the last 
year for the Cabimas field, to regulate internal operations in the field and also 
safety and environmental issues, which is a mix of PDVSA safety and 
environmental regulations, Preussag Energie's experience of operating this type 
of field in Germany and the accumulated experience of PEV of operating the 
Cabimas field. 
The administrative area is more standardised. A guidebook has been developed 
locally, which contains explicit policies, procedures and levels of decisions for 
the administrative areas in the subsidiary. They have been adapted from 
guidelines developed in corporate offices. There has been a process of 
developing procedural controls in the local unit, despite the limited initial 
standardisation in PEV. For instance, there are periodic visits of German 
auditors to carry out management audits of systems and procedures and to make 
suggestions for improvement. 
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The contrast between the two areas, technical and administrative, with high 
levels of standardisation in the administrative area but less in the operative one, 
is largely explained by the lack of international experience of Preussag in 
exploration and production activities. As the manager for Standardization and 
Special Projects department expressed it: 
We use manuals in Germany. As we are the first international operator 
there are no previous manuals for oilfields but we have rules from 
Germany, very precise rules that I also use here. For instance, I have in 
the project area a guide of 140 pages. 1 need to prepare my work 
following that guide. 
The tendency to standardise procedures and norms in German firms, in the case 
of PEV, is mediated by other factors such as the size of the MNC. In addition, 
the standardisation has two levels, global and local. In the case of PEV, the 
multinational structure of the firm does not reinforce the need to standardise on 
global basis, except in the areas such as finance in which more integration is 
required. 
5.6 HR Practices and Policies in Preussag Energie Venezuela 
PEV's HR function shows distinctive characteristics of the typical German 
personnel function described by Ferner and Varul (2000; 1999). The function 
has an administrative orientation. Practices like job evaluation, succession 
planning and management development are not implemented in the subsidiary, 
it has been concentrated and the administration of the pay roll. There is no 
involvement of the function in the decision-making of the subsidiary and there 
no formalisation of training, recruitment and selection activities. 
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The role of the department is more consultative and supporting rather than a 
decision-maker. This assertion is validated by the reporting line in PEV, in 
which the HR function is at a third level under the supervision of the 
administration manager, who reports to the finance and administration vice- 
president (see Figure 5.3). The appointment of an HR supervisor rather than an 
HR manager is consequence of this categorization of the function. 
Communication and flows of information between the local function and the 
rest of the MNC are almost non-existent. The main transfer to the subsidiary 
has been the policies written in a "blue book" created in Germany, which has 
gone through significant adaptation to the local context. The book includes 
information on administrative activities such as level of decisions, HR policies 
and procedures and security activities. However, it has been implemented after 
four years of subsidiary operations. 
The features of the host country environment support the operating nature of the 
HR function in the subsidiary. Granell et al. (1997) have pointed out the 
operating and reactive character of the personnel function in Venezuelan firms. 
The political instability in the country and the frequent changes in the labour 
regulations have forced the HR function in the indigenous firms to concentrate 
on the management of the relationship with unions and government entities. 
Therefore, the MNC subsidiaries operating in this highly regulated context have 
weak pressures to develop a more strategic approach. This fact is exacerbated 
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by the lack of internationalisation of the local firms, who do not bring pressures 
to adopt an alternative view of the function. 
In terms of the career development of employees, there are no activities to 
support a program of this nature, either locally or internationally. In the case of 
expatriates, their main roles are to act as a control mechanism or to cover a 
shortage of qualified people. In the case of local personnel, they were appointed 
to fill positions in the local subsidiary rather than to pursue an international 
career. The expatriates appointed to the subsidiary are located on a temporary 
basis and their assignment to the subsidiary is not part of a career development 
plan. Therefore, the absence of an international managerial career development 
plan does not support the development of informal networks among Preussag's 
units. 
Regarding technical and managerial training, there is no annual planning for 
these activities. PEV is reactive in this matter: the only policy is regarding the 
number of courses that an employee can take in one year in the technical area. 
The managerial training is very informal. The implementation of subtle control 
mechanisms such as global training activities, which are designed to be 
attended by employees from the different subsidiaries, are missing in this case. 
Concerning other practices like personnel selection, there are no criteria to 
support this process in terns of abilities, skills or competencies required. In 
addition, the activity is centralised in the hands of the vice-presidents for almost 
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all the positions of the subsidiary, but there has not been any transfer of this 
practice from abroad. The German subsidiary has preferences on locals with 
German origins as a criterion to hire people for some jobs. The absence of a 
formal process to identify adequate personnel competencies is substituted for 
this selection criterion. 
Finally, there is no formal performance evaluation program: the compensation 
policy merely contemplates an annual pay increase, which is not linked to 
individual or group performance. Regarding job descriptions, there are some of 
these, particularly in the administrative area; however, they respond to the need 
to justify positions to PDVSA rather than an internal control to define the 
outputs of the different job allocations. 
5.7 Expatriate Managers and Personal Control in Preussag Energie 
Venezuela 
PEV has a considerable presence of expatriate managers as was expected in a 
German MNCs. The absence of strong institutions and a legal framework to 
regulate the agreement between PDVSA and PEV make it difficult to influence 
the decisions levels in PDVSA through formal mechanisms, creating pressures 
on PEV to control this relationship through the expatriates. 
The presence of expatriates is justified as a direct control mechanism by the 
volatility of the environment and the particular relationship with PDVSA. The 
German operations vice-president described the situation as follows: 
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We have had this experience several other times, when the general 
managers or members of the board of directors came to Venezuela 
to talk to PDVSA in Caracas. For example, to talk to executive 
members, it doesn't help too much. If you want to get results you 
have to be here all the time, to talk to them, to talk to Caracas, to 
negotiate with them, otherwise, you will not be able to get any 
results. 
The complex relationship between PEV and PDVSA has led the German 
subsidiary to develop mechanisms to cope with the demands of the NOC. The 
German subsidiary has had to adapt to local demands and thus tried to please 
PDVSA in order to win investment approvals. 
This informal network is created mainly between PEI local employees and 
PDVSA decision levels as a tactical mechanism to obtain approvals and to keep 
the business running. The reliance on this informal network to cope with the 
lack of explicit rules to be followed and the frequent changes of PDVSA put 
pressure on the expatriate managers to keep a tight rein on negotiations. Thus, 
the presence of expatriates was justified as a direct control mechanism made 
necessary by the volatility and uncertainty of the environment. 
The presence of expatriates has varied in different levels of the organisation. 
For instance, during the peak of the drilling activities, there was a strong 
presence of them when the subsidiary brought many technical experts from the 
corporate offices to supervise this campaign. However, the reasons for 
expatriation in PEV are different for the managerial and technical areas. In the 
case of the managerial level they come for longer periods of time to support the 
activities of the subsidiary. 
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In the case of the technical area, there are two main reasons why they come to 
the country. First, experts with particular knowledge come for short periods of 
time to help on specific projects. Second, the shortfall of geologists in 
Venezuela forced PEV to bring a group of German geologists to the country. 
There is a plan to localise the subsidiary workforce, which started with the 
localisation of positions like the operations manager for Cabimas, the finance 
and accounting manager and the reservoir engineer supervisor. However, the 
localisation has become slower in the last year because it has been difficult to 
find the right people for some managerial jobs. In some cases the failure to 
appoint the right Venezuelans has created a lack of confidence in continuing 
with the localisation process. Here one interesting feature of how PEV managed 
this difficulty is the employment of Venezuelans of German extraction. In some 
intangible sense, PEV trusted these Venezuelan nationals in a way in which 
they would not trust others, simply because of their families' German origins 
(which in turn could stretch back generations). The sense of a German 
`community' in Venezuela, therefore, became a resource that the company 
could call on to reduce its feelings of independence and loss of control. 
The oil MNC faces on the one hand forces to localise its workforce, because of 
PDVSA demands of a smaller number of expatriates and, secondly, there are 
high costs associated with expatriation, particularly in a country like Venezuela. 
On the other hand, it faces forces to keep a high number of expatriates because 
of the need to have a close eye on subsidiary operations as frequent changes in 
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the environment need to be responded in ways that can not be carry out from 
abroad. 
5.8 Control through Socialisation and Network Development in Preussag 
Energie Venezuela 
Socialisation as a control mechanism is very limited in the subsidiary in 
contrast with what was expected. There are no corporate activities that support 
the socialisation of the local personnel with the rest of the MNC. However, the 
expatriates act in the subsidiary as-an indirect mechanism of socialisation and 
acculturation of locals. A local manager described this process as follows: 
If the boss says I would like to see a summary of what has been 
paid, he does not care about the details, he wants to see 5 lines. 
We are not training for that and that brings frictions. This is a 
cultural process difficult to understand and to integrate in the 
behaviour. Precision is not just in facts, time is very important for 
Germans, too. They are not used to work 40 hours in the week, 
they work 32 hours, and we have to compensate for the fact that 
we are not able to do all the work in 32 hours. 
In an informal way, PEV has developed mechanisms to support the 
acculturation. For instance, the expatriate managers have identified local 
candidates to substitute expatriates in certain positions. The local candidate 
goes through a mentoring process with the German expatriate who is in charge 
of the position, to learn the specifications of the job and the reporting formats of 
the company. 
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There are informal relations between the German expatriates with people in 
corporate offices. This relationship has been developed during the time that the 
expatriates have worked there. For instance, there are strong informal links 
between the two Vice-presidents of the subsidiary and the executive board in 
the corporate offices which facilitate the full decentralisation of decision- 
making process to the subsidiary. However, for the locals the development of 
this informal relationship has been more difficult. There are no formal cross- 
departmental relations with other areas in the MNC that support the 
development of this type of relationship. There is a lack of integration of them 
with the rest of the organisation. 
The control mechanisms found in PEV show some divergence on what was 
expected according to hypothetical strategy of control of Genpan firms 
developed in Chapter 3. They are summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Control Mechanisms in PEV 
Type of Control Mechanisms Control Mechanisms in PEV 
German MNCs 
Output Control Low Low (but in process of 
change) 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control High Medium 
HR Practices and Policies Administrative and Administrative and 
operative operative 
Personalised Centralised Control High High 
Control by Socialisation and Networks 
1. Socialisation Medium Low 
2. Informal exchange of information Medium Low 
3. Formal lateral relations High Low 
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First, the financial controls were in process of change with a more Anglo-Saxon 
approach to control the financial operations of the subsidiary. In this sense, the 
firm is becoming detached from the traditional way to control financial 
operations in German firms. Second, the levels of standardisation that were 
expected in the technical area were fewer according to the tendency in German 
firms. However, the tendency is to move to standards on procedures, 
particularly in the administrative area. It can be argued that the process of 
development of the subsidiary has influenced in the implementation of this type 
of devices. Finally, there is little reliance on cross-departmental relation to 
support the presence of control by socialisation and networks which differs to 
what was expected. However, the characteristics of the sector and the 
organizational structure of the firm can be an important explanation of the 
differences found in the case study and the expectations according to the 
country of origin of the firm. As we can be seen from the analysis of the control 
mechanisms in the German subsidiary, the country of origin is an important 
explanation to the control mechanisms found in the subsidiary. However, there 
are other variables that influence the existence of these devices as this case 
shows. In the next part, we discuss the British oil subsidiary: Lasmo Venezuela 
and the nature of its control devices. 
5.9 LASNIO 
Lasmo is a middle-sized independent company from the oil and gas sector, 
concentrating on exploration and production activities. Its corporate offices are 
in London, and the company employs approximately 750 people globally. The 
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company was founded in 1971 as a venture capital company, which participated 
with funds to explore for oil and gas in the new oil market in the North Sea, 
following high-expected returns from oil exploration activities. During this 
decade oil prices rose and small oil companies invested in exploration activities 
looking for high returns in the production phase. 
Lasmo's internationalisation process started in 1982, almost ten years earlier 
compared with Preussag Energie. The company decided to go abroad due to 
low returns on the investment in the North Sea. It started its internationalisation 
with the acquisition of a Canadian oil firm and followed the same pattern in the 
following years. The firm also obtained licenses for the exploration of oil in 
low-cost regions and worked as a contractor for NOCs to carry out exploration 
and production activities and have a further internationalisation. This mode of 
internationalisation shaped the relationship of the corporate offices with the 
subsidiaries. As the finance and tax director of Lasmo describes: 
Lasmo tends to give a high level of autonomy to the subsidiaries. 
For instance, they should maintain or improve the relationship 
with governments or national oil companies. So their 
responsibility is to keep this local relationship and not that with 
the head offices. In this sense, the head offices' role is to assist the 
subsidiary to fulfil this objective. 
The fact that Lasmo is not integrated downstream also supports the operation of 
the company with a multidomestic structure, with independent subsidiaries in 
each country. Lasmo had experienced an accelerated internationalisation in the 
`90s following a strategy to grow in size. By 1993, the United Kingdom region, 
consisting of the UK Continental Shelf, the Netherlands North Sea and the Irish 
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Sea contained 52 per cent of the group reserves: of the remaining reserves 40 
per cent were in Indonesia, and 8 per cent in the rest of the world, in countries 
such as Algeria, Colombia, Italy, Libya, Pakistan, Yemen and Vietnam 
(LASMO, 1993). In 1999, this distribution of the reserves changed, with 21 per 
cent of the reserves in the United Kingdom, 19 per cent in Indonesia and 60 
per cent in other countries such as Venezuela, Pakistan, Algeria, Libya and 
Turkmenistan (LASMO, 2000). 
This redistribution of the reserves of Lasmo was driven by the adoption of a 
new strategy. In the search for high financial returns in a market with an 
increasing volatility in prices, Lasmo decided to concentrate on regions where it 
was possible to produce oil at low cost. This strategy led it to invest in places 
with a large amount of hydrocarbon reserves with low technical risk and 
attractive cost structures. These areas had low production costs and also offered 
opportunities to increase production in the long term, which made it 
competitive to produce even with low oil prices. The majority of regions with 
these characteristics were onshore basins in developing countries such as 
Venezuela, Indonesia, North Africa and the Middle East, and the Caspian 
region. 
Lasmo also looked for other ways to have more control of its cost structure, 
deciding to be more active in the operations of the field. Lasmo, similar to 
Preussag Energie, was an investor, while other oil firms operated the fields. 
Lasmo had little control over costs, development of the projects, budgets or 
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financial planning under this scheme. The MNC, then, sought for opportunities 
in which it could control the entire operation of exploration and production of 
oil. The changes in the strategy of Lasmo reveal a strong need to generate 
results in the short term. The composition of the ownership structure, which has 
a strong Anglo-Saxon flavour, played an important role in the need to pursue 
this objective. 
5.9.1 Lasmo Ownership Structure 
Lasmo has been a public company since it was founded. Following an Anglo- 
Saxon pattern, its initial investors were institutional investors from the United 
Kingdom. In its process of consolidation, Lasmo continued to obtain funding on 
Anglo-Saxon markets. It is listed on the London and New York stock markets, 
raising funds to expand its operations of over $600 millions on the US capital 
markets (LASMO, 1993). The shareholder structure of Lasmo is composed of 
88.57 per cent in the hands of institutional investors; and 11.43 per cent is held 
by individuals, who are mainly the directors of the MNC (LASMO, 1999). As a 
result of this, the firm is driven by a strong commitment to be attractive to 
Anglo-Saxon shareholders. The Board of directors of Lasmo is a mixed 
composition between executive and independent directors. The majority of 
them have experience in the oil industry. Some of them became directors after 
some of Lasmo's acquisitions of other smaller oil companies, and others came 
from larger oil MNCs such as BP Shell (LASMO, 1999). 
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The character of oil, which is a commodity product, makes it difficult to 
compete by differentiating the product of the firm. The competition among 
firms in the sector is based on the size of the reserves and on the reduction of 
the cost to produce the oil. The strategy of Lasmo has been to move to low cost 
areas as part of its strong drive to maximise shareholder value. The Anglo- 
Saxon influence in the MNC is also observed in a number of internal 
reorganisations and the divestiture of non-profitable fields, following the 
pattern developed by the larger MNCs in the sector after the fall of the oil prices 
in the `90s. In 1993, the company carried out a reduction of its overheads of 21 
per cent, and a number of disposals of low production fields. Other operations 
fields were sold in the next years, and in 1999 the firm decided to concentrate 
its operations in seven regions: UK, Indonesia, Venezuela, North Africa, 
Pakistan, the Caspian Region and the Middle East. 
In 1998, - the multinational organisational structure was reinforced, with more 
autonomy given to the subsidiaries while retaining essential controls at the 
corporate centre. This further decentralisation came together with a reduction of 
its personnel in London by 55 per cent (LASMO, 1998). The pressures from 
shareholders to maximise returns is reflected in the great emphasis on cost 
reduction, profitability and efficiency in the statements of Lasmo. The 
Chairman of the firm described in 1997 the strategy of the company: 
Lasmo's principal objective remains to maximise shareholder 
value... our strategy for delivering growth in shareholder value is 
based primarily upon successful exploration for, and production 
of, hydrocarbons. We will access opportunities by direct 
negotiation, competitive bidding, through license rounds and by 
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acquisitions. In our view, the highest returns can be achieved 
through successful exploration and therefore we shall look for 
new investment opportunities, which offer this, potential. 
This emphasis on short-term results in the Anglo-Saxon MNCs is also observed 
in the financial systems developed in Lasmo, with elaborate systems of control 
and tight financial controls. 
5.10 Lasmo Venezuela 
In 1997, Lasmo entered the third round of the Venezuelan opening, winning the 
contract to explore and to exploit the "Daciön" area in the eastern region of the 
country. Venezuelan oil opening looked very attractive to many oil companies 
that were searching for new oil basins in low cost environments. In the case of 
Lasmo, Venezuela fitted its strategy to invest in low cost environments, and 
also the intention of Lasmo to become an operator. Lasmo obtained a twenty- 
year contract to explore and to extract the oil in the area: the oil wells for 
production activities were already built and the company had to continue with 
the oil production and achieve the production quota fixed by PDVSA. 
The type of investment carried out by Lasmo in Venezuela shows a more risk- 
taking strategy typical of Anglo-Saxon firms compared with Preussag Energie. 
Venezuela was the largest Lasmo investment abroad and it represented the 
highest bid in Venezuela's third marginal round (Oil and Gas Journal, 1997). 
By contrast with Preussag Energie, which made the lowest bid of the third 
round for its concession. The oil MNC, to overcome its weakness as an 
operator, established a strategic alliance with Schlumberger, an international 
engineering company with long experience in the country in oil exploitation. 
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This alliance aimed for support for its exploration activities, and technical 
support in the development of the field. 
Lasmo sent a cadre of expatriate managers to manage the operation in 
Venezuela: the best people that Lasmo had were sent to the country. In 1997, 
Lasmo had 120 expatriates to start up the subsidiary. Similar to PEV and 
following a multinational organisational structure, Lasmo Venezuela was 
managed as a part of a portfolio of independent businesses. The expatriates, 
who came to the country, were at two levels: managerial and technical. The 
expatriate team at managerial level had great autonomy from corporate offices 
to organise the work in the subsidiary, design procedures and negotiate with 
PDVSA. However, this level of autonomy delegated to expatriates went together 
with an informal network between the president of the subsidiary and the board 
of Lasmo. A senior economist in the subsidiary expressed his power of 
influence in London in this way: 
The president of the company (Lasmo Venezuela) here is a quite a 
strong wheel, they are very confident in what he does and he does 
things. So, he has a certain management style and relationship 
with the CEO of the company. The president here has a very 
strong relationship, very strong wheels. So, I think he is an able to 
have more room to do what he wants. 
The pressures under which Lasmo had to reach a fixed production level in six 
months explain the large presence of expatriates in the technical area. The 
company did not have time to look for local people and had to bring its own 
experts. PEV by contrast tried to appoint local people from the beginning but it 
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could not find a well-trained local workforce. In the next sub-section, it is 
described how the characteristics of PDVSA and its relationship with Lasmo 
shaped the subsidiary configuration. 
5.10.1 Lasmo Venezuela Market Positioning 
Lasmo Venezuela is exposed to the same structure of the industry in Venezuela 
as PEV. The concession of the field has been under the same scheme, creating 
similar problems for the British subsidiary in the management of the 
relationship with PDVSA. 
Lasmo has found it very difficult to manage the relationship with PDVSA. After 
the third round of concessions political changes have occurred in the country, 
which have been reflected in the management of the NOC. The difficulties of 
managing the relationship with PDVSA were put in this way by the field 
developing planning manager of the subsidiary: 
We still don't understand PDVSA as an organisation. We still 
don't understand what motivates them. Why we get requests, when 
those requests come, what we should be doing. So, I think enough 
effort is putting in to understand PD VSA. What we should do is to 
be sure that PD VSA gets what it wants. 
The demands of PDVSA in terms of reports change frequently. In addition, the 
periods for approvals on the investments of Lasmo takes more time than was set 
initially. As in the case of PEV, the position of Lasmo to negotiate is weak: the 
strong bargaining power of PDVSA is one of the major reasons for this. An 
investment of the size of Lasmo in the country, together with the strong 
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pressures from shareholders to obtain profits in the short-term, creates a 
difficult situation for the MNC. As the multinational organisational structure 
does not support a careful supervision from the corporate offices, the 
expatriates play an important role in the follow-up of the operations of the 
subsidiary. 
The subsidiary during its operations has developed a number of capabilities, 
which could sustain the initial strategy of the subsidiary or modify it. The next 
part discusses the strategy of Lasmo Venezuela, its development of capabilities 
and its value for the MNC. 
5.10.2 Evolution of Lasmo Venezuela and Development of Capabilities 
A great deal of financial and human resources were assigned to Lasmo 
Venezuela, which implied the transfer of knowledge from abroad. In the initial 
stages, the subsidiary was an implementer, which adapted imported resources to 
the local situation. The subsidiary had an important value for the expansion 
strategy of the MNC mainly for similar reasons to PEV. Firstly, the Venezuela 
subsidiary was the first initiative of Lasmo as an operator of oilfields. A 
technology transfer, was expected, from the alliance with Schlumberger. 
Secondly, the MNC had expectations to move to other related business in the 
country, such as gas and to win other oil concessions in Venezuela. The 
subsidiary after 4 years has 279 employees and still has a presence of expatriate 
managers, as Figure 5.4 shows. 
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Figure 5.4 Lasmo Organisational Chart in 2001 
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However, looking at the evolution of the subsidiary and its place in the business 
portfolio of LASMO. the investment in the Venezuela subsidiary has been 
reduced slightly. Lasmo reduced its investment in exploration and production 
activities in 1998 in all subsidiaries because of the cheap oil price (LASMO. 
1998). Howw, e,. er, the levels of oil production in the country were increasing and 
the subsidiary was working in the reduction of costs in 1999. As the investment 
of the MNC in the country has a strong economic value because of the size of 
it. the MNC has to show profitability in this investment. The shareholders 
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follow with great attention the development of this investment in terms of the 
production of oil. 
The subsidiary had developed a set of local capabilities. Firstly, the technology 
alliance with Schlumberger emerged as an opportunity to create knowledge in 
the extraction of oil. The application of Schlumberger's leading-edge 
development technologies in the production of oil was seen as an opportunity 
for knowledge transfer to the subsidiary. In this sense, the Venezuelan 
subsidiary was sought as a platform to develop expertise, which could be 
transferred to the other operations projects of the company in Pakistan and 
Libya. By contrast, PEV did not have this intention to develop technical 
knowledge and transfer to other subsidiaries of the German MNC: the latter 
subsidiary operates as a more independent business than the British subsidiary. 
Although, the two MNCs are in a multidomestic industry, which brought strong 
demands to localise and adapt to local circumstances, the type of technical 
activities carried out in them can be integrated to the rest of the MNC. 
However, the two subsidiaries show different patterns in this matter. 
The subsidiary is in the process of development of another capability, which is 
more local in its nature. Lasmo is a very flat organisation, working with 
PDVSA, which is a hierarchical and centralised organisation. A very valuable 
capability that the subsidiary has had to develop is to learn how to handle the 
relationship with PDVSA because of its need to obtain the approval for 
investments quickly, and to negotiate the production levels, of the subsidiary. 
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By contrast with PEV, the company has not developed an informal network to 
communicate with PD VSA. It has used the formal channels to negotiate with the 
NOC and it has looked for expert advice on how handles this relationship. In 
the next section, there is a more detailed review on this matter. The control 
mechanisms in Lasmo Venezuela are presented in the next part following the 
typology presented in Chapter 1. 
5.11 Output Controls in Lasmo Venezuela 
There is a strong reliance on financial mechanisms to control the operations of 
the subsidiary in Venezuela as can be expected according to the country of 
origin of Lasmo. There are many activities carried out in the subsidiary to 
control financial operations. For instance, there is strong emphasis on the 
elaboration of budgets to control costs. Every department has to elaborate its 
budget annually with specifications regarding the activities carried out. This 
budget is presented to corporate offices for approval. A special emphasis is 
given to the field development plan to estimate the amount of the investment 
associated with the oil production activities. Lasmo Venezuela compared with 
PEV makes a different use of this practice. In the case of Lasmo it is a practice 
to negotiate with corporate offices, targets and the profitability of the next 
period. In the case of PEV it is more an internal practice to follow up current 
operations. The influence of the country of origin can be seen in the two cases. 
There is a set of monthly reports to corporate offices, such as finance ratios 
regarding the return of the investment, production and administrative costs, 
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finance statements, production, investment and security reports, and headcount 
and personnel costs. As Lasmo is listed on Anglo-Saxon stock markets, the 
follow-up of profits on a quarterly basis is important. This attention to the 
generation of profits is reflected in the production of reports to forecast and 
check the production levels and compare them with the field development plan 
built up at the beginning of the year. There is also a living plan of reserves and 
production levels for the next 5 years, which is elaborated quarterly. The 
estimates of this plan have implications for the price of the share of the MNC 
because they reflect the potential of the MNC to produce oil. 
There are different reports and plans, which the subsidiary has to send to 
corporate offices frequently. In the elaboration of the budget a management 
team integrating by the president of the subsidiary, the commercial manager, 
the operations manager, finance manager and human resource manager was 
created to set the goals of the subsidiary. In addition, there is a negotiation 
process between the subsidiary management and corporate offices for approval 
of budget. This is a common practice of British firms, which negotiate targets 
rather than impose them (Vitols, Casper, et al., 1997). In the particular case of 
Lasmo, the use of this organisational practice responds to a combination of 
factors. First, there is a tendency in Anglo-Saxon firms to negotiate targets 
rather than impose them. Second, the expatriate managers designated to key 
positions in the Venezuelan subsidiary, such as the president, the HR and 
finance managers, are all trusted by corporate offices. Therefore, delegation to 
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this level was easy, and in turn facilitates the budget bargaining process 
between the Venezuelan subsidiary and Lasmo corporate offices. 
The strong financial controls are also reflected in the need for further approval 
for corporate offices when there is an additional investment that was not 
presented in the budget. This is because of its impact on the short-term financial 
performance of Lasmo, which influences the price of the share. 
5.12 Bureaucratic Formalised Control Mechanisms in Lasmo Venezuela 
Similar to the case of PEV, Lasmo Venezuela has few standard mechanisms in 
the technical area. The infant stage of production activities in the MNC is 
evident in the absence of these devices in the technical departments. However, 
there is some evidence of standardisation in areas such as the Health, Safety, 
Environment and Security (HSES) aspects, standardisation which has followed 
international industry best practices. 
As the subsidiary is still learning the management of oilfields; thus, there has 
not been enough time to standardise the knowledge acquired from these 
activities. A Lasmo oilfield engineer compares the standardisation in Lasmo to 
other MNCs: 
I think the technical procedures in other subsidiaries (of Lasmo) 
are very similar. Lasmo is a company if I compare with Shell in 
which I worked before that tends to adapt to the requirements and 
standards in each country and works based on this adaptation. By 
contrast, Shell has the same standards all over the world. 
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In the financial area, there is global standardisation on procedures, norms and 
reporting activities. Lasmo needs to present public information on the 
performance of the firm, and the nature of its ownership structure creates 
pressures in the MNC to have an integrated financial reporting system. There 
are written manuals with procedures, reports and explicit financial calculations 
for investment projects. The other level of standardisation in the administrative 
area is more local: there is an on-line internal management system only for the 
subsidiary, which contains documentation for procedures in the administrative 
departments. The standardisation in Lasmo, particularly in the administrative 
area, is considerable; a typical pattern of control in British firms. 
Other areas such as the HR department are heavily standardised. However, the 
standardisation is on a local basis rather than global. HR policies and 
procedures regarding benefits, training, and localisation plan for expatriates and 
discipline and security policies are explicit. The multinational structure of the 
MNC, with a decentralisation of activities in the subsidiaries, does not support a 
more global standardisation. This local standardisation is also part of the 
evolutionary process of the subsidiary that, since the establishment of the 
operations, looks to have internal organisation and to give cohesion to the 
group. 
5.13 HR Practices and Policies in Lasmo Venezuela 
The Lasmo subsidiary in Venezuela has implemented HR practices designed 
abroad. The function in the subsidiary has a strategic role, implementing 
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innovative practices in the area. Compared with the HR function in PEV, the 
function in Lasmo Venezuela is less reactive, and aligns the practices of the 
area with the strategy of the MNC, which is characteristic of the function in 
British and American MNCs. 
Some examples of a more strategic orientation of the HR function in Lasmo are 
in the area of compensation. For instance, there is a stock option program, a 
typical Anglo-Saxon incentive, to align performance expectations from top 
management with shareholders' interests. The program includes all the 
employees of the subsidiary and is linked to performance. The stock option 
program has a medium-term horizon because in three years the employees of 
the subsidiary can sell the shares. However, it has been subject to adaptation to 
please the preferences of local managers. The volatility of the Venezuela 
economy has shaped Venezuelan managers' preferences for short-term 
incentives such as a cash bonus. Lasmo Venezuela had to add a cash bonus (10 
per cent of the salary) as another incentive linked to the performance of the 
employees. 
The HR function of the British oil MNC is more integrated compared to its 
German counterpart. A group incentive program linked to the goals of the 
subsidiary has been developed locally and has been transferred to other offices 
of the MNC. Lasmo has a set of incentives to align the performance of 
individuals with the goals of the MNC. However, there is a country of operation 
effect, which is reflected in the preferences of local managers for -short-term 
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benefits (cash bonus) rather than long-term benefits, which creates strains for 
the implementation of this practice in the subsidiary and demands adaptation of 
it. 
Lasmo Venezuela shows formalisation in its training activities and a more 
strategic approach to the activity. There is a set of training courses in Venezuela 
designed to develop managerial and language skills in locals and expatriates. In 
addition, there is an annual planning activity to identify the training needs of the 
personnel in the subsidiary and to offer courses to improve the skills and the 
knowledge of the employees of the subsidiary. The technical training can be in 
Venezuela or abroad. However, it does not support integration with other 
employees in the MNC because they are not in-house courses. 
The selection process of the local employees is more elaborate compared to its 
German counterpart and even compared to the business software units. There 
are clear criteria on the background of the local people to occupy managerial 
positions. First, people with studies abroad or an MBA from a Venezuelan 
institution. Second, young people who can be acculturated in the company way 
of doing things. Third, people with work experience in other foreign MNCs in 
the country and preferably not coming from PDVSA. In the selection of the 
local candidate there is the participation of different levels of the organisation. 
For instance, there is a round of interviews with the HR department, if this is 
the case, with the expatriate to be substituted, the potential boss and a technical 
expert. In the case of a senior local position, the local has to go to London for a 
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set of interviews there. The formality of the recruitment and selection process 
helps to choose the candidates, who adapt better to the organisational culture. 
In the case of the expatriates the process is not so formal: the main criteria for 
the selection of the candidate is first, how long they have been working for the 
MNC, second, their expertise in the area, and third the willingness of the 
employee to come to the country. An incentive to take the assignment, 
particularly for the technical area, is the existence of an international career 
program of assignments for 2-4 years. 
Lasmo Venezuela compared to PEV shows a completely different picture 
regarding HR practices and policies. The area has a more strategic approach to 
different activities and there is more alignment compared with PEV between the 
activities of the area and the strategy of the company. 
5.14 Expatriate Managers and Personal Control in Lasmo Venezuela 
As has been discussed, Lasmo Venezuela has high levels of autonomy from 
corporate offices. However, there is still a presence of expatriates at managerial 
and technical levels as Figure 5.4 presents. The managers interviewed at 
different levels of the organization unanimously claimed that there was a high 
degree of autonomy at subsidiary level. A Canadian economist described the 
relationship between the subsidiary and the corporate offices in this way: 
London usually doesn't get involved in most decisions. if 1 need to 
check with somebody I check with the president (Venezuela 
subsidiary): very little is what London gets involved. Only in a few 
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instances where there is very important and they are interested in 
what is going on and they want know what you are doing. 
In the technical areas, there was also high autonomy, as described by a 
geologist interviewed: 
... the offices 
here work very independently. Occasionally we have 
visits fr om technical leaders from London to review things, but not 
very often, maybe two or three times a year. 
A local human resource manager expressed the autonomy in his area as follows: 
If I compare the company with other companies where I have been 
you can find here much more freedom. In other words, I think the 
control that HQ offices have over this subsidiary is very little: 
mainly it is a reporting relation with them. 
Despite the high decentralisation in Lasmo, there are some decisions that still 
have to be consulted over with corporate offices, particularly the use of 
additional financial resources, which can affect the returns in the short-term. 
For instance, headcount increases need authorisation from corporate offices in 
the cases that they have not been included in the budget. This is consistent with 
the tendency in British firms to have a close monitoring of personnel costs 
against the budget, and authorisation is required when there are additional 
increases. There are other forms of direct control, such as a performance review 
meeting with an executive director who comes from corporate offices, and the 
subsidiary management team follow up the progress of the planned activities. 
Sometimes this review is done in the corporate. offices in the presence of the 
board of directors. This activity is carried out every quarter. Finally, a manager 
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from the board of directors, who is part of the Venezuelan management team, 
travels every month to the subsidiary to review its operations. 
Expatriates, since the subsidiary started operations, have occupied top technical 
and managerial positions. There has been a gradual localisation of positions 
such as HR. information technology (IT) and legal managers. However, the 
president and the finance manager are still expatriates. In the technical area 
there is an important presence of these people. The subsidiary developed a 
localisation plan for its workforce. In its first year of operation, 1997,54 per 
cent of the subsidiary employees were expatriates; in the following year the 
figure fell to 35 per cent, and the subsidiary aims to reduce it further, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.5 Lasmo Venezuela workforce localisation plan 
Source: LASMO's HR department. 
Lasmo Venezuela is under strong pressure to localise its workforce. As in the 
case of PEV, PDVSA is putting pressure on the company to increase the number 
of local employees, particularly in senior management positions. Venezuelan 
labour regulations limit the number of expatriates in national operations to 10 
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per cent of the total subsidiary workforce. In principle, the head office of the 
company would also like to reduce expatriate numbers, not least due to the high 
costs associated with the presence of them. 
In spite of all this, however, localisation has had a slow pace in the subsidiary 
and has been much slower than initially planned. Three reasons account for this. 
Firstly, the shortfall of trained people has slowed down the process of expatriate 
substitution. Venezuelan graduates with qualifications in technical areas such as 
geology and geophysics are small in numbers, as the education system is not 
well developed to produce such individuals. Those who do have such 
qualifications are consequently in great demand in Venezuela because of the 
entry of the oil MNCs after the opening. It is therefore a highly competitive 
market for smaller oil companies such as Lasmo that find it difficult to compete 
with larger, more international companies. As a result, Lasmo Venezuela has 
found it not easy to substitute expatriates in technical positions in the subsidiary 
as quickly as expected. 
Secondly, Lasmo expatriates have resisted localisation for reasons to do with 
their own careers. Lasino has limited opportunities for international managers. 
For any manager moved from Venezuela due to localisation initiatives, there 
were no obvious places for him to continue an international career in Lasmo. 
The best they might hope for would be relocation back to Britain, but this 
would in turn lead to all the well-known problems of repatriation in an 
organization that was not used to this process. Therefore, expatriates were 
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tacitly resistant to the localisation. This fact is reinforced by the absence of 
long-term contracts in Lasmo, characteristic of British firms and discussed in 
Chapter 3. The background of the expatriates shows high mobility among oil 
firms. This particular outlook of the expatriates in the British firm in contrast to 
the view of the German expatriates in PEV, who were expecting a smooth 
repatriation process back into the positions in Preussag Energie in Germany. 
Thirdly, there are substantial difficulties in managing the relationship with the 
NOC. The dual roles of PDVSA as a monopolistic buyer of Lasmo oil 
production, and as investor in the facilities that Lasmo is building makes this 
relationship very complex. Lasmo has found it difficult to manage this relation 
with PD VSA, not just because of the power imbalance but also because of the 
uncertainty involved. This uncertainty is reflected in the changeable demands of 
the NOC in terms of reports to Lasmo Venezuela. The strategy of the MNC has 
been to left expatriates in charge of the relationship. However, a local manager 
accounts as one of the major problem this strategy: 
I believe that part of the difficulties with PD VSA has to be with the 
fact that Lasmo does not select people with the same hierarchical 
level to the counterpart in PDVSA... Other factor is that 
expatriates manage many of the relationships with PDVSA. I 
consider that if the relationship would be in local hands, the 
outcome would be different. 
As was stated in Chapter 3, the characteristics of the Venezuelan context make 
it very difficult for economic actors to understand how the system works. So, 
relationships and personal networks are a very valuable asset. The weak 
institutional structure of Venezuela means that the institutional framework has 
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to be substituted for personal ties. Therefore, if the link with PDVSA is to be 
managed properly, the implication is that it should be by people who have 
access to the personal and political networks which are the only way to obtain 
information and approval in a context such as Venezuela. 
It has been difficult for Lasmo Venezuela to adapt to this way of operating. The 
localisation programme has come to a halt in a way which is not consonant with 
traditional models of how British MNCs evolve. PEV, compared to Lasmo 
Venezuela, has found a better way to manage the relationship with PDVSA, 
using locals to communicate with the NOC and developing informal networks 
with different actors, which can help the German subsidiary to communicate 
with the NOC. However, all these activities are under the close supervision of 
expatriates in key positions in the German subsidiary. 
5.15 Control 
. through 
Socialisation and Network Development in Lasmo 
Venezuela 
Lasmo Venezuela does not present numerous mechanisms under this 
classification. Mechanisms to support socialisation such as the creation of an 
organisational vision and mission do not exist. In addition, there are no 
corporate meetings, which facilitate the socialisation of the member of the 
firms. However, there is socialisation due to the presence of expatriates, which 
in an informal way acculturates the locals. This affirmation is supported by the 
common perception gathered in the interviews from the locals of working for a 
British company rather than a local firm. 
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Informal exchange of information occurs between the expatriates and personnel 
in the corporate offices, and other subsidiaries as a consequence of the time that 
they have spent in these sites. However, for the local personnel it is more 
difficult. The lack of integration of the subsidiary with the rest of the MNC 
accounts for fewer possibilities for locals to develop this type of connection. 
For instance, there are some peer review meetings in certain technical areas 
such as geophysics and geologists but their frequency is once a year, which is 
very low to develop informal networks. In addition, the IT platform in the 
subsidiary is mainly local, in which much information is for the personnel of 
the subsidiary. Only after 4 years of operations, did Lasmo Venezuela and the 
corporate offices share the same e-mail system. This has reinforced the 
multinational nature of the operations in the oil firm. 
There are some attempts to develop formalised lateral or cross-departmental 
relations. There are technical meetings with personnel from corporate offices or 
other subsidiaries to exchange information, with a frequency of 2-3 times a 
year. There are other projects, for instance in the finance area, with other 
subsidiaries to support the implementation of systems and programs. 
In the case of Lasmo Venezuela the implementation of subtle mechanisms 
through socialisation and network development is very limited. The small size 
of the MNC is the main reason for this. However, this fact is reinforced by the 
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multidomestic nature of the industry, which is reflected in the organisational 
structure adopted by the MNC. 
In sum, the implementation of control mechanisms in the Lasmo subsidiary 
does not follow a strategic control pattern shape only by the country of origin of 
the MNC, table 5.2 presents the summary of the control mechanisms found in 
Lasmo. 
Table 5.2 Summary of the Control Mechanisms in Lasmo Venezuela 
Type of Control Mechanisms Control Mechanisms in Lasmo Venezuela 
British MNCs 
Output Control High High 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control High Medium 
HR Practices and Policies Strategic and global Strategic 
Personalised Centralised Control Low Medium 
Control by Socialisation and Networks 
1. Socialisation Medium Medium 
2. Informal exchange of information Low Low 
3. Formal lateral relations High Low 
There are differences in the nature of these mechanisms which can be explained 
by other variables such as the size of the company and the organizational 
structure. The former explains the little standardisation in the technical area and 
the latter the few formal lateral relations. An important factor, which was also a 
major source of explanation for PEV, is the characteristics of the country of 
operations. In the case of Lasmo Venezuela, this feature has a direct impact in 
the presence of expatriate managers in the subsidiary. The country of operations 
seems to be an important shaper of the evolution of the subsidiary and 
consequently has an impact in the implementation of control mechanisms in the 
local unit. 
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5.16 Conclusions 
There are some points that are important to highlight regarding the 
configuration of control mechanisms in the two subsidiaries. First, the country 
of origin is a strong influence which explains the existence of several control 
devices in MNCs. In spite of the internationalisation of firms, the country of 
origin is an important factor that shapes the behaviour of firms. In the case of 
the two oil subsidiaries, it was identified an Anglo-Saxon effect on one hand 
and a German effect on the other. The influence of these effects was explained 
in Chapter 3 and the case studies validate some of the propositions developed in 
this chapter. The distinctiveness of these effects was seen in some of the 
behaviours of the MNCs. For instance, Preussag Energie shows a typical 
German pattern in its internationalisation, which is different from the 
international pattern followed by Lasmo. Another example is the long-term 
employment relationship between the expatriates and Preussag compared to the 
relationship of Lasmo expatriates. Finally, the financial controls are different in 
the oil subsidiaries, in spite of the gradual adoption of a more Anglo-Saxon 
pattern in the case of the financial controls in PEV. It is important to stress the 
fact that the adoption of other practices such as the incorporation of new 
financial controls in the case of PEV can be the consequence of changes in the 
institutions of the country of origin. These changes may be permitting the 
introduction of these new practices in the MNCs. The comparison of the four 
cases in Chapter 7 will shed more light on this point. 
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Secondly, other variables from other level of analysis are explanations for the 
differences found in the control strategies according to the country of origin of 
the MNCs. As was presented in Chapter 1, the configuration of these devices is 
a complex phenomenon that requires the integration of different perspectives to 
be fully understood. Features from the type of industry and the organization 
itself have to coexist with the influence of the country of origin shaping the 
actions of firms. For instance, the multidomestic nature of the upstream oil 
reinforces the multinational structure of the two MNCs and does not create 
strong demands to integrate operations. Therefore, there are few incentives to 
create control mechanisms based on socialisation and the development of 
networks. 
Third, the country of operations is another factor that affects the 
implementation of control devices in the subsidiary. In the particular case of the 
oil subsidiaries, it has a strong effect on their evolution and operations. The oil 
industry in Venezuela in a context characterised by weak institutions and little 
regulation of the transactions among economic actors have shaped the evolution 
of the subsidiaries and the development of their capabilities. Its influence is not 
only limited to the implementation of control mechanisms. The characteristics 
of the local context have driven the subsidiaries to concentrate efforts to cope 
with the local environment. In this process, the type of capabilities developed 
may has not strategic value for the MNC. In some cases affecting the role of the 
subsidiary in the business portfolio of the firm such as is the case of PEV. In 
addition, its effect is also seen in the slow localisation of the workforce in the 
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MNC subsidiaries. The presence of expatriates as a direct control mechanism is 
largely explained by the characteristics of the country of operations of the 
subsidiaries, which make difficult their substitution by other modes of control. 
In the next chapter, we present the cases of the subsidiaries from the business 
software industry. The comparison of the cases follows the same structure that 
is presented in this chapter. After the comparison of the next industry, Chapter 
7 will present the fmal analysis of the main similarities and differences found in 
the four cases. 
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Chapter 6: The Business Software MNC Subsidiaries: SAP for 
the Andean Region and the Caribbean and Baan Venezuela 
6.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present and discuss the MNC subsidiaries from the 
business software industry. Doing this, it describes the presence of the control 
mechanisms in the SAP subsidiary for the Andean and the Caribbean region 
(hereafter SAC) and in Baan distributor (hereafter exBaanVe) in Venezuela. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, it presents the evolution of SAP 
AG, stressing its internationalisation process and ownership structure. Then, it 
describes the setting up of the subsidiary in Venezuela, emphasizing its market 
positioning and the development of capabilities in the local unit. Thirdly, the 
dif'erent control mechanisms in the subsidiary are presented. The same 
structure is followed to present the Baan case. Finally, the main conclusions of 
the chapter are discussed. This chapter provides the basis for the comparison of 
the four case studies in the next chapter. The cases presented here are grouped 
by industry and the comparison of the control mechanisms are made according 
to the country of origin of the MNCs. 
6.2. SAP AG 
SAP AG is a German technology firm that develops e-business software 
solutions. Its corporate offices are in Walldorf, Germany and the MNC has 
operations in more than 100 countries. The German firm has more than 13,000 
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clients who run around 30,000 operations of SAP software. SAP AG is one of 
the four largest German companies in terns of market capitalisation and the 
fourth largest independent software group in the world (The Financial Times, 
1998). In 2003, the company had 29,610 employees worldwide, with the largest 
concentration (44 per cent) in Germany (SAP AG, 2003). Figure 6.1 presents 
the distribution of the workforce by regions. 
Figure 6.1 Distribution of SAP AG Workforce by Regions 
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Source: SAP AG (2003). 
The firm was created in 1972 when a group of German engineers left the 
German subsidiary of IBM to start their own software company. Initially, the 
company developed business software packages for specific administrative 
functions. developing later an integrated business software package called 
enterprise systems. 
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6.2.1. The Internationalisation Process of SAP AG 
In the late `80s, SAP AG started its internationalisation, following the typical 
German export pattern. The first international market was Europe and the 
marketing of the software was through the German subsidiaries of European 
MNCs, which implemented the software and promoted it to corporate offices. 
During this early stage of internationalisation, European clients negotiated with 
SAP AG offices in Germany. However, in 1988 the German firm adopted an 
aggressive FDI strategy to expand operations internationally. It opened fully- 
owned subsidiaries in Switzerland and in Philadelphia in the US. The entry into 
the North America market was very aggressive in terms of investment. Between 
1992-1995 more than 20 offices were opened in the US and 5 in Canada (Nee, 
1995). The internationalisation of SAP AG, similar to other German companies 
as was stated in Chapter 3, was late compared to the time of operations of the 
MNC: its international expansion started almost twenty years after its creation. 
During the next years and until 1998, SAP grew spectacularly in terms of sales 
and the opening of many subsidiaries supported this expansion. The 
characteristics of the industry, highlighted in Chapter 4, create pressures on 
SAP to become the standard software and create economies of scale on the 
demand-side. As the main competitors of SAP AG where in the US, the firm 
had to grow fast in this market. The accelerated international expansion was 
assisted by the creation of regional reporting centres, such as Austria as 
headquarters for the central sub-region of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia, and SAP America in Philadelphia as report centre for 
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Canada. the US and Latin America. The accelerated expansion of the MNC can 
be seen in the increase of the revenues during 1996-2001, which are presented 
in Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.2 SAP AG Re-* enues 1996-2001 (in F millions) 
The strategy followed by SAP AG until 1998 is typical of German MNCs 
presented in Chapter 3, table 3.6. It shows little diversification of products, high 
concentration of the MNC operations in Germany and the concentration of 
investment in familiar business environments. The MNC did not diversify its 
Rand D activities to develop new software products in addition to the ES. The 
Rand D activities were focused on the development of a single, integrated 
product that could then be shipped in the same way to all customers. The 
company until 1998 centralised its Rand D activities mainly in the corporate 
offices of Walldorf, with some other research centres in Berlin, Karlsruhe and 
Saarbniecken in Germany. 
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Source: %%w, %. SAP. com. 
The organisational structure of SAP AG until the late '90s fitted the global 
organisation model of Ghoshal and Bartlett (1998). The MNC concentrated its 
assets, Rand D activities and decision-making in Germany. The rationale to 
open a subsidiary was "follow the customers": they sold the software first to a 
large client and then they opened the subsidiary in the country (Nee, 1995). It 
shows a typical pattern of German firms of being less risk oriented compared to 
their Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In this stage, the ES was seen as a standardised 
product, which needed little adaptation. Thus, the market was seen as a single 
integrated one that required from the subsidiaries low levels of local 
responsiveness, in terms of the creation and adaptation of products to local 
markets. 
The limited adaptation of the product was reinforced by the initial marketing 
strategy of the German MNC. In its initial growth, the main clients of SAP AG 
were MNCs, and the firm concentrated its sales efforts on this niche. However, 
as was stated in Chapter 4, the changes in the structure of the industry forced 
SAP AG to alter its initial strategy. In order to cope with the new demands of 
the clients SAP AG had to readjust its strategy and structure. 
A process of decentralisation of Rand D activities was initiated in 1998. SAP 
labs were opened in France, Japan, India, the US and Canada. The following 
year, the company launched a series of Internet-related applications. These 
changes in the portfolio of products developed by the MNC increased the 
number and the type of competitors of the firm. They were not only the 
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providers of ES: Internet application vendors and other business software 
providers became direct competitors of the MNC. 
In addition, SAP AG abandoned the tradition of developing all software in- 
house, and created alliances with competitors such as Commerce One and 
Yahoo, one of the leading companies in internet portals, in order to support the 
diversification of the product portfolio and to speed up the development of new 
software (The Financial Times, 2000). The company also created other 
subsidiaries with autonomy to develop specific types of products, such as SAP 
marketplace and SAP portals in Palo Alto, California, in an area where the main 
competitors of the company had their Rand D centres. The subsidiaries of the 
MNC according to the type activities carry out started to have different roles as 
Birkinshaw and Morrison (1995) have stressed may occur in MNCs. Despite 
the decentralisation of certain activities, the MNC has still a strong attachments 
to its country of origin in terms of the concentration of company workforce (44 
per cent) in Germany and, importantly, a number of Rand D activities is still 
carried out there, too (SAP AG, 2002). 
The US sales boom of SAP AG in the early '90s contributed to the expansion of 
the operations of the firm in Latin America, which is a small market compared 
to other regions such as East Europe and Asia which had higher economic 
growth over this period. The delay of SAP AG in entering this market has two 
explanations. First, the number of Latin America MNCs is small, the main 
niche for SAP's products. Second, the small number of European subsidiaries 
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in Latin America did not make attractive the setting up of subsidiaries to offer 
SAP's software: instead the service could be provided from the US offices or 
even from Germany. However, the entry into the US market at. tered this 
situation. Many US MNCs have subsidiaries in Latin America and SAP AG had 
to expand its operations to these countries: in many cases, the US operations 
abroad were large, and SAP AG had to open subsidiaries to service these users 
abroad. The global character of the sector described in Chapter 4 was the other 
driver of the process of expansion of SAP AG, together with the need to 
become the standard software of the industry. Competition among software 
firms is not local: they need to expand globally rather than to concentrate in few 
countries according to the characteristics of the industry explained in Chapter 4. 
Although, SAP AG was under strong pressures to have a global presence in a 
short period of time, its strategy of growth has been planned following a 
cautious German expansion pattern. The opening of subsidiaries in Latin 
America responded to this need to have a presence in places in which there 
were large clients. 
In 1994, SAP AG set up its first subsidiary in Mexico, where US MNCs have 
considerable investments. The following year, 1995, the German MNC opened 
subsidiaries in Brazil and Argentina. The strategy of SAP AG to sell the 
software package to MNCs made these countries the most attractive in the 
region in which to open subsidiaries, because US MNCs had operations there as 
well as there being large indigenous firms in this locations. 
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6.2.2 SAP AG Ownership Structure 
In its ownership structure SAP AG presents an interesting combination. On the 
one hand, there is a significant amount of shares in the hands of the cofounders, 
a typical Genpan pattern. On the other hand, a significant number of Anglo- 
Saxon institutional investors hold a number of the shares of SAP AG. 
SAP AG ownership structure has an important participation from the 
cofounders of the company, with almost 35 per cent of the stocks. The rest is 
split among institutional and private investors coming from Germany, North 
America and the rest of Europe (see: www. sap. com). The ownership of the free 
float shares of the MNC is presented in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3 Shareholder Structure of SAP AG Free Float Shares (2003) 
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A large proportion of the free float shares are held by American institutional 
investors (3ý. 5 per cent), with 19.1 per cent that are in the hands of UK 
investors; the Genpan investors only hold 14.1 per cent. Anglo-Saxon 
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investors hold more than 40 per cent of the public shares of the company. In 
order to keep the investment of the latter group in the company, and to avoid 
the possibility of aggressive takeovers: SAP AG has to fulfil their demands for 
high shareholder returns in the short-term. This pressure cascades down to the 
profit centres such as the subsidiaries. The SAP CEO in the 2002 annual report 
clearly expressed this objective: 
The greatest challenge was adjusting to slight or even no revenue 
growth - instead of the 15 per cent growth originally expected - 
while increasing profitability. SAP has improved overall efficiency 
in the long term, not with massive reductions in staff, but through 
careful cost-cutting measures and rationalization of our global 
infrastructure. 
The MNC has implemented strong financial controls to monitor the 
achievement of quarterly sales results and to policies to being more cost- 
efficient, they are discussed in great detail in the analysis of the control 
mechanisms of the Venezuelan subsidiary. 
Although there is an important proportion of free float shares, there is still 
concentration of ownership in family hands, typical characteristic of German 
firm. This is reflected in the family control of some of the top-level positions 
until recent time. The composition of the supervisory and executive boards in 
SAP AG presents an interesting picture in which features from the typical 
German firms coexist with other practices which are not typical of this context. 
There are few independent representatives, such as the president of Nokia 
Corporation and the director of the institute for information systems at a 
German research centre of artificial intelligence. Two of the SAP cofounders 
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are members of the supervisory board and one of them was CEO until 2001. 
The SAP AG executive board is dominated by those with long careers in the 
company (see: www. sap. com). 
In 1988 the firm changed to SAP AG and carried out its first public offer on the 
Frankfurt stock market. By contrast to traditional German firms, SAP AG in its 
initial operations did not obtain funding from German banks. It went to stock 
markets to avoid banks' involvement in the supervisory board (The Financial 
Times, 1998). The concern of banks in protecting the value of their loans 
created pressures to adopt conservative business policies that could limit the 
speed of the international expansion of SAP AG. In 1998, ten years later, the 
company sold its stocks on the NASDAQ stock market. SAP AG adopted the 
US GAAP, instead of continuing to follow the GAAPs under the German 
Commercial Code. 
The marketing strategy of SAP AG, originally, concentrated on the sale of 
business software. It considered itself as "software business seller". However, 
the mature stage of the industry that forced the MNC to search for new business 
opportunities and introduce new solutions that can be sold to current clients, 
transformed the relationship between the firm and its customers. This strategy is 
also seen in the role adopted by the subsidiaries of the MNC. 
6.3 SAP for the Andean and the Caribbean Region 
The subsidiary of SAP in the region is responsible for a set of operations in the 
Andean and Caribbean region. The subsidiary in Venezuela centralises the 
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management of the offices in Colombia, Peru and Puerto Rico. The Venezuelan 
office is directly responsible for the operations in the Caribbean, and the entire 
operation of the subsidiary employs 160 people (SAP AG, 2003). 
The market entry of SAP AG into Venezuela, following the German export 
model, aimed to give service to local clients from abroad. There were a number 
of firms from Colombia and Venezuela that implemented the business software 
system, however, the sale was negotiated from the US or Germany. The 
medium size of the first users and the characteristics of Venezuelan and 
Colombian firms, which was explained in Chapter 4, did not support the 
investment in a wholly-owned subsidiary. 
However, in 1996, SAP AG set up formal operations in the country. PDVSA, 
the Venezuelan NOC, was interested in the implementation of ES to integrate 
its operations. The size of PDVSA, which in 1999 had around 33,000 employees 
in its local offices and 15,000 employees in its foreign offices, created enough 
incentives to SAP AG to open a subsidiary in the country. 
In the first year of operations a team of expatriate managers and technical 
experts came to manage the subsidiary. SAP AG compared to the other case 
studies used the expatriates for short-term assignments to set up subsidiaries. 
The average for the expatriate assignment was one-two years, and the 
expatriates mentored the first locals hired by SAP AG in Venezuela. The 
process of acculturation was not only through the presence of expatriate 
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managers: the locals also had to travel to the MNC offices in the US or 
Germany to learn methodologies on specific software. By contrast, to the oil 
subsidiaries in which the locals have had few opportunities to develop networks 
with the rest of the MNC, SAP AG has a process of acculturation described by 
a local manager like this: 
When I was hired, the first thing that I had to do was taking a 
flight and spend three months in Boston. The training there was 
linked to the features of the technical products. When I came back, 
I had a person assigned to train me. His role was more to 
introduce me to SAP organisational issues and to teach me how I 
should do things. 
After the subsidiary was set up, the local team had to look for clients in 
Venezuela and in the rest of the region. Local sales targets were negotiated with 
the local managers in the Venezuelan market but also they had to search for 
business opportunities in neighbouring markets such as Colombia and Peru. 
The strategy of SAP AG for the region, as the Venezuelan market was small, 
was to expand operations to the other Andean countries. The initial sales to 
other regions were coordinated from Venezuela. In 1997, SAP AG set up 
offices in Colombia and Peru, and two years later they opened an office in 
Puerto Rico. The Venezuelan managers trained by the expatriates undertook the 
subsequent opening of Colombia, Peru and Puerto Rico offices and were 
responsible for organising them. A cadre of expatriates still came but only to 
support the local managers in technical specifications of products. 
The initial relationship between the Andean offices and the US offices was very 
tight. The core activities of the subsidiary were sales and marketing and the 
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subsidiary depended on corporate offices for new software and up-grading of 
ES versions. However, the subsidiary went through an evolutionary process, 
which changed its initial structure. 
6.3.1. Market Positioning of the SAP Subsidiary for the Andean and the 
Caribbean region 
The initial strategy of SAP in Venezuela and the rest of the region was to target 
the niche composed of large firms. The Venezuelan subsidiary, pursuing this 
strategy, became a leading software supplier in sectors such as engineering and 
construction, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, and mass consumption products in 
which the larger firms of Venezuelan and the rest of the region have activities. 
The strategy to expand operations regionally was driven by two factors. On one 
hand, the large firms in Venezuela, Peru and Colombia very often have 
operations in neighbour countries in the region. Therefore, SAP AG had to offer 
services to the offices of the user of the software in the region. On the other 
hand, the small size of the local markets created pressures to implement the 
software in many firms as possible in order to create a lock-in effect. 
Despite the successful efforts of Venezuelan subsidiary to implement the 
software in the largest firms, the characteristics of the Venezuelan industry with 
its largest group of small and medium enterprises constrained the growth of the 
subsidiary. The niche of large firms became mature. In 1999, it became difficult 
for the Venezuelan subsidiary to achieve its annual sales plan. In an 
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entrepreneurial subsidiary action (Birkinshaw, 1997) a regional initiative was 
approved to adapt a standard software package to the necessities of local small 
and medium firms. A whole local initiative was developed: a) there was a 
market research in Venezuela to detect the needs of local firms; and b) to 
reduce installation costs of the software, the subsidiary negotiated alliances 
with local companies rather than with international companies to cut down the 
overall cost of the software. This strategy helped the subsidiary to reach its 
sales forecast at the end of the year. The next year, the same initiative was 
launched in the Colombia and Peru markets. The approval of this initiative 
shows changes in the relationship of the subsidiary with corporate offices. A 
less hierarchical relationship in which the subsidiary can adapt product and 
services to the local context is developed in the evolution of the subsidiary. 
6.3.2. Subsidiary Evolution and the Development of Capabilities 
The subsidiary in Venezuela experienced an evolutionary process in its role. In 
its initial stage the subsidiary was highly dependent on corporate offices for 
resources, knowledge and personnel. However, after the subsidiary began to 
generate its own knowledge (e. g., technical expertise and knowledge of the 
local environment), it had more power to negotiate with corporate offices and 
could adapt software products. 
In its evolution the Venezuelan subsidiary has developed a set of capabilities. In 
the technical area, the business software has been adapted to the characteristics 
of medium and small firms. This local initiative has been exported to other 
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neighbour countries in Latin America. Another capability developed in the 
subsidiary is the knowledge of the local context. The sale of business software 
products demands a close interaction between customers and the ES supplier. 
The role of the subsidiary in the development of this relationship has been a 
valuable asset. This fact is enhanced by the strategic drive of SAP AG to 
develop a long-term relationship with its customers, which makes even more 
valuable the relationship that the managers of the subsidiary might develop with 
local clients. In the words of a subsidiary manager: 
ERP is a mature market. We already have a base of clients and we 
can sell to those clients other technology components. You are not 
going to grow fast in number of clients, you are going to grow in 
number of products. That is my job. There is a middle market, a 
mini-market where you can sell low-priced solutions for simpler, 
straight or pre-configured products ... mechanisms that you 
created to have a cheaper membership cost for the customers. 
Another valuable capability of the subsidiary, is the implementation of 
mechanisms to cope with the volatility of the local context. The political 
instability and economic volatility in the region limit the economic growth of 
firms, affecting their decisions to invest in technology. A local manager 
describes how the volatility of the region affects the operations of SAC in this 
way: 
Our first challenge is to manage the political risk in general. For 
instance, in Colombia the political and social risks, which impact 
firms. They have to take decisions in an unstable economic and 
social environment, in which you really do not know what it is 
going to happen tomorrow. So your clients keep telling you: 
tomorrow. Let's see what happens tomorrow. 
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This volatility of the context is reflected in two areas. On one hand, the 
subsidiary managers need to have particular negotiating skills to deal with 
clients, which might be different from the skills required to carry out sales in 
more stable contexts. On the other, the subsidiary has developed internal 
financial mechanisms to protect against the risk of local instability. For 
instance, three years ago, SAC developed a protective mechanism for 
immediate reaction in the case of increases in credits rates, devaluation or 
control exchanges. Some of these practices have been exported to other Latin 
America countries that share similar regulations or economic conditions. 
However, the transfer of these practices is constrained to the Latin America 
context, because only other subsidiaries in the region face similarities in terms 
of economic fluctuations and tax regulations. 
A process of subsidiary-driven charter reinforcement (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998) has occurred in the evolution of the subsidiary. The main activities of the 
subsidiary, sales and marketing, have been reinforced and the Venezuelan 
subsidiary is in charged of these operations of Colombia, Peru and Puerto Rico. 
The initial offices in these countries had a functional structure, with finance, 
sales, professional services and human resource departments and a country 
manager for each of them. Each country unit, although they were not 
subsidiaries, were operating as independent profit centres with their own local 
sales strategy. 
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In 2001, the Venezuelan subsidiary. SAP Venezuela, became SAP Andean and 
the Caribbean (SAC) with a shared service structure to manage the Venezuelan, 
Colombian, Peruvian and Puerto Rican offices. The new structure for the 
Andean subsidiary is presented in Figure 6.4. As this figure shows, the main 
activities of the subsidiaries were grouped on a regional basis, eliminating the 
functional structures in each country. 
Figure 6.4 Organisational Chart for SAP Andean and the Caribbean region (2001) 
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The managers in the subsidiary are distributed between Venezuela and 
Colombia. For instance, the regional sales director, regional services, finance, 
regional contracts and marketing and new initiatives directors are in Venezuela, 
human resource and regional alliances and business developments managers are 
LSV 
in Colombia, with the majority of functions regrouped in Venezuela. In addition 
to cost efficiency, the shared service structure in the case of SAC also has the 
function of centralising operations. According to the managers of the subsidiary 
the new structure allow them to have a better picture of the operations. 
SAP Venezuela has evolved into a subsidiary that has reinforced its original 
charter, becoming a subsidiary that manages a region. It has had the ability to 
create capabilities that have more than local value for the MNC. This is 
reflected in the enhancement of responsibilities from management the 
Venezuelan market to manage the regional market. The evolution of the 
subsidiary has had influenced the type of mechanisms implemented in the local 
unit. These are discussed in the next section following the typology of Harzing 
(1999) and comparing them with the expected model of control strategy in 
German MNCs developed in Chapter 3. 
6.4 Output Control Mechanisms in SAP Andean and the Caribbean 
The output controls are mainly in the finance area. There are variety of financial 
controls coming from corporate offices in Germany and regional offices in the 
US. Their major aim is to detect deviations from business plans in terms of 
sales and costs. 
For instance, there is a set of activities to estimate the annual sales. SAP AG 
discusses the strategic guidelines of the MNC with the subsidiaries in a kick-off 
meeting. According to the strategy of SAP AG, the managers of the different 
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Americas' subsidiaries meet to review the portfolio of SAP products and they 
develop a regional business plan considering the business opportunities in the 
region. This business plan is subject to revision and approval from the Latin 
America regional offices in the US; after its approval comes the elaboration of 
the budget, which is carried out by each subsidiary. 
The planning activities for the year are carried out at two levels. A corporate 
one, which defines the strategy of the MNC and at subsidiary level which 
according to its resources defines its contributions to the strategy. The planning 
process is a mix of integration and localisation. A project manager of SAC from 
the industrial sector describes the planning process in this way: 
SAP AG in Germany develops the corporate guidelines, policies, 
business orientation, and business development; the guidelines to 
know where we are going. SAP -America in Philadelphia 
translates these guidelines to the American context: they say we 
want business with this profitability, we want to grow in these 
sectors and we want to develop this product. Then we need to put 
these demands in operative terms, like to generate a business 
practice in CRMorsupply chain management. You start to look in 
the region for potential clients, what are our resources (people), 
and we start to distribute activities in the group. 
The business plan is forecast every month in the departments that generate 
revenues, such as sales, consultancy, service and support, and training 
activities. They also have to report revenues quarterly to the Latin American 
offices in Philadelphia. A set of cost reports to control working-hours per 
person in consultancy and support, and services activities are elaborated, too. 
For instance, there are monthly reports of consultancy-hours. 
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The strong driven in the subsidiary on profits and cost control is in almost every 
financial control in the subsidiary. Following a corporate requirement, SAC has 
implemented a program of cost reduction in its operations. Every year, the 
preparation of the budget includes a portion of costs that has to be reduced. 
Other mechanisms of control are frequent conference calls with the managing, 
sales and financial directors in the subsidiary and the managing director and 
financial director for Latin America to check current revenues and progress 
with - potential clients. There are also mechanisms to benchmark the 
performance of the subsidiaries in term of profits: they are elaborated in 
Germany and are controlled by the finance manager in the subsidiary. 
In terms of financial controls, they are strongly present in SAC. A strong driven 
to follow up short-term revenues is the main driven in the financial controls 
implemented in the subsidiary. The generation of profits in the short-term is 
closely monitored in the subsidiary, contrary to what would have been expected 
in a German MNC according to the control strategy of German MNCs. The 
ownership structure of the firm with an important proportion of Anglo-Saxon 
institutional shareholders has its influence in the nature of this control in the 
subsidiaries. Compared with Preussag Energie, SAP has implemented a set of 
financial controls that are oriented to prevent deviations from the financial 
planning rather than legitimate financial operations in the subsidiary. 
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6.5 Bureaucratic Formalised Control Mechanisms in SAP Andean and the 
Caribbean 
SAC is highly standardised in the technical area, a control mechanism that is 
distinctive of German firms. The global character of the ES industry is another 
reason why the company places strong emphasis on the standardisation of 
procedures in SAC. SAP AG products are business pre-packaged solutions for 
functional areas in organisations; therefore, from their conception these 
solutions are highly standardised. Finally, the size of SAP AG, with more than 
29,000 employees spread worldwide, brings strong demands to unify operations 
and make more predictable the outcomes of the units of the German MNC. 
For instance, SAC has many manuals in the technical area, many of them on- 
line, regarding sales proposal elaboration, lists of sales prices, steps to 
implement the business solutions, information on support and service activities, 
and types of agreements with consulting partners. 
Standardisation does not come only from outside the subsidiary: there is a 
tendency to standardise procedures internally following the German tradition. 
There are local coordinators to formalise and unify procedures in the different 
areas of the subsidiary. The standardisation can be completely local or might 
take templates developed in other parts of the MNC and adapt them to the local 
context. For example, the Regional Alliances and Business Development and 
Human Resources Departments have written policies and procedures locally 
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developed. In the case of HR policies, such as the compensation policies, they 
are designed in the US regional centre. 
Another area highly standardised is the finance department in the subsidiary. 
The Finance Director of the SAC subsidiary explained the levels of 
standardisation in this area as follows: 
We allow creativity from the members of the team. Their propositions 
have to come to my level to be evaluated and adjusted. We do not permit 
that each country manages its operations in a different way. Everything 
has to be uniform and the only changes between countries are 
adjustments for tax or legal reasons. For example, Colombia has 
control exchange, but apart from this, everything is standard and is 
written in policies, norms, procedures and formats on public files 
shared by all members of the subsidiary. 
The levels of standardisation of SAC can be explained by three reasons. First, 
the tendency of German firms to standardise procedures and norms. Second, the 
pressures to have strict controls on financial results in the short-team which 
influence the development of financial standard devices. Third, the need to offer 
a standard product creates the need of integration through standardisation. 
6.6 HR Practices and Policies in SAP Andean and the Caribbean 
The HR function in SAC has a more strategic approach than the traditional HR 
function in German firms. The subsidiary has also implemented a few Anglo- 
Saxon practices. However, this implementation of more strategic and global HR 
practices is mediated by the characteristics of the country of operations. For 
instance in terms of compensation, there are a set of global policies developed 
abroad which are different from the traditional German remuneration system. 
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SAP AG has implemented Anglo-Saxon practices such as stock options plans. 
The MNC has developed different optional plans to offer to the employees the 
possibility to buy stocks; however, the subsidiary has the choice to decide how 
to implement the option plan, on what terms and to which managerial levels. 
The characteristics of the local context, highly volatile, do not support 
incentives based on long-term investments as part of the salary of the 
employees. Therefore, the local human resource department can negotiate the 
terms of the implementation of this type of practice. 
Other compensation practices such as a variable compensation linked to the 
achievement of specific goals by managers have also been subject to local 
adaptation. The local knowledge of the HR department of the preferences of 
local managers concerning rewards, contributes to designing attractive 
incentives for them. In addition, corporate mandates about salary increases are 
subject to modification. There is a per centage of increase dictated by SAP 
America offices; however, this increase is subject to negotiation with SAC. The 
local economic conditions and their effect on the subsidiary operations are in 
some cases reasons to decrease the per centage of the salary increase dictated by 
corporate offices. Local labour regulations shape the nature of the benefits and 
perks in the subsidiary, which also have an impact on the total compensation of 
the employee. 
The performance evaluation program is global but subject to adaptation, too. It 
is transferred from German corporate offices. SAC has the option to choose 
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between the US and the German models, which are implemented according to 
the region. In the case of SAC, the managerial group decided that the US model 
did not fit the subsidiary culture; therefore, the subsidiary went for the German 
model that was more appropriate according to the local view. 
Job descriptions are another practice subject to localisation. The general job 
description for each position comes from America regional offices but they are 
adapted locally. These descriptions, usually, are for larger subsidiaries in which 
the job activities for each position are fewer. The centralisation of activities 
with the shared service structure in SAC has added more responsibilities to the 
positions in the subsidiary. So, the local job descriptions are adapted to the local 
specifications of the job. 
The nature of certain HR practices such as compensation, performance 
evaluation and job descriptions is more strategic and global. They do not follow 
a German pattern in their nature and their implementation in the subsidiary is 
adapted to local circumstances. Technical training is other practice that follows 
global standards. Corporate offices design the major technical training and its 
execution is coordinated between the subsidiaries and the corporate offices. 
SAP AG has developed a number of in-house technical programs for its 
employees. According to the area of operations, the employee has a set of 
technical courses that are part of his annual training. The training is carried out 
in-house, usually, and SAP AG relies on technology tools such as conference 
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calls, multimedia facilities and the Internet to disseminate new knowledge. The 
MNCs have created strong technical training programs in different sites: for 
instance, SAP AG has multiple agreements to fund positions in different 
universities in Germany and also supports learning projects carried out through 
the internet. Moreover, the company has a University Alliance Program which 
provides software training at no cost to students at hundreds of higher education 
institutes in different parts of the world (SAP AG, 2002). 
SAP AG demonstrates high levels of standardisation and integration of 
activities in organisational areas in which there are stronger demands to "act 
and look" more alike. It needs to homogenise what is sold and to give the same 
service to clients dispersed worldwide, which is a consequence of the global 
nature of the software business sector. This global nature also affects internal 
operations: the high levels of interaction of employees from different 
subsidiaries bring pressures to have internal consistency, too. 
The career development in the subsidiary is based on internal promotion. Local 
people who started in low organisational levels currently occupy top positions 
in SAC: there is a system of internal promotion in the subsidiary. This system 
of internal promotion is connected to a long-term employment commitment. In 
the words of a local manager: 
I think that the fact that it is a company with corporate offices in 
Germany makes interesting their methodologies, to see how the 
Germans manage the business, you can even see that many people 
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stay for a long time in the company. The employee turnover, I 
think is very low or at least I have perceived that. 
SAP AG has developed a program of an international career, which in theory 
implies the existence of opportunities for locals to move abroad on international 
assignments. However, the opportunities for local staff are limited. The 
characteristics of the local environment are again the main reason that 
constrains this type of opportunity. As the subsidiary HR manager expressed it: 
There is a policy that states that the outstanding people have the chance 
to move within the group. The transfer policies are very clear. They are 
sent from Germany and validated in the States. The only bad thing is 
that in my region, I do not have the possibility to send as many as I 
would like to these transfers. The reason is because in our countries it is 
difficult to get one transfer and the majority of people want to go 
abroad Then, if everyone wants to go abroad, what people are going to 
work here? 
In the opposite direction, there are no assignments to the subsidiary from other 
units, regional centres or corporate offices. The political instability and lack of 
personal security are the main reasons argued for this. It can also be 
hypothesised that the lack of strategic value of the subsidiary operations 
compared to other SAP units does not make it attractive to support transfers to 
the subsidiary. The HR practices in the subsidiary are mix of imported practices 
which are localised and adapted to the local circumstances. The analysis of the 
HR practices in the subsidiary shows a strong effect from the host country in 
their implementation. 
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6.7 Expatriate Managers as a Personal Centralised Control Mechanism in 
SAP Andean and the Caribbean 
The presence of expatriate managers in SAC is very limited. In the initial 
operation a cadre of expatriate managers stayed for a period of between one and 
two years. After the process of acculturation was completed, regional offices 
accelerated the substitution of expatriates by local employees. The only 
permanent expatriate position is the managing director who is a Spanish 
expatriate, who lives in the US and travels every two weeks to the subsidiary. 
The substitution of locals by expatriates has been relatively easy. SAP has 
found in Venezuela local people with the adequate training and experience to 
fulfil positions in the subsidiary: another factor which has helped to localise the 
workforce. 
There is another group of expatriates who visit the subsidiary for technical 
reasons. The sale of the business software implies specific knowledge in some 
areas connected to either the business solutions or the industrial sector. In some 
cases, expatriates visit the subsidiary when there is not local expertise regarding 
this matter. A second group of expatriates from the financial area makes short 
visits to the subsidiary. They come either from American or German offices to 
check financial activities such as revenues and cost reduction plans. The 
expatriate presence on the short visits is to monitor activities, but they do not 
become involved in the execution of them. 
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The main reason for the absence of expatriates running the operations of the 
subsidiary is the type of activities that are carried out in it. The core activities in 
SAC are sales and marketing. Therefore, a clear understanding of local markets 
and business practices is fundamental to having a good performance. Local 
managers with their long training in the Venezuelan context might be more 
effective in dealing with clients. SAC has learned this fact from experience. 
German expatriates carried out the negotiations of the subsidiary with the first 
local clients, and it was difficult for them to manage this business relationship. 
The sale of the software was affected in many cases because the two parties had 
different negotiation styles, reinforcing the idea of hiring local workforce. 
Another factor, which supports local presence, is the nature of local work 
practices. The implementation of business solutions usually creates changes in 
the structure and work practices in the firm. Locals are more capable, because 
of their cultural proximity, of managing and communicating the process of the 
implementations of the software. Their organisational experience is embedded 
in the local context. They have developed an implicit understanding, which 
helps them to identify and react according to the circumstances. A subsidiary 
local manager in this way justifies the presence of locals in SAC: 
... the acquisition of one of these solutions 
brings changes. 
Sometimes radical changes in organizations; part of them, it is the 
cultural side of the people that you are working with. When the 
SAP and the user teams start to work together, a critical factor for 
success is the cultural proximity between the two teams. I think 
this is a key point to have a subsidiary in the country. 
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The limited presence of expatriates goes together with permanent consultation 
with the regional offices in the US or corporate offices in Germany. The local 
managers cannot take decisions related to discounts on sales or to the approval 
of delays on client payments without previous authorisation. In addition any 
decision, which does not follow SAP AG corporate policies, requires the 
authorisation of regional offices. High levels of consultation and approval are 
substitutes for direct control through expatriates. The regional marketing and 
new initiatives manager describes the subsidiary-corporate offices relationship 
as follows: 
Every important decision always has to be consulted: we have 
periodic meetings. In my case even though I report over to the 
managing director, I also have to report to the person who 
coordinates the marketing activities and new initiatives in SAP 
America in Philadelphia. 
SAP AG has almost no expatriate managers in charge of the operations of the 
subsidiary. Nevertheless, this absence of expatriate presence in managerial 
positions is substituted by tight controls in terms of consultation of decisions 
and approvals to implement local initiatives. As substitutes for direct controls 
the MNC has developed a set of mechanisms that in direct and indirect ways 
controls very closely the operations of the subsidiaries and the decisions taken 
by the local managers. 
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6.8 Controls through Socialisation and Network Development in SAP 
Andean and the Caribbean 
Control through socialisation and network development is a mechanism that 
takes different forms in SAC. The acculturation of locals through the 
expatriates who came to organise the subsidiary acted as a socialisation 
mechanism in the initial operations. The frequent communication to consult and 
ask for authorisations moulds how locals take decisions and aligns them with 
the company way of doing things. 
The MNC has developed a set of activities to reinforce the corporate culture, 
like communicating the mission, vision and values of the company. The 
implementation of a more Anglo-Saxon approach to managing the 
organisational culture is another tool that can be classified in the category of 
socialisation. 
The flows of information in SAP AG are numerous in supporting the 
development of formal department relations. The knowledge-intensive nature of 
the activities of the MNC reinforces the implementation of subtle control 
mechanisms through the exchange of information between the members of 
SAC, people from other subsidiaries, and regional and corporate offices. For 
example, the configuration of virtual teams is an activity that supports exchange 
of information on one hand, and on the other is a mechanism to disseminate 
practices in the SAP AG. SAP subsidiaries create special teams called "virtual 
account teams" when they need to elaborate a sales proposal or implement a 
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business software solution and they do not have enough local expertise to 
elaborate it. The members of the "virtual team" do not need to travel to the 
subsidiary: they communicate using electronic devices such as conference calls, 
videoconferences and e-mails. SAP AG, to strengthen this activity across 
subsidiaries, has developed an "internal knowledge community" which the 
subsidiaries can access and look for experts. 
The different activities mentioned above also support the development of 
informal exchange of information. In addition, events such as the kick-off 
meeting are mechanisms to meet people from other subsidiaries, share 
experiences and develop informal networks. Technical training, which is 
standardised for all subsidiaries, is another way to develop this type of network. 
The local managers visit frequently the offices of the US and Germany 
supporting the development of informal networks within the MNC. These trips 
have two functions. On one hand, the managers have to report activities to 
regional or corporate offices. On the other, there are periodic meetings to 
network with colleagues in the same industrial unit and exchange information 
about the needs of clients on new software developments. The areas of finance 
and HR also have meetings and conference calls to exchange information; 
however, they are limited to the Latin America region. 
The subtle control mechanisms in SAC are numerous; they give cohesion to the 
group and facilitate the integration of activities, particularly in the technical 
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area. The presence of expatriates is substituted by a set of devices that aim to 
develop the acculturation of the workforce in a subtle way. The review of the 
control mechanisms in SAC, which are presented in table 6.1, has highlighted 
some interesting points that are important to discuss. 
Table 6.1 Summary of Control Mechanisms in SAC 
Type of Control Mechanisms Control Mechanisms in SAC 
German MNCs 
Output Control Low High 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control High High 
HR Practices and Policies Administrative and Strategic and Global 
operative 
Personalised Centralised Control High Low 
Control by Socialisation and Networks 
1. Socialisation Medium High 
2. Informal exchange of information Medium High 
3. Formal lateral relations High High 
First, the strategic control on German MNCs according to the country of origin 
has some divergences from the original model developed in Chapter 3. There 
are other variables that influence the presence of control mechanisms besides 
home institutions such as the country of operations. The limited presence of 
expatriate managers, which is not characteristic of German firms, is explained 
by the characteristics of the country of operations. The large difference between 
the two countries and their institutional environments reinforces the value of 
local managers to supervise the operations of the subsidiary. However, the 
presence of local managers does not imply fully autonomy to the subsidiary. 
The frequent consultation of the major decisions in the subsidiary with regional 
and corporate offices is another way of direct control. In addition, the financial 
controls are a complementary form of control to frame the decisions taken by 
local managers. The implementation of the financial controls in SAP AG, 
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which have a more Anglo-Saxon orientation, is evidence that the firm is 
becoming more detached from the country of origin on the one hand. On the 
other. it also shows that there are changes in the home institutions that are 
supporting another type of practices in German firms. They are going to be 
discussed with more detail in the next chapter in the comparison of the four 
cases 
6.9 Baan Company 
Baan Venezuela is the second case from the business software industry. The 
path followed by the Baan subsidiary in Venezuela (hereafter BV), since the 
MNC set up operations in the country, is remarkably different from the route 
taken by the SAP subsidiary. 
Baan was founded in The Netherlands in 1978 and today is a leading global 
provider of ES. The MNC offers a portfolio of enterprise software applications 
that are in use by more than 7,000 customers. 
Figure 6.5 Baan Net Revenues bý Geographic Regions (in S thousands) 
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Source: SEC (2000). 
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Baan has concentrated on the development of software in industries such as 
industrial equipment and machinery, automotive, aerospace and defence, and 
the high tech industry (Baan, 1999). In 1999, the company had 4,835 employees 
among corporate offices and its subsidiaries (SEC, 2000). Its revenues by 
regions in 1999 are presented in Figure 6.5. 
Baan initiated operations as a small family business, which provided financial 
and administrative consulting services. Jan Baan, a founder of the company, 
detected a business opportunity in the use of software to automate the planning 
process for manufacturers: then, the firm started the development of business 
software in 1982. 
6.9.1 The Internationalisation Process of Baan 
The internationalisation process of Baan started relatively early compared to its 
German counterpart: eight years after the first software developments. The 
internationalisation of the firm was signalled by slow growth in the initial 
stages, which accelerated into a run to cover foreign markets in a short period of 
time. It began in the early `90s under an exporting strategy: sales activities were 
carried out from the Netherlands to the rest of Europe. In a second stage of 
growth, the Dutch company set up a shared profit scheme with local distributors 
in Europe, the US and Asia. They were authorised to sell the licenses of the 
software in these countries and shared the income with the business software 
firm. The adoption of this strategy was shaped by the size of Baan, which did 
not have enough capital to support a strategy of FDI and could not find in the 
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local markets enough funding to finance an internationalisation process on a 
considerable scale. 
This situation changed in 1993 when a US venture capital firm invested in Baan 
and boosted its growth in international markets. The US investor, following an 
Anglo-Saxon style, was interested in making profits in the short-term. A 
strategy to follow was to go public and sell the shares of the company on stock 
markets. However, it was important to be large in size and sales to attract 
institutional investors, so, the firm had to show a considerable presence in 
international markets. A third stage of growth started through an accelerated 
internationalisation, which has important implications in many areas of the 
firm. 
Part of this growth was to set up an international service centre in the 
Netherlands and to acquire the accounts of large distributors in Germany and 
the UK. Because of the global nature of the industry, together with the large 
size of the US market, Baan developed an aggressive entry plan through DFI in 
the US. Its strategy of growth was to have direct presence in the largest markets 
and leave distributors in small markets. The firm continued its expansion 
through acquisitions of previous distributors in the US, Japan and South Africa, 
and setting up subsidiaries. 
In order to support its fast growth, Baan changed its organisational structure. 
The expansion went together with a decentralisation of operations in sales and 
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marketing. In 1994, Baan had two corporate offices, one in Barneveld, The 
Netherlands and the other in Virginia, the US. The US corporate offices were 
autonomous in taking decisions about marketing and sales strategies for the 
region. At this stage, Baan was adopting an international model of operations. 
The decentralisation of operations had the objective of localising products and 
services to the needs of the US markets. A Venezuelan manager explains the 
rationale behind this strategy: 
They were autonomous and the business was split into two 
regions. They had their own power. The drivers of the America 
business were different to the drivers in Europe. The cultural 
aspect was important; therefore, it was central to have a Baan in 
the States. The Dutch culture would not have worked there. 
In the new structure the Rand D activities were decentralised, too. Rand D 
centres were opened in India, Denmark, UK and the US (SEC, 2000). The 
MNC as a part of its strategy had the intention to grow by number of products 
as well. The development of software in-house is a slow process and the firm 
faced strong demands to grow fast. It adopted a more Anglo-Saxon style of 
growth through acquisitions. Between 1994 and 1998, the MNC acquired a 
number of small and medium software companies to expand its product 
portfolio. These acquisitions diversified Baan products into software that was 
not connected to ES. 
Since the beginning of its internationalisation, Baan has been concentrated in 
the niche of small and medium enterprises. By contrast, SAP had been oriented 
to the niche of larger firms such as MNCs. In 1999, the changes in the industry 
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also forced Baan to embrace the Internet and created a product suite that 
supported e-business processes, which facilitated the interconnection between 
users and their customers and suppliers. 
Baan's entry in the US market implied offering services to the US firms with 
operations in Latin America. By contrast to the strategy followed by SAP AG, 
which was more cautious in opening subsidiaries, Baan opened wholly-owned 
subsidiaries in many Latin countries. In 1994, the firm set up operations in the 
largest markets of the region, such as Mexico and Brazil. During the period of 
1994-1997, five additional subsidiaries were set up in Argentina, Venezuela, 
Colombia, Chile and Peru (Baan, 1998). 
The character of the global industry is reflected in the geographical expansion 
of the MNC. In the words of the Operations Vice-President for Latin America 
indirect sales: 
I think there are two elements. First, it is important to have many 
customers. Second, there is a global market; you have a number of 
MNCs that have operations in different countries. We have one in 
particular that operates in 7-8 countries companies in Latin 
America. You go and to talk to them about the business software 
and they say: my main operation is in Venezuela. Do you have 
offices in Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia and Ecuador? I have 
operations there too. 
The US offices controlled Latin America subsidiaries; it was a full 
decentralisation to the US offices, which dictated the corporate guidelines for 
the Latin America units. The communication with the headquarters in the 
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Netherlands and Latin American subsidiaries was minimal and only in the 
technical area with the Rand D centre. 
Despite Baan's fast growth in markets and products, its profitability was erratic. 
The company could not generate attractive profits prior to 1996, as is presented 
in Figure 6.6. The aggressive expansion of the company was not supported by 
an integration of products, functions and administrative centres, and the costs 
skyrocketed in the company, affecting the share price. 
Figure 6.6 Baan Operative Revenues/ Net Income 1994-1999 
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A local manager describes the lack of integration on the marketing strategy of 
Baan: 
The other problem was the Baan acquisitions. Baan had three 
(software) solutions for the same problem. In addition to Baan's 
original product, there were three additional ones with other 
brands, owned by Baan that did the same process. So, which one 
did we sell? 
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In 1998, the firm went through a process of considerable restructuring that 
resulted in a reduction of approximately 20 per cent of the workforce as an 
attempt to reduce costs and increase profitability. An additional reorganisation 
was carried out at the end of the same year. The MNC announced a further 
reorganisation that resulted in approximately 14 more offices being closed and 
an additional reduction of headcount by approximately 4 per cent. In the 
countries in which Baan closed offices, they had to leave a representation to 
continue with support and services activities to current customers, then the 
partnerships with distributors were reassumed in these sites. In 1999, the 
company had 200 indirect channels covering 15 countries in the different 
continents (SEC, 2000). 
The Latin America subsidiaries were also affected by the reorganisation of 
Baan. The fast expansion in the area was halted in 1998. The reduction of costs 
did not support the existence of subsidiaries for small markets because of the 
considerable operating costs. The subsidiaries in Colombia, Peru, Chile and 
Mexico were sold, the Dutch MNC left the subsidiaries in countries like 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela. The next year, the company decided to close 
the Venezuelan subsidiary and to give support to current clients through a 
distributor. The absence of large clients, who could generate substantial profits, 
was an important element in this decision. By contrast with SAP subsidiary in 
Venezuela which has an important and profitable customer as PDVSA. 
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The ownership structure of Baan played an important role in the strategy 
followed by the MNC. The next section presents how the interests of the 
shareholders moulded many of the decisions of the MNC. 
6.9.2 The Ownership Structure of Baan 
Baan's ownership structure has changed significantly since the foundation of the 
company, especially in the last decade. Baan until 1993 funded its expansion 
through cash generated from operations, long-term debt, bank lines of credit 
and loans from the principal shareholders (Baan, 1995). This type of funding 
did not support an expansion through FDI. However, the interest of a private 
equity investment, which acquired 34 per cent of Baan's shares, changed the 
strategy of the firm. The new investor provided the money to accelerate the 
expansion of Baan and in the short-term obtain high returns when the MNC 
would sell its shares on stock markets. 
Two years later in 1995, Baan went public and listed its shares on the 
Amsterdam and NASDAQ, stock markets. The financial statements of Baan 
were prepared according to generally accepted accounting principles in the 
Netherlands (Dutch GAAP) and according to the US GAAP, and the firm 
started to report on a quarterly basis. 
Although the MNC went public in 1995, the two cofounders of Baan kept the 
control in the company, one as chairman and the other as a member of the 
supervisory board until 1999. Baan did not follow the pattern of considerable 
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separation of control and ownership. In 1998 as a consequence of the low 
profits of Baan, public investors demanded changes on the management board, 
so the two cofounders resigned. 
Baan's attempts to reorganise and become profitable failed: it could not meet 
the expectations of shareholders. The prices of the shares of the company fell 
sharply, and in 2000 Invensys, a British engineering conglomerate, acquired 82 
per cent of the shares of Baan. 
6.9.2.1 Invensys Acquisition of Baan 
Jnvensys is the result of a merger of two British engineering companies BTR 
and Siebe. The merger of the two MNCs follows a typical Anglo-Saxon pattern 
of growth through mergers and acquisitions (Whittington and Mayer, 2000). 
The new conglomerate was the merger of a company that grew through 
acquisitions in the engineering sector, Siebe, particularly in the market of 
supplying automation and control systems, and another firm, BTR, which was 
an engineering conglomerate with a number of diversified operations in the 
sector. In 2001, Invensys had 93,519 employees. The geographical distribution 
of the workforce has a considerable internationalisation, with a significant 
concentration in the US. Figure 6.7 presents the workforce distribution 
according to regions. 
The merger of the two British companies was followed by a reorganisation 
process and cost reduction program that created a more centralised structure, 
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and the disposal of divisions that did not fit with the new strategy on 
automation requirements of clients. A business unit for software systems was 
set up to cluster all the business software packages sold by the group (Invensys, 
2002). 
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The new organisational structure adopted a multidivisional form, with its 
corporate headquarters in London and four divisions located in the US that 
serve global markets. Figure 6.8 shows the four divisions of Invensys and their 
locations. 
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Invensys's acquisition of Baan caused additional job cuts and cost reductions. In 
order to support the new reorganisation, the administrative activities of Baan 
Company were merged with the administrative operations in the Software 
Division of Invensys under the scheme of a shared structure. 
The acquisition of Invensys changed again the Baan's organisational structure. 
The corporate offices in Virginia were closed, and the offices in the Netherlands 
became the only corporate offices that reported to Invensys Software Division 
in Virginia in the US. The sales and marketing activities, because of their 
specialised nature, were not integrated with other Invensys areas, as happened 
with the rest of Baan administrative functions. 
6.10 Baan Venezuela 
BV was a fully operating subsidiary in 1995. The process of setting up the 
subsidiary was part of Baan's decision to expand into Latin America. The start- 
up of the subsidiary was similar to SAP through expatriates, from Mexico and 
The Netherlands, although the general manager of the subsidiary was local. The 
Mexican expatriates guided the first sales and the Dutch expatriates were in 
charged of the implementation of the software. In addition, the local personnel 
received further training in the Brazilian subsidiary, the largest one in Latin 
America. In the next two years and for short periods of time, expatriates came 
to the country to continue the transfer of technical knowledge. Expatriates came 
from the Rand D centres in the Netherlands, India or the US when the 
284 
knowledge transfer was technical, and when it was linked to other activities 
such as sales, the expatriate came from other Latin countries such as Mexico. 
The expatriates were not seen as a mechanism of direct control. According to 
the view of a Venezuelan manager they were more a resource for technical 
training and support for the sales and the implementation of the software: 
We never used the definition of expatriates. The expatriates were 
in the US. What we did was to send the Latin America subsidiary 
managers to Miami because we decided that Miami was the 
strategic place to manage the relationship with Latin America, but 
expatriates in the subsidiaries, we did not have that. We carried 
out knowledge transfer activities through them but they were very 
specific. To move someone from the US to manage a subsidiary 
was very uncommon. 
Similar to SAC the subsidiary was managed by local people. The activities of 
the subsidiary, sales and services, rely on a strong knowledge of the local 
market. For an expatriate manager was more difficult to carry out these 
activities because of their lack of interaction with the local context. Local 
managers were more fit because of their cultural proximity to perform the main 
activities of the subsidiary. 
6.10.1 Baan Venezuela Subsidiary: its Market Position and its Evolution 
Baan's strategy to enter the Venezuelan market was to sell software solutions in 
the sectors where the company had expertise. The limited diversification of the 
Venezuelan industrial sectors concentrated the operations of Baan in two 
sectors: a) industrial equipment and machinery and, b) the automotive sector. 
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The small and medium sizes of Venezuelan enterprises were attractive for 
Baan, which had developed a strategy of growth concentrated in this sector. 
Baan Venezuela in its first years of operations was concentrated on local 
markets. Its role was as an implementer, which adapted the software to the 
needs of local fines. Nevertheless, in the subsequent years Baan Venezuela 
performed better in term of sales than its counterparts in Colombia and Peru. A 
subsidiary charter extension (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998) occurred and the 
Centro America and the Caribbean markets were assigned to the Venezuelan 
subsidiary. 
However, the reorganisation and downsizing of Baan affected the operations of 
the subsidiary. The subsidiary was not profitable enough to justify FDI in the 
country according to the reorganisation plan of Baan. In 1999} Baan withdrew 
from direct involvement in the country and a divestment occurred. It sold off 
the right to sell and service Baan products to the top management of what had 
previously been Baan Venezuela. This new entity (called here exBaanVe) had a 
profit-sharing agreement with Baan based on revenues from sales, up-grade 
versions and support activities. 
The evolution of BV has been affected by numerous changes inside and outside 
the subsidiary. First, the strategy of growth in Baan has been erratic, and its 
expansion in markets and products had a lack of coordination, which affected 
the support of the MNC to its subsidiaries. Second, the absence of large users of 
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the software, which could generate attractive revenues, influenced the decision 
to divest the subsidiary. In the words of a subsidiary manager: 
I think we have a recession and the ERP boom is gone. We are 
moving to another type of software. I believe that Baan Venezuela 
did not have all the expertise to be in the market, to group a 
number of well-trained people, to sell the product and to give 
service to a group of customers. 
Currently, ExBaanVe is focused on service activities rather than the sale of the 
software. This strategy can be observed in the increase in the headcount of the 
customer care department, which is responsible for the post-sales service. 
Figure 6.9 shows the larger dimension in terms of employees of the services 
department compared to the sales department in exBaanVe. 
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Despite exBaanVe new status since 1999, the distributor needs to be in contact 
with corporate offices and other subsidiaries because of the constant flows of 
new products and the need to up-grade information on current ones. Invensys 
after the acquisition in 2000 has left some old mechanisms and implemented 
new ones to control the operations of exBaanVe. The next part discusses the 
control mechanisms in exBaanVe and the effect that Invensys acquisition has 
had on them. 
6.11 Output Control Mechanisms in ExBaanVe 
The main control on exBaanVe is through activities that generate revenues to 
the MNC: for instance, software sales and support activities. In addition, the 
global character of the industry and the geographical dispersion of Baan also 
create pressures to control the quality of the service offered by cxBaanVe to 
clients. 
ExBaanVe has implemented a set of financial controls, particularly to follow up 
the revenues from the sales of software and support activities. ExBaanVe has to 
send sales reports every quarter to Baan regional offices for South America. 
Furthermore, exBaanVe sends sales forecast every month to check the progress 
or. achieving the targets of the business plan elaborated at the beginning of the 
year. The distributor also sends invoices of the software sales and payments 
from clients for support activities to the regional offices. Baan before the 
acquisition, as a public firm in Anglo-Saxon markets, was under strong 
pressures to implement mechanisms to control financial operations and report 
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on quarterly basis. This type of control has become even stronger after the 
acquisition by Invensys. In the words of the Vice-president for the region: 
Before (the acquisition), we had more flexibility. We had the 
possibility to make agreements, for instance, in credits to clients. 
Invensys is stricter in the management of the client's accounts, 
and the distributor (exBaanVe) has little margin to manoeuvre. 
Now, the distributor has to be honest about what it can and cannot 
do. Before, the distributor could say: let's see if this business can 
generate some profits. And if during this process the distributor 
had some cash problems, Baan could help it. Today, it is not so 
flexible: today you need to work closer, it needs to have a more 
realistic dimension and has to be focused on what the business 
really is. 
A more Anglo-Saxon style creates more pressures to meet sales targets and 
make payments on time. ExBaanVe needs to be more accurate in its sales 
planning and its financial planning to fulfil these demands. Invensys places 
more demands on exBaanVe to achieve planned revenues, so, the forecast for 
sales needs to be more accurate and bill payments need to be on time. 
The other type of output control is over the service provided to the users of the 
software. The global nature of the software business industry demands strong 
homogeneity in the quality of this service. There is a regular report to check the 
response rate of exBaanVe to clients. There are also activities carried out by 
centres in the US and the Netherlands to obtain feedback from the users on the 
service provided by the distributor. The support activity is shared between 
exBaanVe and Baan: the former provides support for certain requests from 
clients and Baan offers the service for more complex demands. The fees paid by 
the clients go to the entity that gives the support. 
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6.12 Bureaucratic Formalised Control Mechanisms in ExBaanVe 
ExBaanVe, in spite of its independent character, relies on standard 
methodologies in the technical area. The distributor follows templates 
developed by Baan in the areas of sales, support, implementation and 
consultancy. ExBaanVe has a considerable number of standard procedures in 
the technical area in which global homogenisation is important. However, the 
standardisation is not in such detail as it is in the case of SAC: for instance, 
there is a general methodology to implement business solutions, which is 
adapted according to the circumstances and the specificities of the software. 
There is information about software specifications and sales strategy for 
specific products, and also there is a set of standard activities for the support 
services. A local manager describes the levels of standardisation in the technical 
area like this: 
You review a product, and search for a client, then, you study how 
to make the match, what procedures you need. We need to identify 
every thing to make the product works. One this is done, they give 
the software solution to us and say: this works like this, the way to 
sell it is this, the type of support is this, this is the legal agreement, 
so go and sell it. 
The administrative area has little standardisation: some procedures 
particularly in the financial area are followed according to Baan 
standards. Other areas such as consultancy have internal procedures 
developed locally. In the areas in which there are not global demands, 
Baan allows exBaanVe to choose its way to operate. 
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6.13 HR Practices and Policies in ExBaanVe 
The HR area in exBaanVe has a more operative nature than a strategic one. 
There is not a HR department: instead, the finance area is responsible for the 
HR activities in the distributor. There is a full localisation of these practices: in 
many cases, they are not formalised. For instance, the performance evaluation 
plan and the job descriptions of the different positions are developed locally 
with no input from Baan. The selection process has no formal criteria: 
experience in the software is the main attribute, which influences the selection. 
The former employees of Baan Venezuela fill the managerial positions. There is 
a career plan for employees who can be promoted to higher positions. However, 
the small size of exBaanVe does not offer many possibilities for vertical 
promotion, and to move horizontally is the option for most middle managers. 
There is a variable compensation plan for the technical area, which has been 
developed locally. The HR practices in exBaanVe are very similar to the HR 
practices in Venezuelan firms, as was discussed in Chapter 3. Technical training 
is fully integrated with the activities carried out in Baan. There is a strong link 
between the two organisations regarding this matter. On the other hand, 
managerial training is fully localised and independent from Baan control. 
6.14 Expatriates as a Personal Centralised Control Mechanism in 
ExBaanVe 
In exBaanVe, the presence of expatriates as a direct control mechanism is rare. 
Expatriates come on short visits to discuss technical issues, especially to review 
activities in the support and consultancy areas. When some technical expertise 
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is required to support a sales activity, the exBaanVe has to pay a fee to Baan for 
those services. Another type of expatriate control is through the monthly visits 
of the indirect sales operations director for Latin America, to have an update on 
the sales activities of the distributor. 
The reasons for the low presence of expatriate mangers are associated with the 
activities of exBaanVe. A deep knowledge of potential clients and local 
business practices is very important for the main activities of ExBaanVe: sales 
and marketing. It is difficult for a foreign person to understand local markets in 
a short period of time. Local personnel in charge of the operations offer a better 
chance to handle the relations with local customers. 
Although there are high levels of autonomy in managing the operations of the 
distributor, there is consultation on certain decisions that might affect the 
revenue of Baan. The exBaanVe must ask the regional offices for authorisation 
to on discounts on the prices of the software for potential clients. In addition, 
the distributor can hire resellers in Central America and Caribbean countries in 
which exBaanVe does not have sale offices; however, to make an agreement 
with a reseller the Venezuelan distributor needs to ask for authorisation. 
6.15 Control through Socialisation and Network Development in 
ExBaanVe 
There is not a strong presence of these mechanisms in exBaanVe. The need for 
integration in the technical area is reflected in a frequent consultation on 
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information about support activities, product specifications and enquiries on 
after-sales services. These activities have helped to develop an informal 
network with people in subsidiaries of Baan. As a socialisation mechanism, 
there is an annual corporate meeting with other distributors in the America 
region to present the new products and services. The frequent innovation in the 
business software sector makes it important to update corporate guidelines 
regarding the sales of new products and new services to clients. 
Table 6.2 presents a summary of the main control mechanisms in exBaanVe. As 
a first point to highlight is that the existence of the control mechanisms in the 
subsidiary is strongly shaped by the character of distributor of the local unit. 
The more distant relation of a distributor compared with subsidiary is less 
demanding in terms of control. This explains the existence of few controls 
through socialisation and networks compared with the other British MNC and 
SAP. 
Table 6.2 Summary of the Control Mechanisms in eiBaanVe 
Type of Control Mechanisms Control Mechanisms in exBaan Ve 
British MNCs 
Output Control High High 
Bureaucratic Formalised Control High Medium 
HR Practices and Policies Strategic and global Operative and local 
Personalised Centralised Control Low Low 
Control by Socialisation and Networks 
1. Socialisation Medium Low 
2. Informal exchange of information Low Low 
3. Formal lateral relations High Medium 
Secondly, the Anglo-Saxon origin of Invensys is perceived in the stricter 
financial controls in the distributor. The demand for short-term results, as has 
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been mentioned, creates more pressures for accurate sales forecasts. Finally, 
there is a stronger country of operations effect in exBaanVe compared to the 
other case studies. This can be seen in the nature of the HR policies and 
practices and the medium presence of bureaucratic formalised controls in the 
distributor. As the link between the local unit and the MNC is weaker, the effect 
of the country of operations becomes more powerful creating more pressures 
for localisation. 
6.16 Conclusions 
The discussion above of the cases from the business software industry 
highlights the complexity associated with the study of the implementation of 
control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. The country of origin is still an 
important effect in the implementation of control mechanisms in the 
subsidiaries and other features of MNCs. For instance, SAP late 
internationalisation and still its concentration of operations, of employees and 
Rand D activities in Germany are evidence of this. In the case of the German 
MNC, the implementation of practices with a more Anglo-Saxon character has 
to coexist with other practices with still follow a German pattern. The German 
MNC shows a hybrid nature in which elements from the country of origin and 
from other origins interact and shape the operations of the MNC and its 
subsidiaries. The more hybrid nature of SAP is also evidence that some changes 
are occurring in the German institutional context that allows German firms to 
adopt practices that are not German in their origins. The country of origin effect 
is also present in the case of exBaanVe and the tighter financial controls that 
Invensys has imposed in the distributor. 
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Finally, the effect of the country of operations is also evident in the operations 
of the two business software units. As has been discussed it creates pressures on 
MNC subsidiaries to adapt their operations and products to the local context. In 
the two cases its effect is seen in the need to adapt products, services and 
practices to local demands and local institutions. For instance, SAC has 
localised products and has also developed control mechanisms to deal with 
local circumstances. In the case of exBaanVe, the effect is even stronger 
because the weak link of the distributor with the MNC that creates room for a 
stronger country of operations effect. In the next chapter in which the 
comparison of the four cases is made this points are discussed in more detail. 
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Chapter 7: The Origin of Control Mechanisms in MNCs a 
Comparison across Countries 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to compare the presence of control mechanisms in the 
MNC subsidiaries. The presence of these devices in the subsidiaries shows the 
interrelation between distinctive elements belonging to the country of origin of 
the MNC, country of operations of the subsidiary, and other features linked to 
the type of industry and the firm. 
In order to capture the complexity of the implementation of control mechanisms 
in MNC subsidiaries, this thesis has focused its analysis at subsidiary level, 
which is the unit of analysis of this research. The factors selected to explain the 
existence of a particular set of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries are laid 
out in the analytical framework presented in Chapter 1. 
The chapter is divided as follows. First, it presents the analysis of the main 
characteristics of the case studies. Using the dimensions of control mechanisms 
presented earlier, the second section compares the output control in the four 
subsidiaries. Third, this section compares the level of standardisation as a form 
of bureaucratic formalised control. Fourth, the analysis of the HR practices and 
policies implemented in the MNC subsidiaries is discussed. Then, this section 
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focuses in the presence of expatriate managers as personal centralised control in 
the Venezuelan subsidiaries. The last type of control mechanism, control 
through socialisation and network development, is also compared in this 
section. Finally, the main conclusions of the chapter are stressed. 
7.2 Main Characteristics of the Case Studies 
This section will present and compare the main characteristics of the case 
studies, to facilitate the later comparison of the control mechanisms in each 
subsidiary. A full description of each case is incorporated in Chapters 5 and 6, 
in which the cases have been grouped according to their industry of operations. 
7.2.1 The German AINCs and their Subsidiaries 
This sub-section contrasts the most important features of the MNCs from a 
German origin with operations in the business software and oilfield service 
industries respectively. Table 7.1 lists and compares them. 
The comparison of the two German firms highlights the existence of some 
similarities and differences. The similarities can be explained by the effect of 
the country of origin, which influences the path taken by the firms. For 
instance, the composition of the boards shows considerable attachment of the 
two MNCs to the German context, with the presence of the cofounders on the 
boards in SAP AG, and the election of a CEO with strong connections with one 
of the main shareholders in the case of Preussag AG. 
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Table 7.1 The Main Features of the German MNC Case Studies 
SAP AG Preussag Energie 
Industry: Industry: 
Business Software Oilfield Service 
Number of Employees: Number of Employees: 
29,610 employees (43 per cent concentrated in The conglomerate has around 69,000 employees 
Germany) (34 per cent concentrated in Germany). The energy 
division has 700 employees 
Ownership Structure: Ownership Structure: 
There is combination in the ownership of shares Mainly institutional investors from Germany. A 
between cofounders of the firms and institutional large participation from a German financial 
investors (mainly from the US) provider 
Composition of the boards: Composition of the boards: 
Presence of the cofounders in the supervisory board Representation of the different stakeholders of the 
and one cofounder CEO until 2001 firm on the supervisory board. The current CEO 
was a former employee of the German financial 
provider, one of the major shareholders of the 
group 
International Expansion: International Expansion: 
SAP was founded in 1972 and its The group was founded 1959. Its 
internationalisation was initiated in the late `80s internationalisation started in the late `90s 
Organisational Structure: Organisational Structure: 
Evolution from a global structure towards an A multmational structure with decentralisation of 
international structure with the decentralisation of decisions to exploit local opportunities 
some operations 
The late internationalisation in the two MNCs is a similarity which can be 
explained according to the country of origin of the firms, as was discussed in 
Chapter 3. However, there are other features of the MNCs that show attempts to 
be less attached to their home base and follow a more global strategy. In the 
case of SAP AG, the evolution of its organisational structure with a 
decentralisation of operations is part of this. In the case of Preussag AG, its 
internationalisation, with an increasing concentration of its workforce outside 
Germany, is another way to become a more global company. 
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The subsidiaries of the two German MNCs have characteristics which are a 
combination of the effect of the parent country and the country of operations. 
. 
These are presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 The Main Features of the German MNC Subsidiaries 
SAP for the Andean Region and the Caribbean Preussag Energie Venezuela (PEV) 
(SAC) 
Size: Size: 
160 employees 280 employees 
The entry strategy: The entry strategy: 
The MNC opened a subsidiary after obtaining a The MNC entered the country by making the 
contract with the largest local fine (PDVSA), lowest bid in the third round for the concession of 
looking to expand operations in neighbouring an oilfield 
countries 
Range of operations: Range of operations: 
Regional (Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Puerto Local (Venezuela) 
Rico) 
Subsidiary Role: Subsidiary Role: 
An implementer (it adapts to local needs software A miniature replica (the development of a set of 
products developed somewhere else) value-adding activities in the subsidiary). However, 
technology to operate the fields was imported from 
abroad 
Evolution of the Subsidiary: Evolution of the Subsidiary: 
Subsidiary-driven charter reinforcement has A decrease on the investment in the subsidiary 
occurred in the subsidiary. The main activities in occurred with a cost-reduction program in the 
the Venezuelan unit, sales and marketing, have subsidiary. It can be considered a parent-driven 
been reinforced with the responsibility of other divestment strategy 
offices in the region 
The entry mode of the two German MNCs to Venezuela shows a cautious 
strategy to enter the country, which might be explained by the unfamiliar nature 
of the Venezuelan context to the German fines. As was highlighted in Chapter 
3, they had tended to focus their foreign operations on familiar contexts such as 
Western Europe with little expansion to other more dissimilar environments. 
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Other characteristics of the German subsidiaries are explained by the 
characteristics of the country of operations. The two subsidiaries followed 
different paths in their operations in the country. One has grown in its activities 
and responsibilities, and the other has decreased in its value to corporate 
offices. In this evolution, the subsidiaries have developed a set of capabilities 
that have had different value for the two MNCs. In the case of PEV there is an 
important influence of institutions of the country of operations, such as the state 
in the development of capabilities in the subsidiary. 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, the institutional environment is a key factor that 
may shape the development of capabilities in the MNC subsidiaries. In the case 
of the Venezuelan state, with its interventionist policy on the management of 
the oil reserves, it has played a leading role on the type of capabilities 
developed by the oil subsidiaries. The lack of a stable policy to develop this 
economic sector does not create incentives for PEV to continue with the 
investment in the subsidiary. In addition, the weak regulatory framework in the 
country does not offer enough protection to the initial agreement signed 
between the German oil subsidiary and PDVSA. 
The institutional regime in the case of Venezuela has created constraints on the 
development of capabilities in the subsidiary despite its strategic value for the 
MNC. The behaviour of PDVSA reflects the impossibility of the Venezuelan 
state to provide a stable and predictable environment. It affects the behaviour of 
the firms (local and foreign) in the country that search for high profits in order 
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to overcome the difficulties associated with operating in these environments. 
When it is difficult to achieve this, the strategy of the corporate offices towards 
the subsidiary may be modified. 
The case of SAC is slightly different. In spite of the limitations of the 
institutional environment and the small size of the Venezuelan market, the 
German subsidiary has managed to increase its value for SAP. In the case of 
this subsidiary, its interaction with local institutions is less tight than in the case 
of PEV. The bonds are not so close. The weakness of the educational system to 
provide personnel with the adequate skills is solve with the internal training 
developed by the MNCs. The type of relationship between SAC and its clients 
acts as a mediator in the absence of a strong regulatory environment. The need 
of SAC to rely on the regulatory system to manage the relationship with clients 
in the case of default of the agreement is less strong. 
An important point to highlight is that MNC subsidiaries interact in a different 
way with the institutional environment of the country of operations. The level 
of this interaction will have different effect on the influence of the context in 
the operations of the subsidiary. When this interaction is more frequent the 
effect of the institutional environment on the operations of the MNC subsidiary 
will be greater. When this interaction is less frequent, the effect of the 
institutional environment will be less strong. 
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7.2.2 The British MINCs and their Subsidiaries 
In the case of the British MNCs, there are similarities in the two firms that can 
be explained by the country of origin. For instance, the internationalisation of 
the firms, looking for a fast expansion in one case and in the other to invest in 
low-cost environments is a strategy which reflects the short-term orientation of 
British firms. In addition, in the case of Lasmo and Baan, there is a clear 
separation between management and ownership. Table 7.3 illustrates the main 
characteristics of the two British case studies. 
Table 73 The Main Features of the British MNC Case Studies 
Baan Lasmo 
Industry: Industry: 
Baan (business software) Oilfield Service 
Number of Employees: Number of Employees. 
Baan: 4,835 employees (1999) 750 employees 
Invensys: 96,519 employees (46 per cent 
concentrated in the US) 
Ownership Structure: Ownership Structure: 
Invensys (British Engineering Group held 82 per 88.57 per cent in the hands of Anglo-Saxon 
cent of the shares of Baan) institutional shareholders and the rest held mainly 
by the directors of Lasmo 
Composition of the board: Composition of the board: 
The management team of Baan is mainly composed The board of directors has a number of independent 
of Baan employees with the exception of the people, who come from larger oil MNCs such as 
financial, marketing and technology positions who BP and Shell. The rest are former employees of oil 
are personnel of Invensys firms acquired by Lasmo. 
International Expansion: International Expansion: 
Early and accelerated through acquisitions of other Early looking to invest in low-cost environments 
technology firms and the set up of subsidiaries 
Organisational Structure: Organisational Structure. 
An international model from the beginning of its A multinational structure with decentralisation of 
FDT, after the acquisition, a multidivisional decisions to exploit local opportunities 
organisational structure 
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The British subsidiaries show a more risk-taking style compared to their 
German counterparts as is presented in Table 7.4. The modes of entry to 
Venezuela of Baan and Lasmo are less risk- adverse and they are oriented to 
growing fast and achieving results in the short-term. In the case of Baan 
opening subsidiaries to enter the market without setting up previous agreements 
with clients. In the case of Lasmo offered the highest bid of the "Apertures" to 
obtain the oil field. 
Table 7.4 The Main Features of the British MNC Subsidiaries 
BaanVe Lasmo Venezuela 
Size: Size: 
105 employees (the current size of ExBaanVe the 279 employees 
local distributor) 
Entry to the country: Entry to the country: 
Baan opened a subsidiary before drawing up The MNC entered the country making the highest 
contracts with profitable customers, concentrating bid in the third round for the concession of an 
on small and medium companies. A subsidiary oilfield 
focuses only on the Venezuelan market; other 
subsidiaries were opened for neighbouring 
countries. 
Range of operations. Range of operations: 
Venezuela and afterwards the Caribbean. In a later Local (Venezuela) 
stage, it became a local distributor (ExBaanVe) 
Subsidiary Role: Subsidiary Role: 
An implementer (it adapts to local needs software A miniature replica (the development of an entire 
products developed somewhere else) set of value-adding activities in the subsidiary). 
Evolution of the Subsidiary: Evolution of the Subsidiary: 
A subsidiary-driven charter extension (with the A cost-reduction program was implemented in the 
expansion of operations to the Caribbean) and then whole company. However, it can not be considered 
a parent-driven divestment (the change on the a parent-driven divestment strategy regarding 
status of the subsidiary to a distributor) Lasmo Venezuela 
The subsidiary role in the case of the four subsidiaries has been mainly 
implementer. In the case of the oil subsidiaries, a set of activities in the area of 
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exploration and production was developed by combining the knowledge of the 
oil MNCs with the local expertise. However, this knowledge developed locally 
did not change the role of the oil subsidiaries. It seems that the Venezuelan 
institutional context influence greatly in this matter. The lack of opportunities to 
increase the operations of the subsidiaries did not support a more strategic role 
of them for the oil MNCs. 
SAC is the only case of the four that has increased its charter. By contrast to 
BaanVe, the German subsidiary has increased its value to corporate offices. The 
local management team found options to deal with the difficulties of the 
Venezuelan context and increase the range of their operations. BaanVe shows 
an opposite picture with the decreased value of the subsidiary and followed by 
its change to a distributor. The behaviour of the subsidiaries shows a different 
response by the local management of the local units to the same context. These 
two cases present a less deterministic view on the effect of institutions on the 
operations of firms. There is the possibility of strategic action by local 
managers which in turn may mediate the effect of institutions on the operations 
of firms. There is room for manoeuvre for strategic action which can influence 
the fate of the subsidiaries and how they decrease or increase in strategic value 
for the MNCs. 
The next section, analyses the presence of control mechanisms in the 
subsidiaries according to type, with special emphasis on the forces which 
influence their existence. 
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7.3 Control Mechanisms in MINC Subsidiaries 
This section compares the different control mechanisms in the MNC 
subsidiaries. The classification to make the comparison of control mechanisms 
was presented in Chapter 1. The control mechanisms are an interesting topic to 
study the effect of the country of origin and country of operations on the 
activities of the MNC subsidiaries. They reflect organisational characteristics 
such as how organisations are configured. As was discussed in Chapter 3, this 
configuration is highly influenced by the institutional context. The classification 
has four categories: output control which is mainly related to financial controls, 
bureaucratic formalised control associated with the standardisation of 
procedures, norms and rules, personalised control linked with the presence of 
expatriates in the MNC subsidiaries, and control by socialisation and networks 
which are subtle and informal forms to control operations. In addition, the 
research contemplates HR policies and practices as another means to control 
operations in MNCs. The review of the control devices in the MNC subsidiaries 
follows the previous classification and presents them by group of firms 
according by national origins. 
7.3.1 The Comparison of the Output Controls in the AMNC Subsidiaries 
Output controls focus on the behaviour of individuals. Financial targets 
achieved and financial reports filled by different areas of the organisation 
represent them. Planning and budgeting activities are also in this category. 
Following the typology developed in Chapter 3, the type of output control in the 
German subsidiaries shows differences from the initial propositions of few 
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financial controls in German subsidiaries. The case of the British subsidiaries is 
more consistent with the initial proposition of strong reliance by British firms 
on financial controls. These findings are now explained in more detail. 
7.3.1.1 The German AINCs: The cases of SAP AG and Preussag AG 
In the cases of SAP AG and Preussag Energie, the demands of the shareholders 
and their expectations are reflected in the characteristics of the financial 
controls in the two companies. 
In the case of PEV, the financial controls implemented by the subsidiary were 
set up to legitimise decisions and actions that had already occurred rather than 
to control future management performance and outputs. The considerable 
proportion of German investors, who share fewer expectations for short-term 
results, is reflected in the weakness on these controls to align the performance 
of subsidiary with short-term results. This is also reinforced by the fact that 
Preussag AG is only listed on the Frankfurt stock market. Thus, the pressure to 
use the financial controls as a mechanism to align performance and behaviours 
with the strategy of the firm is less strong. 
However, in spite of the embeddedness of the financial controls of PEV on the 
German context, there are indications that the MNC is looking to implement 
financial controls, more oriented to monitor performance in the short-term. The 
introduction of a management programme, with the aim of monitoring costs, 
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improving profitability analysis, and eliminating the duplication of reports, 
demonstrates changes in the MNC financial controls. 
The reorientation of financial controls may be linked to the radical change in 
the core activities of Preussag AG, which is searching for more profitable 
business due to the decline of its "old core business". The strategy of the firm is 
to enter the logistics and tourism businesses and this implies a significant 
change in the location of the MNC's operations, with a notable redistribution of 
the workforce abroad. 
SAC, the subsidiary of SAP in Venezuela, presents a different picture compared 
to Preussag Energie with a more Anglo-Saxon orientation in its financial 
controls. The relationship between the Venezuelan subsidiary and the reporting 
centres in the US and Germany are characterised as having strong controls over 
the operations of the local unit. There is a close monitoring to meet sale targets 
and to be cost-efficient. Managers in the subsidiary face strong pressure to meet 
quarterly profits by meeting sales targets or carrying out cost reductions. 
SAP AG lists its shares on NASDAQ and Frankfurt stock markets to obtain 
funds from these resources and be more independent of the pressure of German 
banks. To be listed in an Anglo-Saxon stock market implies to make public its 
financial activities and following the accounting standards that these markets 
set. The consolidated financial statements of the MNC are prepared in 
accordance with U. S. GAAPs (SAP AG, 2002). Investors in the Anglo-Saxon 
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markets such as NASDAQ focus on financial performance and markets, which 
is reflected in the share price. SAP AG has to monitor this carefully and ensure 
that it keeps its share price up; otherwise it will raise its cost of borrowing and 
make itself subject to a possible takeover. As part of this process, the subsidiary 
is pressured to be as a cost-efficient as possible and to be accurate and positive 
in profits and forecasts. 
Overall, the two German companies show a process of becoming more 
international and less dependent on Germany in sales growth, number of 
employees and profits. The rationalisation of costs together with the search for 
cheap capital, new investors and business opportunities seem to be drivers 
behind the internationalisation of the two companies. Although SAP AG still 
has a significant proportion of its workforce in the home country (43 per cent), 
a recent announcement by the company that it will double its workforce in India 
in the next three years shows a tendency to continue to look for low-cost 
environments and become a more global firm (The Economist, 2003). 
The financial internationalisation of SAP AG introduces a more Anglo-Saxon 
approach to control the financial operations of the firm. As Beyer and Hassel 
(2002) argue, firms with a higher degree of financial internationalisation can 
expect to have investors that are looking for a higher portion of the net added 
value generated by the firm. This value is transferred to dividends and share 
growth, and away from wages. 
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Although SAP AG shows traces of a more Anglo-Saxon approach in its 
financial operations, the composition of the company board presents vestiges of 
the home country influence, with the cofounders continued to manage the 
company directly until 2001 since then indirectly through their presence in the 
supervisory board. There is a "hybrid effect" with the coexistence of an Anglo- 
Saxon style in the search of funds and a "German way" to have family-managed 
enterprises. 
In Preussag AG, the board of the MNC has a more typical German composition 
with the participation of the different stakeholders and the linkage of the CEO 
to one of the main German banks and provider of other financial service, which 
holds shares in the firm. 
The two firms show traces of hybridisation with the combination of practices 
that are still embedded in the German context and the adoption of others, which 
are imported from other BSs. The introduction of the concept of shareholder 
value in German companies is a subject of increasing debate (Lane 2005; 
Jackson, 2003; Hassel et al., 2003; Beyer and Hassel, 2002; Jürgens et al., 
2000; Peck and Ruigrok, 2000; Vitols et al. , 1997). The debate involves 
positions which range from a weak adoption of the role of shareholder value in 
German companies (Jürgens et al., 2000) to the other extreme, which argues 
that structural changes in the German national business system are the origin for 
transformations in the corporate governance of German firms (Lane, 2005). 
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Vitols (2003) has argued that there is a reorientation in the business strategy of 
large German banks in the direction of US style investment banking. The author 
argues that there is "hybridisation" in the German financial system with a split 
in two segments: one that is more liberal and serves the need of large firms, and 
another for small and medium-size companies. The effect on large firms is that 
there is a reorientation of the preferences of German banks and insurance 
companies, for instance, towards a profit-oriented portfolio of companies. 
Domestic institutional investors are expanding dramatically in Germany 
because of the changes in the taxation rules such as the "Eichel" laws and the 
restructuring of pensions schemes. These new investors are likely to change the 
way in which firms relate to their shareholders. They will create more pressures 
for short-term results in the companies that should be reflected in the price of 
shares. 
Some authors are arguing that there is a hybridisation of the German model 
(Streeck and Yamamura, 2003; Vitols, 2003; Jackson, 2003), and they are 
refracted in changes of national institutions and in modifications in the role 
assumed by social groups. This hybridisation is reflected in the coexistence of 
features from the old model with other from the new model. SAP AG is an 
example of this, with its pressures for short-term results and a weak separation 
between ownership and management. 
As Jackson (2003) has described it, there are changes in the German institutions 
that have affected the rules of the game and the strategies of major actors, 
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taking them away from the traditional model. A hybrid model is emerging, 
which combines traditional features from the country of origin and new 
features, which are the reflection of changes in the institutions. These changes 
allow the incorporation of practices imported other contexts, for instance, the 
adoption of financial controls with a more Anglo-Saxon orientation. 
The comparative analysis of the financial controls in the German subsidiaries 
shows that there are changes in the institutions from the country of origin which 
in turn are affecting the management of the German MNCs. A finding of this 
research is that institutions are exposed to change, which is reflected in the 
management of firms from a specific origin. A less static approach has to be 
incorporated in the analysis of the effect of institutions in the firms' 
management. This research has assumed a more static view of institutions 
looking at them as monoliths which were not affected by time and history. As 
Morgan (Morgan, 2005) has stated a more dynamic view is needed for the study 
of the effect of institutions on firms. They are subject to change and 
realignment. During this process, their demands on firms may vary altering the 
internal operations of organisations as this research has shown. 
7.3.1.2 The British MNCs: Lasmo and Baan 
As can be expected, the financial controls in firms from a liberal market 
economy, as is the case of the Lasmo subsidiary in Venezuela, are sophisticated 
mechanisms to control the financial operations in the MNC subsidiaries. Lasmo 
presents a variety of financial mechanisms to control the Venezuelan 
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subsidiary: a permanent monitoring of the subsidiary performance in terms of 
profit, cost and return on the investment is carried out from corporate offices in 
London. 
Lasmo shareholder structure shows a typical Anglo-Saxon pattern with a large 
proportion of institutions holding shares. From its origins the MNC has had 
considerable dependence on Anglo-Saxon capital markets. The company has to 
produce short-term results through quick profits to fulfil their demands, and the 
financial controls play an important role to achieve this objective. 
The case of ExBaanVe shows a more complex picture because of the changes in 
the ownership structure of the MNC since the company was founded and the 
changes in the subsidiary. Baan was founded in The Netherlands as a small 
software firm that became a Dutch MNC and ended as part of a British 
conglomerate. The ownership structure of Baan has changed, affecting the 
fmancial controls deployed in the company. In the early stage of its operations, 
the firm followed the typical pattern of Dutch firms, which are characterised as 
having a medium size and using credit funding to fmance their short term 
needs. Iterson and Olie (1994) describe the Dutch banks as specialists in short- 
term credit provision and trade finance. Other financial institutions, such as 
pension funds and insurance companies, provide long-term credit. 
The second stage, starting in 1993, was characterised by a vigorous 
international expansion of Baan funded by the investment of US venture 
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capital. This process was facilitated by the well-developed nature of the 
Netherlands stock market, with high levels of foreign investment. The small 
size of the domestic market and the strong pressures from the Anglo-Saxon 
investor, who was looking for short-term results that would reflect in the price 
of the share forces, create pressures to internationalise rapidly. The subsidiary, 
BaanVe, was set up during this rapid expansion of the firm. Since the initial 
operations financial controls with an Anglo-Saxon approach have been 
implemented to monitor revenue from sales and support activities, and generate 
quarterly reports. 
The third stage implied a radical change in the shareholder structure of Baan, 
when Invensys acquired it. The new shareholder tightened the financial controls 
in general and over exBaanVe. In spite-of the nature of distributor of the ex- 
subsidiary, the few financial controls that remained between the two parts were 
increased. This was expected accorded with the behaviour of Anglo-Saxon 
investors, as we have discussed above. 
It seems than in the case of Britain the domination of the economy by market- 
driven transactions focused on short-term gains is reflected in the emphasis of 
British MNCs on tight financial controls. There are sophisticated mechanisms 
to control the financial operations of firms from liberal market economies, as 
was explained in Chapter 3. By contrast to the German institutions the British 
ones have been exposed to fewer forces of change. Therefore, there are not 
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significant pressures to change the nature of the financial controls in British 
MNCs. 
7.3.2 Comparison of Standardisation as a Bureaucratic Formalised Control 
Mechanism 
The aim of making activities and procedures more predictable in a specific 
direction is the rationale for another set of control mechanisms implemented in 
the subsidiaries. These controls are in the category of bureaucratic formalized 
controls. Child (1984) argues that, when organisations grow, levels of 
decentralisation are desired. Thus, there is the need to develop frameworks of 
rules and systems within which decision-making can be delegated and 
predictable results can be obtained, the implementation of mechanisms to 
standardise operations in organisations fulfils this aim. The strong reliance of 
German and British MNCs in standardisation to control the operations of their 
subsidiaries was discussed in Chapter 3. The findings of the four cases support 
this proposition; however, the level of standardisation in the MNC subsidiaries 
is mediated by other factors such as the stage of internationalisation of the firms 
and its organisational structure. The control mechanisms to standardise 
operations in the MNC subsidiaries are now presented in the next part. 
73.2.1 The Standardisation in the German Subsidiaries 
In the case of SAC, the German business software subsidiary, there is heavy 
reliance on standardisation of procedures, norms and levels of decision. This 
standardisation has two dimensions: one level of local standardisation, which 
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involves formalisation of procedures and written policies but only for the 
subsidiary's operations, and the other more global, with uniformity of 
procedures and norms among the different units of the MNC. 
The differences in the nature of standardisation in the subsidiary, global and 
local, respond to different degrees of consistency in the operations of the local 
unit, which are dictated by the organisational structure of the firm. When the 
firm needs to have a global consistency which facilitates the integration 
between the subsidiaries to support flows of knowledge and personnel, the 
standard mechanisms in the subsidiary are implemented following principles 
that are shared by all subsidiaries, many of them coming directly from 
Germany. The type of industry of business software creates more demands to 
standardise procedures, norms and policies in the MNC, as discussed in Chapter 
4,. This is particularly relevant in the technical area in which the need to offer 
the same quality in products and services creates greater demands to 
standardise. 
Standardisation is extensive in SAC, with many templates, procedures, policies 
and norms imported from abroad, some of them subject to adaptation and other 
implemented as they come. The number of operations of SAP AG abroad which 
shows an advanced stage of internationalisation with more than 29,000 
employees spread worldwide, brings strong demands to unify operations and 
make more predictable the outcomes of the units of the German MNC. 
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PEV, the other German subsidiary, has a mixed picture on the implementation 
of standard controls. There are few procedures to follow in the technical area, 
particularly to guide the exploration and production activities. PEV relies on 
individual knowledge, particularly expatriate personnel, to carry out them. In 
the operation fields the standard procedures have written recently and they are 
only to regulate the operations in the Venezuelan field. This standardisation has 
been on a local basis, integrating international standards, PDVSA requirements 
and PEV experience operating in the urban field. 
The administrative area is more standardised with the transfer of some 
procedures and rules from Germany. However, they have been adapted to the 
local context to fulfil local regulations. The financial area is also standardised, 
and there are explicit procedures for carrying out the accounting. The contrast 
between the two areas, with high levels of standardisation in the administrative 
area but less in the operative one, is largely explained by the lack of 
international experience of Preussag in exploration and production activities. 
The standardisation in the administrative area shows the legacy from the 
country of origin of the MNC. However, the early stage of the 
internationalisation of Preussag Energie has not created demands to standardise 
procedures in the technical area. Expatriates can supply the technical 
knowledge required in the operations of the MNC abroad because the number 
of these international operations is small. 
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We would expect high standardisation of procedures from German MNCs but 
in the case of case studies of this research is mediated by the 
internationalisation stage of the MNC and its organisational structure. 
7.3.2.2 The Standardisation in the British Subsidiaries 
Lasmo Venezuela, similar to PEV, has few standard mechanisms in the 
technical area. The infant stage of exploration and production activities in the 
subsidiary, similar to PEV, accounts for the little reliance on these mechanisms. 
The financial department, in the administrative area, has global standardisation 
in procedures, norms and reporting activities. There are written manuals with 
procedures, reports and explicit financial calculations for investment projects. 
In other administrative areas such as the HR and security departments, the 
standardisation is more local. 
ExBaanVe, in spite of its independent character, relies on standard methods in 
the technical area. The administrative area in the subsidiary has weak 
standardisation of administrative procedures and systems, although, exBaanVe 
still follows the financial formats inherited from its time as a subsidiary of 
Baan. 
There are similarities in the level of standardisation in the MNC subsidiaries 
from the two countries. The MNC subsidiaries not matter, if the standardisation 
is on a local or global basis, show indications of a heavy reliance on standard 
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procedures and written rules to support operations. As was discussed above, 
there is a tendency of German and British MNCs to depend on this mechanism 
to control and coordinate their operations. 
Overall, it can be argued that the implementation of standard controls is shaped 
by the country of origin of the MNC, which is tend to reinforce the presence of 
certain type of controls rather than others. The cases of Germany and Britain 
are examples of how the country of origin explains the presence of standard 
controls in their MNCs. However, this influence from the home country is 
mediated by intra-organisational characteristics such as the stage of 
internationalisation of the firm and its organisational structare. On one hand, 
firms with short international experience, either because they have few 
subsidiaries abroad or they are new to carrying out certain operations 
internationally, have to learn these activities before they can attempt to 
standardise operations in those areas. Thus, the tendency for firms to implement 
standard mechanisms is connected with features of the firm that will support or 
delay their implementation. On the other hand, certain organisational structures 
are going to demand more integration in operations than others, and this also 
shapes the type of standardisation: global or local. 
7.3.3 Comparison of the HR Practices and Policies in the MNC 
Subsidiaries 
This section presents the HR practices and policies in the four MNC 
subsidiaries. In the case of the German MNCs, it is argued that their approach 
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to the function is more operative than British MNCs. The high-regulated 
environment of Germany explains this. By contrast, in the case of British firms, 
they have a more strategic approach with the implementation of practices that 
support the strategy of the firm. The case studies support this argument, 
showing a country of origin effect in the nature of the function. However, this is 
mediated by other factors such as the localisation of practices because the 
country of operations effect. 
The HR function in PEV has distinctive characteristics of "Germanness" as was 
described in Chapter 5. The HR has an operative orientation with the absence of 
practices such as job evaluation, succession planning and management 
development. The function does not participate in the top-decision making, the 
HR function is at third level under the supervision of the administration 
manager who reports to the finance and administration vice-president (see 
subsidiary chart, Figure 5.3). 
There is a lack of integration of the HR department with the rest of the function 
in the MNC, which limits the adoption of practices from abroad. In addition, the 
characteristics of the Venezuelan context, which is highly regulated, reinforces 
the operative nature of the function in Venezuelan firms. Because of this, this 
context does not encourage the adoption of practices with a more strategic 
approach in the areas of selection, training and career development. 
SAC presents a different picture, compared with PEV, and has imported HR 
practices from abroad. The existence of a variable compensation scheme linked 
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to performance, which is designed abroad and coordinated by the regional 
centres, is evidence of this. 
Job descriptions based on competencies, in addition, to the pressures to create a 
career development program in the subsidiary are further evidence of the 
adoption of imported practices in the area. Furthermore, the existence of an 
international career. development programme with clear guidelines and 
procedures shows a more strategic and integrated approach in SAP to managing 
its human resources. SAP relies on these activities as a subtle way to control 
operations through the transfer of common patterns (e. g., job analysis) and 
communication of desired behaviours (e. g., career development programme). 
However, there is a country of operations effect because the implementation of 
these practices in the subsidiary is mediated by the characteristics of the country 
of operations. Because of the characteristics of the region, the managers of the 
subsidiary do not participate in the international career development programme 
of the company. There are limitations for the integration of these managers with 
the rest of the MNC due to a country of operations effect. The effect, in this 
case is so strong, that makes more valuable for the MNC to have these 
managers in charge of the local operations than encourage their participation in 
an international career development programme. 
The country of operations effect is also seen in the adaptation of other HR 
practices to the local -context: the maximum per centages of salary increase 
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which are decided locally, imported job descriptions that are adjusted locally, 
and the variable portion of the compensation is designed according to the 
preferences of local managers. Finally, HR practices such as recruitment and 
selection are designed locally, too. 
The analysis of the HR practices in the two German subsidiaries presents 
evidence of a country of operations effect. In relation to the parent country 
effect, recent research on German MNCs and the nature of the personnel 
function in these companies has shown an increasing adoption of practices to 
support the strategy of companies. The fact that SAP is a step further than 
Preussag in its process of becoming a global firm may account for the adoption 
of HR practices with a different nature than the German traditional ones. As 
Ferner and Varul (2000) posit, companies that have more internationally 
integrated activities are more likely to face growing pressures for HR practices 
to be orchestrated more internationally. Global coordination, in theory, 
demands a more strategic approach to the HR function, to facilitate the 
integration among the subsidiaries of the MNC. Thus, when the need of the 
MNC to be integrated is higher, it is going to implement HR practices which 
are more standardise because these support integration among the subsidiaries, 
and the subsidiaries and corporate offices, and they also act like subtle control 
mechanisms in the subsidiaries. 
The highly regulated labour market in Venezuela has not impeded the transfer 
of HR practices, which are different to the practices implemented locally. 
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Ferner et al. (2001) in an analysis of German companies with operations in 
Spain, state that the management model of the latter is more open and 
indeterminate with few management traditions. This lack of a uniform set of 
local HR practices allows more choices for MNCs to implement imported HR 
practices in subsidiaries operating in this context. A similar argument can be 
applied to subsidiaries in Venezuela. In spite of the highly regulated 
environment that demands adaptation to follow local regulation, there is still 
room to introduce imported practices. The absence of strong local managerial 
patterns facilitates the introduction of other managerial practices such as the 
transfer of human resource policies and practices from abroad. 
The Lasmo subsidiary in Venezuela has implemented HR practices, which are 
more common in Britain. The HR function has a strategic role with the 
formalisation of many practices in the area such as the development of a formal 
programme to substitute expatriates by local personnel, and the implementation 
of a performance evaluation system linked to compensation. The attempt to 
transfer a stock option program, which is common in Britain, shows the 
influence of the parent country. 
Despite the more strategic role of the HR area in Lasmo Venezuela, which on 
one hand implies more integration of the subsidiary with the rest of the MNC, 
and on the other hand, it helps put in place subtle control devices. The demands 
to adapt to the country of operations are strong in this subsidiary, too. For 
instance, a stock option plan was adapted to local preferences. A corporate 
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company policy states that local managers are appointed as substitutes for 
expatriates, but career development has a local ground different to the people in 
the technical area, which is more international oriented. The country of 
operations limits the possibilities to have an international career for local 
managers. They are developed to support local operations rather than to be a 
cadre of international managers that move around the different sites of the 
MNC. 
The HR function in the exBaanVe is fully localised. There is autonomy to 
implement the HR practices and policies according to the preferences of the 
local managers. In this particular case, the parent country effect is minimal. 
The analysis of the forces that intervene in the implementation of human 
resource practices in the- subsidiaries shows the complexity of this control 
mechanism. On one hand, there are forces from the parent country and the 
organisation itself that shape the nature of these practices in firms. However, 
when MNCs set up operations in a country they face pressures, which certainly 
mould the implementation of HR practices in the subsidiaries. The 
implementation of practices imported from abroad will be easier when there is 
little uniformity in the HR practices of local firms. In this case, the adoption of 
imported HR practices will be facilitated as the previous analysis showed. 
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7.3.4 The Presence of Expatriate Managers as a Personal Centralised 
Control Mechanism 
According to the country of origin debate, the presence of expatriate managers 
should vary in the MNC subsidiaries. In the case of British subsidiaries, the 
presence of these managers should be lower compared to German subsidiaries. 
In Chapter 3 was discussed that German MNCs are distinctive because of their 
strong presence of expatriates. Nevertheless, the findings from the cases do not 
fully support this proposition. There are differences in their presence between 
MNCs subsidiaries from the same origin in different industries. For instance, 
the oil subsidiaries have expatriates independently of the country of origin. By 
contrast, in the business software subsidiaries there are not expatriates. The 
main reason for this unexpected finding is the effect of the country of 
operations and the characteristics of the two industries in Venezuela. In the next 
sections, these two effects are analysed in detail. 
7.3.4.1 The Presence of Expatriates in the Oilfield MNC Subsidiaries 
Lasmo Venezuela, after four years of operation, still has a considerable number 
of expatriates. Considering the multidomestic nature of the oilfield service 
industry one might expect fewer expatriates and a bulk of locals managing the 
relationship between PDV'SA and the subsidiary. However, there is a slow pace 
in the substitution of expatriates by locals, particularly in the finance and 
operative areas. This contradicts what would have been expected: fewer 
expatriates in the subsidiary because of a country of origin effect. In addition, 
there are pressures to localise the workforce from the corporate offices (e. g., 
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expatriates' high costs on salary and perks) and from outside the MNC (e. g., 
Venezuelan labour regulations limit the number of expatriates in MNC 
subsidiaries in the country). 
PEV, the German oil subsidiary, presents a similar picture the localisation has 
become slower in the last year. It has been difficult for the company to find 
local people for managerial and technical jobs. In some cases, they had not 
appoint Venezuelans with the right qualifications for certain positions, creating 
a lack of confidence in the localisation process of the subsidiary. 
The reasons for the presence of expatriates can be explained by the institutional 
environment in Venezuela and the characteristics of the oil industry in the 
country. One hand, the nature of the Venezuelan state is reflected in the way 
PDVSA manages the relationship with the oil h1NCs. The interventionist role of 
the state, as has been discussed, is reflected in the changing strategy of the 
NOC, which in turn affects the demands that PDVSA makes on the oil MNCs. 
On the other hand, the educational system has not trained enough people 
affecting the localisation of the technical expatriates. The fragmentation of 
institutions has made it difficult to coordinate job between the educational 
system and the oil industry. This is reflected in the fact that the former has 
failed to supply personnel with the qualifications to support the development of 
the latter. 
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Furthermore, the BS in Venezuela does not have a strong legal framework to 
regulate the transactions among economic actors. Therefore, for the oil 
subsidiaries to rely on this framework to make the NOC fulfils the initial 
agreement is very difficult. The development of personal networks becomes 
important to reduce the levels of uncertainty associated with the frequent 
changes in demands that PDVSA makes on the oil subsidiaries. 
For PEV has been less difficult than Lasmo Venezuela in coping with the 
uncertainty of the Venezuelan context. The German subsidiary has found a 
solution in the middle ground using locals to manage the relationship with the 
NOC, who are closely supervised by the expatriates in the subsidiary. 
Local people are good candidates to act as bridges between the MNC 
subsidiaries and PDVSA. It is more feasible that indigenous people with their 
knowledge about the local system can more easily interpret PDVSA requests 
and negotiate according to its terms and style. In addition, locals working in the 
Venezuelan oil industry may have connections in PDVSA. Before the opening, 
the main firm in this industry was the NOC, thus, to know people inside the 
firm would not be very difficult. 
However, the combination of a high level of autonomy for the subsidiaries and 
the use of informal and personal networks to manage the PDVSA relationship 
created some difficulties for the subsidiaries, which were at least partially 
resolved by the presence of expatriates. The vulnerability of the MNC because 
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PDVSA was the only buyer for the production of oil and at the same time is 
supplier of resources, puts the subsidiaries in a weak position. In turn this 
makes the corporate offices reluctant to let go of control because failure to 
manage the relationship satisfactorily would had a serious impact on 
profitability. Thus, the corporate office was thus averse to decentralise to locals 
and instead maintain expatriate control. 
Expatriate managers in the oil subsidiaries reconcile the demand for local 
responsiveness with the need for close monitoring of local context. They exert 
an important role as a mechanism of control in MNCs in a multidomestic 
industry with operations in unstable environments. Boyacigiller (1990) has 
pointed out that when a subsidiary is operating in an environment with high 
political risk the subsidiary has a greater presence of expatriates. Moreover, 
when there is high information asymmetry between the parent and the 
subsidiary and significant differences in the information and knowledge held 
between the subsidiary and the corporate offices, a high presence of expatriate 
managers is justified (Harvey, Speier, et al. 2001). 
In this context, the home country effect is relevant but operates in a distinctive 
way. British firms generally find it easier to reduce their expatriate numbers 
than German firms. As the former tends to operate on the basis of output 
controls (over financial performance) rather than the control through 
expatriates, which is more common among German MNCs. In this case, 
however, output controls are ineffective in themselves. They are important to 
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increase economic efficiency on production activities. However, control over 
the relationship with PDVSA has a more strategic value, because in the long 
term the increased profitability of Lasmo Venezuela production are determined 
by the relationship with PDVSA. Furthermore, British expatriates are reluctant 
to cede control because there is no clear career for them within the firm once 
they leave Venezuela. In this respect, they send the message to headquarters 
about the continued need for expatriates reflecting partly the reality of 
institutional uncertainty and dependence and partly the insecurity they feel 
about their own career prospects. It also leaves the corporate offices that is used 
to evaluating performance on output and financial criteria with a problem 
because this is no longer satisfactory. 
The German subsidiary faces similar uncertainty. However, managers there and 
in the headquarters seem to experience less anxiety about this for three reasons. 
Firstly, the existence of the German community within Venezuela seems to 
provide a pool of potential employees for the firm that can take this 
intermediary role and provide some access into the appropriate networks. 
Secondly, German expatriates (unlike the British ones) are strongly tied into the 
corporate offices. They expect to return there having been assigned abroad for a 
specified time. Their career is still "German" in key respects and the firm treats 
them as valuable assets. Their international assignment is a temporary position 
within a broader expectation of long-term commitment to Preussag Energie. 
The expatriates in the British subsidiary are, however, more like "career expats" 
who will have an international career often moving between firms rather than 
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seeing themselves as locked into a particular firm. The close tie between the 
German expatriate and head office means that the subsidiary managers have 
more day-to-day autonomy because it is believed they will know the interests of 
the firm more generally and operate along those principles. Thirdly, the German 
firms are more used to implementing subtle mechanisms of control such as 
socialisation, informal communication and the development of personal 
networks as was discussed in Chapter 3. Therefore, to use these devices to 
manage the relationship with PDVSA is easier than their British counterpart that 
relies more on formal and impersonal mechanisms such a financial controls to 
manage their operations abroad (Morgan and Marquez, 2003). 
7.3.4.2 The Presence of Expatriates in the Business Software MNC 
Subsidiaries 
The presence of expatriate managers in the MNC subsidiaries in the business 
software industry is very scarce. In the case of SAC, the managing director of 
the subsidiary is the only permanent expatriate position. There are short visits 
from personnel from other SAP offices but they are for short periods of time 
and to accomplish specific tasks. In the case of ExBaanVe is even scarcer as 
was discussed in Chapter 6. 
There is a technology effect associated with the characteristics of the industry 
that explains the absence of expatriates in the subsidiaries. There is a lock-in 
effect that creates a dependency between the user of the software and the 
business software provider as was explained in Chapter 4. In the case that the 
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client interrupts the payment for software and service, the service provided by 
the business software firm ceases. The interruption of the service may create 
serious problems for the operation of the client affecting activities in operative 
areas (e. g., manufacturing, finance and RH). Then, to breach the terms of the 
agreement between the two parts is very costly for the business software user. 
The need to rely on a strong regulatory framework to regulate the transaction 
between two parts is overcome by the implications for the user if the 
relationship is broken. The threat of losing the support activities and the 
upgrading of business software versions acts an incentive to fulfil the business 
commitments. In the case of the business software subsidiaries, the effect of the 
Venezuelan institutional environment is less strong on the operations of the 
subsidiaries as compared to the oil subsidiaries. From the findings of the case 
studies, it can be argued that institutions do not affect in the same way the firms 
that are operating in a specific context. There are specific features from the 
industry and the firm itself that act as mediators on the effect of institutions. 
The effect of the Venezuelan institutions and the size of the local markets 
influence the development of capabilities in the firms, as was discussed 
previously. It also accounts for the scarce presence of expatriates in control of 
the local operations. The main activities of the subsidiaries are sales and 
marketing. It is particularly relevant for people carrying out these activities to 
understand the indigenous way of negotiating and the threats and opportunities 
that the local environment creates for firms. For instance, to know the local 
language, know the business processes in local firms, and understand local 
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regulations are barriers to have expatriate presence. Thus, from a strategic 
position the MNC has more incentives to support a rapid localisation and limit 
the presence of expatriates to increase the profitability of the subsidiary. In this 
case, the implementation of strong financial controls and the frequent 
consultation on decisions are efficient devices to monitor the operations of the 
MNC subsidiaries. By contrast in the oil subsidiaries, the financial controls are 
not efficient mechanisms because there is a different relationship between the 
local units and the Venezuelan institutional context. 
7.3.5 Comparison of Control through Socialisation and Network 
Development in the MNC subsidiaries 
The case studies present evidence of the effect of the country of origin in the 
implementation of subtle controls. However, the industry that influences the 
organisational structure adopted by firms is a complementary explanation for 
the presence of these devices. 
7.3.5.1 Subtle Controls on the German Subsidiaries 
The German subsidiaries present a mixed picture on the use of subtle controls 
as a control mechanism. For instance, PEV is a typical German example with 
the use of socialisation of the expatriates as a subtle way to transfer the 
organisational culture. However, this is the major subtle way of control in the 
MNC. The development of informal networks is limited to the networks 
developed by the German expatriates from the time that they were in the 
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corporate offices. The limited communication between locals and corporate 
offices offers few opportunities for locals to develop such informal networks. 
Other subtle devices are few. There is limited presence of cross-functional 
teams between the subsidiary and other units. The weak integration between the 
subsidiary, corporate offices and other subsidiaries is confirmed by the lack of 
knowledge transfer between the Venezuelan subsidiary and the rest of the firm. 
Even if the Venezuelan subsidiary has inflows of new technical knowledge 
from local personnel with previous experience in other oil MNCs, the 
subsidiary has not made any serious attempt to transfer this to the rest of the 
firm. 
SAC makes a more sophisticated use of these devices. In spite that the firm 
does not use expatriates as a subtle control, it has implemented other subtle 
mechanisms. The need for integration because of the global nature of the 
industry is reflected in the implementation of other forms to support subtle 
ways of control. The configuration of virtual teams, with members from 
different subsidiaries is one of these mechanisms. The creation of these teams 
with people localised in different sites around the world who have to work 
together are part of this more integrative nature of the firm. There is a strong 
development of informal networks because of this in the MNC. There is also 
substantial exchange of information between the Venezuelan subsidiary, other 
subsidiaries, and regional and corporate offices, which facilitates the 
development of these networks. 
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The analysis of subtle mechanisms in German subsidiaries has shown 
differences in the reliance of the two units on these devices and in the levels of 
integration between the subsidiaries and their corporate offices. Variations in 
the nature and extent of subtle mechanisms in firms from the same country are 
explained by the characteristics of the industry. 
Despite the tendency to select control devices according to the MNC country of 
origin, the nature of the industry reinforces this selection or weakens this 
primary pattern. The effect of the country of origin on the implementation of 
control mechanisms is mediated by the characteristics of the industry as was 
hypothesised. 
7.3.5.2 Subtle Controls on the British Subsidiaries 
Lasmo Venezuela relies little on socialisation as a mean of control. In an 
indirect way the expatriates act as a socialisation mechanism but the firm has 
not developed other subtle controls that is accorded on how British MNCs 
operate. In Lasmo, expatriates have an opportunity to create informal networks 
because of their connections with corporate offices and other subsidiaries but 
locals do not have the same opportunity. In the case of ExBaanVe, the main 
evidence of this type of control is an annual corporate meeting. There is also 
evidence of the development of informal networks because of the exchange of 
information among personnel in the technical area. 
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The presence of these devices is in accord with what would be expected from 
British firms. The development of an informal network with people in other 
sites in the case of ExBaanVe is supported by the characteristics of the industry. 
In the analysis of subtle controls, the parent country effect has to coexist with 
the industry characteristics. The industry is an explanation of the similarities 
Found in subsidiaries from different countries in the same industry. When the 
parent country pattern supports integration between the corporate offices and 
the subsidiaries and this tendency is supported by the characteristics of the 
industry, the presence of subtle devices is facilitated. By contrast, when the 
parent country supports integration but there are stronger demands for 
localisation (e. g., a multidomestic industry), fewer subtle mechanisms to 
facilitate integration are in place. The success of the subsidiary, for instance in a 
multidomestic industry, depends on its ability to adapt to the local context. The 
control mechanisms implemented will concentrate on facilitating this aim. 
7.4 Conclusions 
The' comparison of the implementation of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries highlights the following points. Firstly, it is important to recognise 
the complexity associated with the analysis of these devices. The specific 
combination of control devices in the Venezuelan subsidiaries is explained 
through a framework that integrates variables from different levels, macro and 
micro, which have forces that create pressures on the MNCs and are going to 
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reinforce in the subsidiaries the presence of one type of control mechanism 
rather than other. 
Secondly, the analysis of the cases demonstrates the dynamic nature of the BSs, 
and how they are exposed to change and modification (e. g., German BS). The 
modifications in institutions from the parent country are reflected in MNCs and 
their operations, as can be seen in the change of the nature of the financial 
controls in SAP AG. For instance, the financial internationalisation of German 
MNCs has driven some firms to adopt a more Anglo-Saxon approach to 
managing subsidiary operations. However, the effect on MNCs because of the 
introduction of changes in the BS, might impact some organisational features 
while others remain the same. This situation generates hybrid forms in MNCs 
in which there are organisational features that are affected by the unchanged 
institutions that coexist with elements generated by the changes from the others. 
Thirdly, the institutions from the home country do not only mould the 
implementation of control devices in MNC subsidiaries. The country of 
operations also affects the operations of the subsidiaries and as a result the 
control mechanisms in the local unit. The comparison of the four MNC 
subsidiaries operating in Venezuela sheds some light on this subject. The effect 
of the country of operations affects the subsidiary in three areas. The first area 
is reflected in the clear demands to localise certain operations and control 
mechanisms at the local unit. Then, the subsidiary becomes a hybrid 
organisation, with organisational features that are imported from abroad but at 
335 
the same time have others, which have been adapted or have been developed 
locally. 
The second area is the type of capabilities developed in the subsidiary. An 
important effect of the Venezuelan environment is the need for MNC 
subsidiaries to develop a set of capabilities that are crucial for their success in 
the local context but may not have strategic value for the rest of the 
organisation. The uncertainty of the environment forces such concentration on 
the MNC subsidiaries to cope with the local dynamic that the development of 
products, services or practices, which can be useful and transferable for the rest 
of the MNC, may be limited. 
The third area is the country of operations effect, which is not the same to each 
MNC subsidiary. The presence of control mechanisms in the subsidiaries is an 
example of this with the slow pace of the reductions of certain control 
mechanisms (e. g., the expatriate managers in the oil subsidiaries) or the absence 
of the same mechanism in other subsidiaries (e. g., the absence of expatriate in 
the business software subsidiaries). The country of operations affects the 
subsidiaries in different ways. The greater the attachment of the subsidiary to 
the institutional system of the country of operations, the greater is the effect of 
the system on its operations. 
In sum, the investigation of the control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries 
requires different level of analysis. There is an intrinsic logic, in which 
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elements from the country of origin coexist with other factors connected to the 
competitive context of the firm. As the MNC behaviour is shaped by the 
institutional settings of its country of origin, a subsidiary's operations are also 
moulded by the institutional arrangements derived from the country of 
operations. The latter institutions facilitate or restrict the growth of the 
subsidiary, and this evolution is reflected in the value of its capabilities for the 
rest of the MNC. The subsidiary evolution and the type of capabilities 
deployed, as Geppert et al. (2003) have pointed out, is strongly influenced by 
the social embeddedness of the subsidiaries in the country of operations. In this 
sense, how rooted is the subsidiary in the national business system allows it to 
take advantage of local resources or restrict its opportunities to grow. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Introduction 
This final chapter discusses the major findings of this research, in order to 
assess how the investigation has contributed to the understanding of the 
implementation of control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. A further section 
discusses the limitations of the research and makes suggestions for future 
research in the area. 
The findings of the research support the analytical framework presented in 
Chapter 1. This framework was built on the integration of different levels of 
analysis: national (country of origin and country of operations), industry and 
organisational levels. The variables that make up the framework explain the 
presence of control mechanisms in the MNC subsidiaries, identifying effect of 
the country of origin in the implementation of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries. In spite of the increasing globalisation of firms, the influence of 
parent-institutions remains an explanatory variable of the behaviour of MNCs. 
This research has shown how they affect the implementation of control 
mechanisms in MNCs. In the same order of ideas, the institutions from the 
country of operations explain the configuration of these devices in the 
subsidiaries. Institutions from the country of operations matter as shapers of the 
devices that are implemented to control the subsidiaries' operations. 
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The industry, another level of analysis of the framework, is the factor which 
explains the similarities found in the control mechanisms from MNCs from 
different origins but operating in the same industry. Characteristics of the 
industry such as the attributes of the product or service, the industry life cycle 
and forces of competition are isomorphic pressures, which explain the presence 
of some control devices found in MNC subsidiaries. The industry mediates the 
influence of factors at the national level that pull for divergence. The industry 
level is space for reconciliation of differences among MNCs derived from their 
distinctive origins. It creates a room in which firms may show similar behaviour 
in some areas of operations. 
At the organisation level, variables such as the MNC international operations 
and the subsidiary development are responsible for the absence or presence of 
other control mechanisms. A process of organisational learning emerges with 
the growth of the firm. This learning is reflected in the capabilities that firms 
develop over time and may be come a source of distinctive advantages. The 
implementation of some control devices aims is to support and develop these 
competitive advantages in the subsidiary. Finally, the subsidiary's own 
development is the last feature of the analytical framework affecting the 
implementation of different types of control. This development is shaped by the 
environment, changes inside the firm, and the strategy of the subsidiary to cope 
with- these transformations. The path of this development may modify the 
behaviour of the subsidiary and consequently the control devices in the local 
unit. 
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This research has contributed, particularly, with new insights into the effect of 
the country of operations and country of origin on management control 
mechanisms. The analysis of the effect of the country of operations showed the 
influence of this factor in two main areas. On one hand, the research has shed 
some light on how unstable institutional systems affect the operations of the 
MNC subsidiaries and the implementation of control devices at the subsidiary 
level. On the other hand, the effect of the country of operations was also 
observed in the capabilities developed in the subsidiaries. These capabilities are 
interrelated with the development and evolution of these units. A relationship 
between the subsidiary development and the effect of the country of operations 
was identified. 
The analysis of the effect of the country of origin on the control devices in the 
subsidiaries has highlighted two interesting points. First, it shows that 
institutional systems have a more dynamic nature than this research initially 
assumed. Second, the effect of the country of origin can be observed in the 
choices made by the MNC subsidiaries to deal with the local context. In order 
to operate locally, the MNC subsidiaries have to make choices and take 
decisions; however, these decisions are influenced by the origins of the firms. 
In the next sections, the contributions of the research to the effects of the 
country of origin and country of operations will be discussed in greater detail. 
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8.2 The Effect of the Country of Operations 
This section presents the findings of the thesis that shed more light on the effect 
of the country of operations on MNC subsidiaries. The research observed this 
effect in two areas. 
First, the influence of the country of operations studied in this thesis highlights 
the effect that an institutional context such as Venezuela's has on the operations 
of MNC subsidiaries. Institutional contexts similar to Venezuela are common in 
Africa, Asia and Latin America; however, little research or theorisation on the 
influence of this type of context on the operations of MNCs, has been carried 
out. As was highlighted in Chapter 3, there has been some empirical research 
on the effect of strong institutional regulatory systems on the operations of the 
MNC subsidiaries. It has been found that this type of institutional systems put 
pressures on the local units to adopt local practices (Muller-Carmen et al., 2001; 
Whitley 2005). On the other hand, it was also stressed in Chapter 3 that 
environments with less coordination among institutions, such as in Venezuela, 
are more prompting to allow subsidiaries to import practices from abroad. 
Following these points, the research looked for control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries, which were influenced by parent country, organisational, or 
globalisation effects. 
It was found that a host country institutional context such as Venezuela allows 
the adoption of control mechanisms, which are not local in origins but creates 
strong demands to localise them. The MNC subsidiaries have- become hybrid 
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organisations in which there is a combination of imported control mechanisms 
with local adaptation. Therefore, it can be expected by MNCs that set up 
operations in environments with weak institutions and little coordination among 
them that they will face strong demands to localise their control devices. The 
lack of strong institutions and the weak regulatory environment of formal 
contracting in the country make difficult the adoption of organisational 
practices without partial or full localisation. When the practices require 
institutions with different characteristics to support their introduction, their 
adoption will be difficult (e. g., the adoption of stock plans in oil subsidiaries). 
In this case, the organisational practices need to be adapted to what the 
institutions of the country can allow and support. 
The instability of the institutional system acts as a strong force which pulls 
towards localisation of the activities and practices of the local units, which is 
reflected in the adaptation of the control mechanisms deployed by the MNC 
subsidiaries. However, it is important to mention that the nature of the local 
demands that bring pressures for localisation is not the same for each 
subsidiary. For instance, there are clear differences in the presence of 
expatriates in the oil MNC subsidiaries compared to the business software 
subsidiaries. This difference is largely explained by the interaction that the 
subsidiaries from the two sectors have with the institutions of the country, 
particularly the state. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the greater the 
interaction of the subsidiary with the institutions of the country of operations, 
the larger will be the influence of these institutions on the operations of the 
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subsidiary, making more difficult the adoption of organisational practices from 
abroad. 
Second, the case studies highlight the effect of the country of operations on the 
development of capabilities in the MNC subsidiaries. As discussed in Chapter 
3, the country of operations can be an important shaper of subsidiary 
capabilities. The chances of a subsidiary to develop capabilities, which might 
have a strategic value for the MNC, are framed by the opportunities and 
constraints that the country of operations offers to the local organisation. This 
development of capabilities is associated with the evolution of the subsidiary 
and the decisions taken by the corporate offices to invest or divest in the local 
unit according to the performance of the subsidiary. The oil MNC subsidiaries 
are an example of this effect. A set of expectations was created when the 
subsidiaries were set up in the country. As discussed in Chapter 5, those initial 
expectations were associated with the potential growth of the subsidiaries, 
which implied further investments in the local units and an increase in their 
value for the MNCs. However, the institutions belonging to the country of 
operations, as discussed in Chapter 7, were a major shaper of the development 
of capabilities and, consequently, in the decision of the corporate offices to 
divest in the oil subsidiaries. The development of these subsidiaries, in which 
PDVSA and the Venezuelan state played an important role, did not fulfil initial 
expectations; local institutions brought on a decline in their value. 
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Institutions from the country of operations matter as an important factor to 
explain the evolution of subsidiaries. MNC subsidiaries are organisational units 
that are embedded in a specific context, one that consists of both institutions 
and markets. The combination of these two features has to be incorporated into 
the analysis of the MNC subsidiaries, particularly to understand their 
development and evolution. This research sheds some light on this subject, 
which is generally neglected, in the subsidiary development research stream of 
thought, as presented in Chapter 1. The stream has concentrated its analysis on 
the effect of the market structure on the operations of the subsidiary, with little 
attention given to the effect of institutions belonging to the country of 
operations on the subsidiary evolution. 
This research has contributed to better understand the effect of unstable 
institutional systems on the operations of MNC subsidiaries. Nevertheless, 
further research in the area is needed because of the increasing investment of 
MNCs in countries with similar institutional systems. There is need for research 
from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. 
8.3 The Effect of the Country of Origin 
The country of origin, according to this research, is one of the major shapers of 
the behaviour of MNC subsidiaries. Its effect is seen in the development of the 
four case studies, as was presented in previous chapters, and cascades down to 
some of the control devices implemented in the subsidiaries. 
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The initial approach of this research to the effect of the country of origin on 
MNC subsidiaries had a static view of the institutional system. In Chapter 3, 
different institutional models were selected to explain the characteristics of the 
business systems of Britain and Germany. One of the key assumptions of this 
model was the strong nature of the institutions, and the difficulties associated 
with the introduction of change. The case of Germany is particularly 
illustrative. The nature of the institutions of the country and the alignment 
among them, it was argued, make difficult any change in the system. Thus, a 
static nature of the system was assumed, in which the firms were locked into 
each other's actions, encouraging cooperation among them by limiting exit 
opportunities. The analysis of the implementation of control mechanisms in the 
MNC subsidiaries was initiated with this approach to the country of origin 
effect, expecting a particular and specific type of control mechanism according 
to the country of origin of the firms. However, the existence of control devices 
that were not those expected according to the nature of institutions of the 
country of origin, led to identifying changes in those institutions. It was found 
that some country of origin institutions were undergoing a process of change, 
such as the case of the financial system in Germany. 
From a theoretical perspective, this research validates novel propositions in the 
institutionalist stream of research that stress the more dynamic nature of 
institutions (see Morgan, 2005). This stream of research of the institutionalist 
theory takes a more innovative approach, with a position that considers that 
firms have the possibility to explore options which may not be supported by 
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national institutions. Moreover, it looks at institutions as entities which are 
subject to change and realignment, studying how this process affects 
organisations embedded in the system. 
Morgan (2005: 450) in his defence of a more dynamic approach to studying 
institutions has stated: "this will happen as our studies become more intensively 
historical, more sensitive to diversity within institutional settings, more 
cognizant of the inter-relationship between national and international contexts 
and finally more willing to recognize uncertainty, ambiguity and 
experimentation at the level of firms and institutions". The cases of the German 
subsidiaries illustrate how changes in the home country institutions have an 
effect on the control mechanisms in the subsidiary, particularly on the financial 
controls. The nature of this control in the two German subsidiaries shows that 
firms are increasingly concerned about their financial performance and are 
developing forms to. monitor profitability in more accurate ways. The financial 
internationalisation of SAP, with an important participation of Anglo-Saxon 
shareholders, is the main driver of the careful monitoring of the firm and 
generation of revenues in the subsidiary. This case highlights the fact that firms 
can take actions to become detached from their home institutions and to search 
for opportunities that the home institutional system does not provide. SAP, in 
order to support its international expansion, looked for alternatives of funding 
in international markets rather than local ones. 
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By contrast, the financial internationalisation of Preussag has been limited; 
however, the firm is becoming more profit-oriented and initiated an 
implementation of tighter financial controls in the Venezuelan subsidiary. As 
Vitols (2003) has stated, there is a liberalisation of the financial regime in 
Germany, led by the country's banks. A sector of the financial industry looks to 
serve the needs of large corporations such as Preussag, adopting a more US- 
style of investment banking which is more concerned with returns in the short- 
term. The case of Preussag supports the proposition that there is the possibility 
of change in institutions, and raises the question of how this change permeates 
organisations and affects their practices. The research has analysed, on one 
hand, how the process of change in institutions has affected the implementation 
of financial devices in Preussag. And on the other, it has shown how firms are 
not locked into a particular system and have possibilities to take actions that 
may not be supported by the institutions of the country of origin. 
The cases of the British MNC subsidiaries also show traces of the effect of 
home-country institutions, too. The evolution of the MNCs and the strategic 
decisions that they have taken in order to grow are explained by factors related 
to the local context. For instance, there is the case of Lasmo a firm that initiated 
operations as a venture capital company and took radical steps to become a 
MNC. The investment decisions of the MNC were facilitated by the less 
regulated British environment, compared to the German one, that has fewer 
restrictions for British firms to move capital and resources abroad. The British 
ownership of firms, which looks for profits in the short-term, also explains the 
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risky investment that Lasmo made in Venezuela, offering the largest bid among 
the investors. This may also explain the Invensys acquisition of Baan, which 
was a firm with financial problems at the time of its acquisition. The decisions 
taken by the British, Lasmo and Invensys, firms with a grater risk-taking 
mentality, in which the generation of profits in the short-term represents an 
important aim, explain their decisions over investments in Venezuela. 
The research findings support the claims concerning the effect of home-country 
institutions on the operations of MNCs, and the country of operations 
institutions in the case of the subsidiary. However, it has also been found that 
institutions have to be seen from a more dynamic perspective. In both home and 
host country, the respective institutions are exposed to change and realignment; 
this process influences firms within the system and drives them to take 
decisions to adjust to changes in institutions. This adjustment may have two 
levels: when it occurs in the parent country, the adjustment may affect the 
whole operations of the MNC; and when it occurs in the institutions of the 
country of operations, it affects only the operations of the subsidiary. 
Another important effect of the country of origin is reflected in the selection of 
organisational practices when the MNC subsidiaries are set up in a new 
country. The MNCs come to the country with a plan of how to control their 
operations; however, the interaction with the local context determines which of 
these forms of control are more effective. As the cases of this research have 
shown, the subsidiaries have to adapt to local pressures, and the country of 
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origin of the MNC shapes the selection of the options to cope with the local 
environment. For instance, the differences found in managing the relationship 
with PDVSA in the case of the German and the British oil subsidiaries, clearly 
highlights this point. The different roots of the two MNCs explain the different 
approaches of the two oil subsidiaries. In the case of the German oil MNC, the 
strong use of personal networks to monitor operations in Germany facilitates 
the adoption of similar mechanism to relate to PDVSA. By contrast, British 
firms rely more on impersonal mechanisms to control their operations, which 
make it more difficult for the British subsidiary to find alternative devices to 
manage this relationship. Firms that belong to different contexts and face the 
same circumstances might react in a different way: their response is shaped by 
their origins and by the capabilities that they have developed over time. 
Institutions from both the country of origin and country of operations are 
important forces, which shape the presence of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries. Their effect permeates to the levels of the local units in MNCs, as 
this research has shown. Nevertheless, it is important to look at them from a 
more dynamic approach. This approach has the underlying assumption that they 
can change over time, and in that process they will affect the organisational 
practices adopted by firms, as was the case of the MNC subsidiaries in this 
research. 
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8.4 The Presence of Control Mechanisms in the MNC Subsidiaries 
The research has shown the complexity associated with the study of control 
mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries. This complexity is due to two major reasons. 
First, the explanation of their presence does not correspond to a single factor: 
there is a combination of them as the explanatory reasons for the presence of 
these devices. Second, the nature of these factors is dynamic and their 
characteristics may change over time: as was explained above in the case of 
institutions, there are possibilities of modification of the nature of the control 
mechanisms. Any change in the forces that intervene in their implementation 
might change the characteristics of the mechanism, altering the nature of these 
devices in the MNC subsidiary and their combination. 
For instance, the pressures to substitute expatriate managers by local personnel 
in the oil subsidiaries may continue; therefore, the MNCs have to fmd other 
mechanisms to manage their operations in Venezuela, and possibly the 
combination of these devices in the subsidiary will change. The study of control 
mechanisms requires a framework built on multiple level of analysis in order to 
explain the presence of these mechanisms. As the subsidiaries operate in 
multiple spaces that are interrelated, i. e., the local context, the industry that the 
MNC belongs to, and the background of the firm, they all exert some kind of 
influence on the operation of the local unit. Therefore, the study of these 
organisations in general and the control mechanisms in particular should 
include multiple factors; otherwise the analysis will be incomplete and present 
partial explanations of the reality that MNC subsidiaries cope with. 
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8.5 Limitations of the Research and Suggestions for Further Research 
The control mechanisms may change over time, as the research has 
demonstrated. An area that requires further study in the implementation of 
control mechanisms in MNC subsidiaries is the micro-political process within 
the organisation that can influence the implementation of these devices. 
Subsidiaries are entities struggling to develop their own identity: in this process 
the local managers may take advantage of their local resources, such as their 
knowledge of the local context, and may reject mandates from corporate offices 
on activities and controls which can affect their level of autonomy or their own 
interests (Ferner, 2000). 
The increasing pressures to substitute expatriate managers with local personnel 
in the oil subsidiaries are an example of this micro-political process. In the 
event that the expatriate managers in the subsidiary perceive a threat to their 
own interests in this activity, they may oppose their substitution by local 
people. Something of a power struggle between locals and expatriates may 
occur at the subsidiary level, as expatriates seek to preserve their positions even 
as locals attempts to take over expatriate position. These strains, in turn, 
influence the implementation of practices and control mechanisms in the 
subsidiary. 
In addition, there are groups at corporate level who are struggling for power and 
try to impose their own preferences. In this process, the control mechanisms 
deployed at subsidiary level may partially reflect the inclinations of a coalition. 
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For example, between expatriates at the subsidiary and their allies at 
headquarters. A deeper analysis in further studies of the influence of micro- 
politics in the implementation of control devices will shed more light on the 
importance of this effect as a mediator of the effects of the country of origin, 
country of operations and industry. Micro-politics may be more important in 
longitudinal studies of the implementation of control mechanisms. As we have 
stated above, the control mechanisms can change overtime, in this process of 
change aspects such as micro-politics can play an important role in the 
substitution of one mechanism by another. Coalitions and groups of interest 
may exert their power to support or reject the implementation of a new 
mechanism as this research has shown in the case of the expatriate managers. 
This research has highlighted the value of case studies in carrying out 
comparative research. The cases as an empirical investigation, as presented in 
Chapter 2, are a useful method when there is no a clear separation between the 
phenomenon and the context, as was the case with this research. In addition, the 
value of a qualitative methodology in comparative research has been confirmed. 
The use of this methodology has facilitated the identification of the causal 
mechanisms that underline the implementation of control mechanisms in MNC 
subsidiaries. It has also allowed understanding of why and how these causal 
relationships affect the implementation of these devices. 
Ideally, the case study method also offers the possibility to design a case sample 
that matches the research question and increases the external validity of the 
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research. However, in practice there is a limitation to this method because of the 
real possibilities to find cases that satisfy all the conditions of the sample 
design. This is more obvious when the research is carried out in countries with 
limited foreign investment, and there are a number of conditions that have to be 
fulfilled in order to carry out the comparison, as was the case of this research. 
Another aspect to consider in the use of the case study as a research tool in the 
study of MNCs is the increasing difficulty of finding "pure cases". This point is 
also relevant in the study of industry of operations. Moreover, mergers and 
acquisitions across borders are increasingly common in international business. 
Therefore, it is difficult to establish the identity of the firm and the influence of 
the parent country. When a research project is carried out over a period of a 
couple of years, organisational changes may occur during the period of the 
research. There are some methodological implications of this feature. On the 
one hand, the researcher should be aware that the selection of cases may include 
cases which are not pure and this should be justified methodologically. On the 
other hand, the research design of a project, which has a multilevel analysis 
should consider the possibility of change. Among those changes are those 
pertaining to ownership of the firm (at national level), entry in new markets 
following the development of new products (industry level) and changes in the 
evolutionary process of the firm or the subsidiary (intra-organisational level). 
Doctoral researchers who are working on the study of MNCs should consider 
this variable into the research framework when they carry out research of this 
kind. 
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This final chapter has summarised the main conclusions of the thesis. It has 
highlighted the main contributions of the research which are concentrated on 
the effect of the country of origin and the influence of the country of operations 
on the implementation of control devices in MNC subsidiaries. Finally, the 
chapter has discussed the main limitations of the research project and has made 
suggestions for further research in the area. 
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